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Our efforts to "lift the standard of household industry" ignore the laws
of industry. We seek by talking and writing, by poetising and sermonising, and playing on every tender sentiment and devout aspiration, to
convince the housewife that there is something particularly exalted and
beautiful, as well as useful, in her occupation. This shows our deeprooted error of sex-distinction in industry. We consider the work of the
woman in the house as essentially feminine, and fail to see that, as work,
it is exactly like any other kind of human activity, having the same limitations and the same possibilities.'
Charlotte Perkins Gilman, 1903
Whether or not the modern marriage has become like a business, and
regardless of whatever else it may have become, it continues to be defined by statute as a personal relationship of mutual support. Thus, even
if few things are left that cannot command a price, marital support re2
mains one of them.
- California Court of Appeal, 1993
I.

INTRODUCTION

Women's unpaid domestic labor produces tremendous economic
value. In the United States, women spend more of their productive
work hours in unpaid labor than in paid labor, and the credible estimates of the economic value of unpaid labor range from the
equivalent of 24% to 60% of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product
("GDP"). 3 Given its economic value and its significant role in the
I CHA.OTrE

P. GxiMAN,THE HoM: ITs WORK AND INFLUENCE 97, 98 (U. of Ill. Press

1972) (1903).
2 Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
3 See infra subpart II.B. The United States is not unique in this respect. The United Nations concludes that women's unpaid work worldwide produces the equivalent of $11 trillion,
almost half the value of the $23 trillion world economy. Unpaid work, combining men's and
women's work, produces an equivalent of $16 trillion annually. U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 97 (1995) [hereinafter U.N. Development Pro-

gramme]. The U.N. report advocates a worldwide project of remedying the undervaluation of
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working lives of women, it is surprising that the topic of home labor
has received no systematic examination by legal scholars. This Article
undertakes such an examination. It concludes that a wide range of
legal doctrines treat women's home work as if it were not value-producing labor. Instead, the U.S. legal system conceptualizes housework
as solely an expression of affection, the currency of familial emotions.
Consider the following case.
Suzanne Margie Bachmann, who was sentenced to 90 days jail
time in 1994, asked that she be allowed to leave jail on weekdays to
perform housework and care for her four children. Because she had
negotiated an hourly wage to be paid by her husband for her work,
Bachmann argued that she satisfied the conditions of a Minnesota
statute authorizing work-release to employed individuals who receive
a fair and reasonable wage for their work. A trial court nonetheless
denied work release on the ground that homemaking is not "employmeaning of the statute. The Minnesota Court of Apment" within the
4
peals affirmed.
The Bachmann Court did not justify its statutory interpretation of
"employment" by reference to the purposes of the work-release program. Instead, the court supported its interpretation by sampling
other areas of the law in which housework is not considered work and
concluded that "homemaking is generally not considered employment."'5 The court cited a case that held that homemakers are not
covered under workers' compensation because "[p]ersons engage in a
trade, business, profession or occupation for profit, or as a means to'6
gain a livelihood, but not so in establishing and maintaining a home."
The court also relied on a decision denying a paid domestic worker
the right to picket his worksite as guaranteed by a state labor statute
because "the home is a sacred place for people to go and be quiet and
at rest and not be bothered with the turmoil of industry... [it] is...
the abiding place of the affections."'7 Finally, the court decided that
Bachmann's contract with her husband to receive a wage lacked consideration because she had a prior legal obligation to her family to
perform the work: "The Bachmanns have not shown that their proposed wage agreement results in either gain or loss to either person;
unlike the typical employment relationship, the economic exchange
between the Bachmanns would be purely illusory." 8 The court
women's unpaid labor, in particular, by improving the legal status of that labor. The report recommends that nations attempt to evaluate the output from unpaid labor and add it to their
Gross Domestic Product calculations. Id.
4 State v. Bachmann, 521 N.W.2d 886, 886 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
5 id.at 887.
6 Id. at 888 (citing Eichholz v. Shaft, 208 N.W. 18, 19-20 (Minn. 1926)).
7 Id. (citing State v. Cooper, 285 N.W. 903, 904-05 (Minn. 1939)).
8 Id.

91:1 (1996)

Legal Response to Home Labor

showed that its conception of housework in the parole context is consistent with the legal conception of housework in other areas of law;
that alone was sufficient rationale for deciding that housework was
not "employment" under the work-release statute. 9
The Bachmann case illustrates three arguments that this Article
makes. The first is that courts and other legal actors repeatedly decline opportunities to treat housework as work because of the affectionate familial context in which the work is performed. Economists
and sociologists argue that housework-unpaid household labor for
consumption by a family-may have as much in common with paid
work as it does with leisure, consumption, or emotional exchange. Yet
housework's integral connection to family life exempts it from the
benefits and protections that other value-producing labor receives
across a surprising range of legal doctrines.' 0
The second argument that Bachmann illustrates is that denying
housework its status as work is costly to those who perform it. While
some legal doctrines that deny the value-producing aspects of housework may, when viewed in isolation, appear to provide benefits to
houseworkers, many others are harmful.1 ' A more balanced conception of housework would take account of its potential to express affection without denying its similarities to wage labor. A consistent
account within the law of housework's economic value would benefit
those who perform the work-predominantly women.
To date, most legal analyses of issues surrounding women's unpaid labor have focused on the effects of women's housework responsibilities on women's wage labor opportunities or performance. These
treatments implicitly assume that wage labor market participation

9 Id. It may be that there are policy reasons associated with the work-release program that
make housework inappropriate for coverage under the statute. For example, if supervision is
critical to the program's success, one might be concerned about whether a given housework
contract would include adequate supervision. However, the Bachmann opinion did not address
the purposes of the work-release statute. The court instead decided the case by addressing a
question that precluded the need for a discretionary judgment as to the suitability of a given
supervisor to work-release goals. It decided whether the housework contract could fall within
the statute at all, so that a work-release program administrator could consider the employment
agreement on the facts of the case. If it makes policy sense to exclude all houseworkers from the
statute based on the goals of the work-release program, the court should have made that argument directly.
10 Few would argue that a wage-earner's work is not integral to family well-being, but its
status as work is not thought to be damaging to family life. By contrast, I will argue throughout
this Article that the legal system routinely invokes threats to family privacy and tranquility as a
justification for separating housework from the rest of human industry.
11 In the Bachmann case, failure to recognize housework as work was detrimental to Suzanne Margie Bachmann, to her children, and to her husband, all of whom lost the benefit of her
labor for the time she was in jail.
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ought to be the goal for feminist legal reform. 12 This Article does not
assume that either wage labor or housework is preferable for women.
Instead, it takes women's labor as it now exists, divided between paid
and unpaid labor and considers how the legal treatment of women's
unpaid labor disadvantages women. My approach reflects the view
that the gender gap in wealth cannot be remedied through a focus on
paid labor market policies alone. Even when reform efforts aim to
reduce the effects of home responsibilities on labor market prospects,
they posit the paid labor market as the primary means of achieving
gender equity. This orientation undervalues home labor.
The final argument illustrated by the Bachmann case is that the
legal treatment of housework in one context can set norms that cut

across a number of legal disciplines. Judges, scholars, and legislators
routinely address one legal issue implicating housework in isolation
from other legal issues implicating housework. A number of scholars
in recent years have examined the treatment of housework under discrete legal doctrines, bringing to the forefront some parts of the picture explored in this Article. 13 This Article argues that policymakers
12 Obviously, there are exceptions. See, e.g., MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED
MOTHER: THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TwENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES passim (1995)

[hereinafter FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER] (arguing for increased attention to supporting
the necessary role of giving care to dependents).
13 Consider, as examples of episodic coverage, MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF
EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991) [hereinafter FINEMAN,
THE ILLUSION OF EOUALIrY]; FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 12; Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy, Feminism, and the Limits of the Law (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author); Mary E. Becker, Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination,Social Security, and
Stone, Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet's ConstitutionalLaw, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 264 (1989) [hereinafter Becker, Obscuring the Struggle]; Martha A. Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE L.J. 274; Sylvia Law, Women, Work, Welfare, and the Preservation of
Patriarchy,131 U. PA. L. REv. 1249 (1983); Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A
FreshLook at BehavioralGender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983 (1993) [hereinafter
McCaffery, Taxation and the Family];Edward J. McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality: Gender
Discrimination, Market Efficiency, and Social Change, 103 YALE L.J. 595 (1993) [hereinafter
McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality]; Richard A. Posner, Conservative Feminism, 1989 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 191; Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on
Playingwith Dolls, PartnershipBuyouts and DissociationUnder No-Fault,60 U. CH. L. REV. 67
(1993); Nancy Staudt, Taxing Housework 84 GEO. LJ. 1571 (1996).
Gillian K. Hadfield, an economist and lawyer, argues that economists and legal scholars
should consider legal intervention into the household division of labor, not just the employment
setting, to remedy the gender gap in compensation. Hadfield examines past reform efforts to
remedy the wage gap and argues that a particular understanding of household labor underlies
them. Gillian K. Hadfield, Households at Work: Beyond Labor Market Policies to Remedy the
Gender Gap, 82 GEO. L.J. 89, 98-106 (1993). Hadfield argues in effect for the kind of examination of the legal treatment of housework found in this Article, without herself undertaking such
an examination.
Women of color have criticized white feminist scholarship for excessive emphasis on the
domestic role. See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizingthe Intersection of Race and Sex:
A Black FeministCritique of AntidiscriminationDoctrine,Feminist Theory and AntiracistPolitics,
1989 U. CH. LEGAL F. 139. Women of color and poor women have never viewed wage labor as
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in diverse fields ranging from tax to divorce to labor law should understand the potential impact of their conceptions of housework beyond their discrete disciplines. When housework is denied the status
of work in one context, denial in other contexts is reinforced.
Part II of this Article sets the stage for a discussion of housework
by providing data from the economic and sociological literature on
housework. It offers time use studies that show that women perform
substantially more housework than men do, regardless of their respective wage employment status, and it reports the available estimates of
the economic value of housework. Part II also discusses recent
changes in both the sociological and economic conceptions of housework. It traces the transition in those fields over the past thirty years
from a conception of the home as a site of consumption and leisure to
a conception of the home as the site of production. Changes in sociological and economic conceptions of housework have allowed those
disciplines to identify new research questions, and I argue that law
would benefit from a similar shift in its mode of analyzing unpaid
labor.
Part III examines the development of our understanding of unpaid home labor by reviewing recent historical literature on housework. This section puts the existence of a separate sphere of
housework and its legal treatment into its historical context.
After the first three Parts provide the expanded understanding of
the economic and social nature of home labor necessary to a consideration of its legal status, Part IV undertakes the main task of this Article: an examination of the legal response to home labor. The Article
analyzes the current legal treatment of housework by contract, social
security, tort, tax, divorce, welfare, and labor law. This systematic examination of the legal response to home labor permits us to see patterns in the legal status of the work that the examination of any single
legal discipline would miss.
Finally, Part V considers the lessons of this survey. I argue that
across a variety of fields, legal actors tie housework to the affections
that characterize the home and not to the wage labor that brings material well-being to a family. I argue that on balance, denying the productive nature of housework harms those who do the work. I also
argue that legal actors should understand that this conception of
novel but as necessary. Since unpaid labor in the home is performed by women whether they
are in the wage-labor market or not, the critique in this Article has some salience for most
people who perform unwaged labor. Nonetheless, in some places the analysis tends to be more
applicable to married women than to single women, as with discussions of divorce and marital
contracting. Some topics have more relevance to those with property, such as divorce. Some are
relevant to everyone, such as tax and social security. And, some are particularly relevant to poor
women and women of color, such as welfare reform and the treatment of domestic workers
under labor laws.
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housework is not episodic, but rather pervades the legal system. My
goal is to identify and describe a pervasive mode of analysis within the
14
law, which should aid in the development of programmatic reform.
Ii.

HOUSEWORK IN SOCIOLOGY AND ECONOMICS

Sociologists and economists have studied housework extensively
over the past thirty years. Each field has produced findings that shed
light on the importance of home labor. These research results highlight the need to examine the legal treatment of housework.
A.

Housework in Sociology

Sociological research shows that housework is a significant aspect
of women's lives. Women do much more unpaid work than men, even
in two-wage families, and unpaid housework accounts for a large portion of women's overall working hours. After summarizing the available time use data, this subpart contrasts the decision by sociologists
to give attention to home labor with the legal profession's neglect of
housework as a serious topic for study.
1. Time Use Studies: Housework Is Still Women's Work.-Women spend significantly more time on housework than do men, and
the sex role changes in modern marriages have led women to take on
men's roles more than they have led men to take on women's. The
time women spend on household labor does not appear to vary significantly with class, race, or ethnicity. 15 A representative modern account is as follows: in 1975, men spent 46% as much time on
household labor as women, in 1981, 54%, and by 1987, 57%.16 In
homes where both men and women work more than thirty hours per
week for pay, men's share of the housework rises to 60% of the women's in 1987,17 compared to 53.1% in 1975.18 This modest increase
14 Though programmatic reform is periodically addressed throughout this Article, it is not
the primary focus of the project.

15 Heidi I. Hartmann, The Family as the Locus of Gender, Class and Political Struggle: The
Example of Housework, 6 SIGNs 366, 385 (1981).
16 BETH A. SHELTON, WOMEN, MEN AND TIME: GENDER DIFFERENCES IN PAID WORK,
HOUSEWORK AND LEISURE 65-66 (1992).
17 Id. at 73.
18 Id. at 79; see also VICTOR R. Fucs, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EoUALITY 77-78

(1988). I call these figures representative because both Shelton and Fuchs have combined a
number of different data sets to reach their conclusions, and because a look at a sample of time

use studies confirms that these are typical results. This kind of data is difficult to collect and
people who gather it across a number of studies, as do Shelton and Fuchs, are left trying to

compare data sets that do not use the same methodology. Most people agree that time use
diaries are more reliable than personal reconstructions of time use, which are in turn more reliable than personal estimates at time use. Shelton discusses methodological problems at some
length. See SmLTON, supra note 16, at 21-31; see also Margaret M. Marini & Beth A. Shelton,
Measuring Household Work- Recent Experience in the United States, 22 Soc. ScI. RES. 361-82
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in the proportion of housework being performed by men is misleading
because it overstates the changes in men's conduct. These data
changes occur without men devoting any more time to housework,
because as women devote less time to housework, men's housework
becomes a greater portion of the total amount of housework done.
Between 1960 and 1986, housework hours have fallen for women and
remained virtually constant for men. 19 The difference is accounted for
in a lower standard of household care and in an increase in the
purchases of housework replacement
services or goods, such as carry20
out food and laundry services.
Meanwhile, in the paid labor force, women spent 80.9% as much
time as men in 1987,21 compared to 71.3% in 1975 and 70.5% in
1981.22 Married women spent 77.4% of the number of hours that men
spent in the paid labor force in 1987, compared to 65.9% in 1975.23
These changes result from both an increase in the number of hours
women spend in the paid labor force and a concurrent24 decrease in the
number of hours men spend in the paid labor force.
Women are now working more hours than men, when paid and
unpaid work hours are combined. 25 This is a shift from 1960, when
men worked more hours than women, averaging paid and unpaid
work.26
In absolute terms, mothers who are employed over 30 hours per
week in the paid labor market spend between 32 and 37 hours per
week on housework, depending on marital status and family structure.
Mothers who are not in the paid labor force spend between 45 and 52
(1993). Those problems include both how to trust time use measures and how to decide what to
measure as leisure and what to measure as labor. See generally RIcARD A. BERK & SARAH
FENSTERMAKER BERK, LABOR AND LEISURE AT HOME: CONTENT AND ORGANIZATION OF THE

HOUSEHOLrD DAY 9-51 (1979) [hereinafter BERK & BERK, LABOR AND LEISURE AT HOME] (dis-

cussing conceptual and methodological problems in measuring household time use and discussing what should count in the measure); Ann Chadeau, What is Households' Non-Market
Production Worth?, 18 OECD ECON. STUD. 85 (1992) (defining productive activities, as opposed
to leisure, as those that produce goods that could have been produced by a third party).
19 FucHs, supra note 18, at 78.
20 Contrary to what we might expect, technological improvements have not reduced time
spent on housework. See EUSTON QUAH, ECONOMICS AND HOME PRODUCTION: THEORY AND
MEASUREmENT 107 (1993); John P. Robinson, Housework Technology and Household Work, in
WOMEN AND HOUSEHOLD LABOR 53, 54 (Sarah Fenstermaker Berk ed., 1980); see also JuLIET
B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN: THE UNExPECIED DECLINE OF LEIsuRE 84, 86-94

(1991); Susan M. Strasser, An EnlargedHuman Existence? Technology and Household Work in
Nineteenth-Century America, in WOMEN AND HOUSEHOLD LABOR 29, 30 (Sarah Fenstermaker

Berk ed., 1980).
21 SHELTON, supra note 16, at 39.
22 Id. at 46.
23 Id.

24 Fucss, supra note 18, at 77.
25 Id. at 78.
26 1d
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hours per week on housework. 27 For all fathers, the range is from 10
to 15 hours per week.28 These figures do not include time spent on
29
childcare.
Another measure of the meaningful difference between men's
and women's quality of life is the amount of leisure each enjoys. A
comparison of leisure time shows the costs of the Second Shift-the
housework that follows a day of wage work 30 -for women in the wage
labor market. Of those people working between 31-40 hours per
week in the wage labor market, women spent 1554.8 hours annually
(29.9 per week) in 1981 on leisure activities, while men spent 2298.4
annually (44.2 per week). 31 Of those people who spent 41-55 hours
per week in the wage labor market, women enjoyed 1773.2 hours of
leisure annually (34.1 per week) while men enjoyed 1934.4 (37.2 per
week). 32
Since substantially more than half of women's working hours are
spent on housework, while less than a quarter of men's are spent on
housework, the heightened significance of the legal treatment of
housework to women is apparent. Legal rules surrounding housework
are disproportionately the legal rules that apply to women's work, and
as such, they are an important part of the legal treatment of women.
Moreover, the foregoing discussion shows that the legal treatment of
housework is very relevant to women who participate in the wage labor market, who still spend a substantial amount of time on unpaid
labor, as well as to those women who do not work in the paid labor
force.
2. Measurement Criteria and Their Meaning for Women. -Significant difficulties arise in structuring and reporting sociological time
use studies. Those difficulties probably have the effect of underestimating the severity of the gender gap in household labor. Housework
is usually thought of as work that meets the material needs of the
family-for example by turning market goods into consumable prod27 David H. Demo & Alan C. Acock, Family Diversity and the Division of Domestic Labor
How Much Have Things Really Changed?, 42 FAM. REL 323-31 (1993).
28 Id.; SARAH FENSTERMAKER BERK, THE GENDER FACToRY: THE APPORTIONMENT OF
WORK IN AMERICAN HOUSEHOLDS 8 (1985) [hereinafter BERK, TiH

GENDER FACTORY].

29 This is a different data set than the one used to calculate men's unpaid labor time as a
percentage of women's, discussed above, hence the slight discrepancy in the figures. These
figures cover the following tasks: preparing meals, washing dishes, cleaning house, outdoor work,
shopping, laundry, paying bills, car maintenance, and driving. These researchers used a 1987
data set deliberately including a diverse group of individuals by race, family structure, and marital status. Again, these figures can vary depending on the study's methodology, but these results
are representative of available data.
30 Arlie Hochschild popularized this term for the second job to which women return at the
end of their paid work day. See ARLE HocHscmLD, THE SECOND SHIFr (1989).
31 SHELTON, supra note 16, at 139.
32 Id.
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ucts-rather than as leisure. The "third-party" criterion is a functional method of distinguishing work from leisure: if the goods or
services could be provided by another economic unit, the activity producing those goods and services is work.3 3 An activity is leisure rather
than work if a person must do it herself to enjoy its benefits. For
example, a person can eat a meal and enjoy its benefits whether she
cooks it or whether someone else cooks it for her. A person cannot
enjoy the benefits of reading a book unless she reads it herself. Thus
cooking is work, and reading is leisure.3 Most studies measuring
housework time include the following tasks: preparing meals, washing
dishes, house cleaning, outdoor tasks, shopping, washing and ironing,
paying bills, auto maintenance, driving, and childcare.3 5 Some studies
are far more detailed, including a much larger number of tasks as
"housework": for example, making coffee, feeding the baby, emptying garbage, answering the telephone, planning family activities, making beds, caring for pets, weeding, sweeping floors, or putting clothes
away. 36 Most studies include childcare in the definition of housework,
but some do not. However, the effects of removing childcare hours
37
from the calculation are not as dramatic as one might expect.
A number of studies indicate that the picture is slightly worse for
women than time use alone suggests. This is the result of two factors
that are missed by measuring only time spent on the labor in question.
First, the kind of housework that men and women each do varies in a
33 Chadeau, supra note 18, at 89; Reuben Gronau, Leisure, Home Production, and Work:
The Theory of the Allocation of Time Revisited, 85 J. PoLt ECON. 1099-1123 (1977); see also
GARY S. BacKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 89, 99-101 (1976) [hereinafter, BECKER, ECONOMIC APPROACH] (discussing the difficulty of distinguishing labor from

leisure).
34 Economists and sociologists recognize that there are significant weaknesses to this approach: most work involves some leisure component, and most leisure involves some work component. However, this definition has been functional for both sociologists and economists. See
the discussion of this problem, infra note 41 and accompanying text.
35 SHELTON, supranote 16, at 161-62. Childcare presents special issues, because some people
experience it as pure leisure while others do not. Even though childcare by a family member has
some distinctively nonmarket qualities, it still has significant economic value as well. Problems
with childcare are discussed infra note 42 and accompanying text.
36 BERK & BERK, LABOR AND LEIsuRE AT HOME, supra note 18, passim; Sarah Fenstermaker Berk & Anthony Shih, Contributionsto Household Labor: Comparing Wives' and Husbands' Reports, in WOMEN AND HOusEHOLD LABOR 191,201-03 (Sarah Fenstermaker Berk ed.,
1980). There are of course differences between studies that ask participants to reconstruct the
number of hours they spend on these tasks and those that require participants to keep daily logbooks of their time use. Nonetheless, a few scholars have done survey studies from the literature
that exists to date and attempted to control for these differences as much as possible.
37 For a sample of the effect of removing childcare hours from the equation, consider the
following data: in 1986, women worked a total of 2416 hours annually, including childcare, and
men worked an average of 2328. FUCHS, supranote 18, at 78. When you remove childcare from
the picture, women worked an average of 2219 hours per year, while men worked an average of
2270. Id.
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way that makes women's tasks more demanding. 38 There is still significant sex segregation by task in housework. Women do more food
preparation, child care, shopping, and laundry-tasks that must be
done on a daily basis. Men do more yard work and house and car
maintenance. Men's tasks tend not to be time-essential and are much
more easily postponed in a scheduling crunch than women's. This
makes the intersection of paid work and housework more difficult for
women than for men based on tasks alone, even before we consider
in the amount of time men and women spend on
the difference
39
housework.
Time use studies can also underestimate the severity of the gender gap in terms of the quality of work because women tend to perform a greater number of housework tasks simultaneously than men
do. The qualitative difference becomes especially clear when one
looks at the difference in the way men and women supervise children:
women tend to overlap the time during which they supervise children
with shopping, laundry, or food preparation, while men tend to supervise children as their sole use of time.40 One of the difficulties that
sociologists and economists have had in calculating childcare time as
household labor is that under an economic view, it is not easy to understand whether childcare is work or instead consumption or leisure. 41 An answer to this difficult question might be that childcare as
a solo activity-a visit to the park or reading to a child-is more like
leisure or consumption than is childcare performed in combination
with food preparation or shopping. 42
In short, women perform more hours of work than men when
paid and unpaid work is combined. Women perform substantially
more hours of unpaid housework, and unpaid housework accounts for
a substantial percentage of women's overall work hours. In addition,
women perform more time-sensitive housework, and this decreases
their flexibility. Women also perform more housework tasks simulta38 See Marini & Shelton, supra note 18, at 361-82 (critiquing time-use studies in general).
39 BERK, THE GENDER FACTORY, supra note 28, at 9; BERK & BERK, LABOR AND LEISURE
AT HOME, supra note 18; HOCHSCHILD, supra note 30, at 8; SHELTON, supra note 16.
40 U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 3, at 90; BERK, THE GENDER FACTORY,

supra note 28, at 180-84; HOciscHILD, supra note 30, at 8-9.
41 The working definition of leisure provided by economists is whether the activity can be
done through a surrogate. Gronau, supra note 33, at 1100. Laundry can; quality time with a
child cannot. This definition is of course controversial, with some pointing out that perhaps all
activities are part leisure and part production. See BECKER, ECONOMIC APPROACH, supra note

33, at 99-101.
42 The gains from watching a child while shopping, primarily the gains associated with ensuring that the child is supervised for her own safety, can be achieved through a third party more
easily than the gains from taking a child to the park, which more often include parental enjoyment of the child's company. A person who is shopping and watching a child at the same time is
not able to derive as much enjoyment from the task of childcare as one who takes the child to
the park.
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neously than men do, decreasing the amount of personal utility that
women can derive from the work. Again, because the legal treatment
of housework governs a significant aspect of women's lives, it is important to women's overall welfare.
3. Possible Determinants of the Difference in Men's and Women's Household Labor.-Why do women spend more time .on
housework than men? Sociologists and economists have tested a
number of theories that might explain the gender gap in household
labor, some with greater success than others. Even taken together,
these factors fail to account for a large portion of the difference in
men's and women's labor time.43 Though one might expect to find
that more egalitarian sex role attitudes correlate with a more even
division of household labor, studies have not demonstrated a significant correlation between the two.44 One might especially expect time
availability to determine the number of hours people spend on housework, such that paid labor by women, for example, would reallocate
work to men based on women's lesser availability. But studies have
not fully borne out this expectation. 45 Some economists 46 argue that
families decide that the spouse with higher earning potential will do
paid work while the spouse with lower earning potential will do
housework.47 However, there is substantial evidence that household
members disagree about the allocation of work, making the assumption that the distribution is consensually problematic. 4s In addition, it
is not clear that time spent on housework comes out of time spent on
paid labor, thus costing the household cash; it appears that time spent
43

See

BERK,

THE GENDER FACTORY, supranote 28, at 184-211;

SHELTON,

supra note 16, at

33-62.
44 MICHAEL GEERKEN & WALTER R. GovE, AT HOME AND AT WORK: THE FAMILY'S AL-

LOCATION OF LABOR 117 (1983); see also Berk & Shih, supra note 36, at 191; Shelley Coverman,
Explaining Husbands' Participationin Domestic Labor, 26 Soc. Q. 81 (1985).
45 See Catherine E. Ross, The Division of Labor at Home, 65 Soc. FORCES 816, 816 (1987);
Joann Vanek, Tune Spent in Housework, 231 ScL AM. 116 (1974), reprinted in THE ECONOMICS
OF WoMEN AND WORK 82,87 (Alice H. Amsden ed., 1980). But see Coverman, supra note 44, at
81.
46 This idea is common within a school of economic thought called New Home Economics,
pioneered by Gary Becker. See infra section II.B.2.
47 BECKER, ECONOMIC APPROACH, supra note 33, at 108; GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON
THE FAMILY (1981) [hereinafter BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY]. Gillian K. Hadfield, a
lawyer-economist, argues that this explanation is riddled with problems and that economists
have not made any serious effort to come up with alternative explanations for the household
division of labor. The efficient allocation of resources theory blunts any justification for intervention into family arrangements, which in turn blunts the justification for intervention in the
wage labor market in which discrimination against women is understood to be a rational response to women's home labor roles. Hadfield, supra note 13, at 95-98.
48 PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHwARTZ, AMERICAN CouPLEs: MONEY, WORK, SEX 146
(1983); HoCHscHILD, supra note 30; see also Berk & Shih, supra note 36, at 201-07.
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on housework may instead come out of leisure. 49 The earliest explanation for the disparity between the time men and women spend on
household labor was that the person with more power or resourcesmoney, education, social standing-will spend less time on housework
than the person with less power. This theory relies on the assumption
that housework is unpleasant and a person will try to avoid it if possible; the theory weakens if that assumption is relaxed. 50 No single one
of these determinants fully explains the difference between men and
women's housework time, and sociologists continue to debate and
pursue explanations. This pursuit stems from the judgment, held by
most of the theorists, that the distribution of housework is
problematic. 51
4. What Makes the Distributionof Home Labor Problematic?.Feminists generally posit that the distribution of home labor is problematic. It is important to understand what makes it so. It might be
based on a normative theory of equality that is separated from the
material consequences of any given distribution of tasks in society,
such as a view that gender as a category should be eliminated through
the elimination of gender roles. But it might also be problematic because of the consequences that are attached to the gendered distribution of home labor. We have seen the consequences of home
responsibilities on women's prospects for equal participation in the
wage labor market revealed and debated in the employment law context. But interference with equal paid labor force participation is not
the only problem with the gendered distribution of home labor. The
distribution of labor is problematic because the status of home labor
in law is inferior to that of wage labor. As demonstrated in Part IV,
the legal consequences of home labor do not bring the kind of financial rewards, security, and recognition that accompany paid labor.
This Article takes the position that it is as important to focus on improving the consequences that flow from the uneven distribution of
home labor as it is to focus on altering that distribution or accommodating it in the wage labor market. The importance of focusing on the
49 A New Home Economist would probably respond that the trade-off between leisure and
unpaid work is still a matter of opportunity costs. On this view, leisure and not just paid labor
hours have a higher opportunity cost for men because men's time is worth more than women's.
It is less clear that the opportunity cost explains differences for leisure than for paid labor.
50 ROBERT 0. BLOOD, JR. & DONALD M. WOLFE, HUSBANDS & WiVES: THE DYNAMICS OF
MARRIED LIVING 47-74 (1960); Marion T. Coleman, The Division of Household Labor: Suggestions for Future Empirical Considerationand Theoretical Development, in GENDER, FAMILY,
AND ECONOMY: TE TRIPLE OvERLAp 245 (Rae L. Blumberg ed., 1991). Much market work is
also unpleasant, and it will always be an empirical question whether a person prefers the available market work over housework.
51 The New Home Economists are the exception. They do not all assume that the distribution of labor is problematic. See infra section II.B.2.
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status of home labor is supported by the real differences among women and the variation in their preferences.5 2
5. An Intellectual History Within Sociology: Housework Becomes Work in the Work-Leisure Divide.The study of housework as work is a topic entirely missing from
sociology.

-Ann

Oakley, 197453

What prompted sociologists to collect the foregoing data? This
section traces the development within sociology of an interest in home
labor. It is intended to show legal academics the value of focusing
attention on housework. Sociologists have been able to see an entirely new set of research questions by changing their conception of
housework. The foregoing data are just one example of the benefits
derived from sociology's recent focus on home labor. The identification in this Article of a consistent mode of analysis within the law
should prompt us to open a similar window onto new research
questions.
When Ann Oakley published The Sociology of Housework in
1974, she undertook more than the first extensive treatment of housework in sociology. She also self-consciously challenged the categories
of study within sociology that had until then obscured housework as
work. By studying housework as an incident of marriage and family
rather than as a form of work, sociology had defined the nature of
housework as a component of kinship and relationships, not as productive labor that contributes to meeting the material needs of a family. Women's role in the home was understood to be expressive and
nurturing, but not productive. The sociological literature treated family success solely as a function of variables like marital adjusting, tension and crisis management, family planning, and the creation of
stable environments for children.54 Within sociology, subject divisions
included "Industry and Work" as well as "Family and Marriage," and
52 Professor Staudt argues that many African American women, who have traditionally
spent a great number of hours in the wage labor market, value the ability to devote labor to their
own family more highly than many middle class white women, and this further supports the need
to focus on improving the legal status of home labor rather than encouraging greater wage labor
participation. See Staudt, supra note 13, at 1587-88.
53 ANN OAKLEY, Tnn SOCIOLOGY OF HousEwoRK 2 (1974).
54 SHELTON, supra note 16, at 5; Richard A. Berk & Sarah Fenstermaker Berk, Supply-Side
Sociology of the Family: The Challenge of the New Home Economics, 9 ANN. REv. Soc. 375,375
(1983) [hereinafter Berk & Berk, Supply-Side Sociology of the Family];Ann Oakley, Prologue:
Reflections on the Study of Household Labor, in WOMEN AND HOUSEHOLD LABOR 7 (Sarah
Fenstermaker Berk ed., 1980).
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sometimes the effects of each on the other,55 but in no56place was the
site of family life conceived of as a workplace as well.
For Oakley, the categories of sociological study reflected a sexist
tradition in sociology that would fall in the face of the newly revived
feminist movement. Her book both provides a study of houseworkcovering such topics as societal images of housework, work conditions, standards and routines, socialization-and the division of labor
within marriage and provides an explicit critique of the sociological
neglect of housework.
Since Oakley's book was published, a body of sociological study
of housework as work has emerged, as evidenced by the time use
data.5 7 A second generation of scholars has pointed to weaknesses in
the methodologies of the pioneers and fashioned more sophisticated
measurement and study criteria. 58 In recent years, sociologists have
studied such topics as the effects of advances in household technology,59 satisfaction with housework compared to satisfaction with paid
work, role responsibility for housework versus wage work, time spent
on household tasks, and other issues that arise once housework is understood to be work. A new research agenda within sociology became
visible through an expanded conception of housework.
Though at one time sociological literature obscured the productive nature of a household and of the housework that occurs there, for
twenty years sociologists have given serious study to housework and
other unpaid labor as work. Simply identifying the problem-that
housework had been cast exclusively as an expression of family affections instead of as a method of meeting a family's material needs as
well-permitted sociologists to see numerous new questions and is55 Here, some sociologists had treated women's increasing participation in the paid labor
force as the source of some social problems within the family, particularly tensions in marriage
and role confusion. This "social problem" approach treated housework only as a determinant of
the more significant category of familial relations. See SHELTON, supra note 16, at 5; Sarah Fenstermaker Berk, Introduction to WOMEN AND HousEHOLD LABOR 15-27 (Sarah Fenstermaker

Berk ed., 1980).
56 OAKLEY, supra note 53, at 2-5.
57 See infra section II.A.1.
58 E.g., BERK, Tim GENDER FACTORY, supranote 28,passim; GEERKEN & CovE, supranote

44; SHELTON, supra note 16, at 21-31; Berk & Berk, Supply-Side Sociology of the Family, supra
note 54, at 391-93; Vanek, supra note 45, at 82.
59 Contrary to the intuitions of scholars in this field, household technology has not had a
significant effect on the amount of time women spend at household labor, perhaps due to higher
standards in home consumption. See QUAH, supranote 20, at 107; Robinson, supra note 20, at
53; see also SUELLEN Hoy, CHIASING DIRT THE AMERICAN PuRsurr OF CLEANLINEss 163, 169-

70 (1995); SCHOR, supra note 20, at 86-94; Strasser, supra note 20. In very recent years, there
may have been a drop in expectations for home maintenance, which is thought to explain why
women in the wage labor market do fewer hours of housework than women who do exclusively
unpaid labor. SHELTON, supra note 16, at 11-12; Robinson, supra note 20, at 65; Vanek, supra
note 45, at 85 (higher standards of consumption account for the high number of hours women
still spend on housework).
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sues. This insight permitted the discipline to view family roles differently and allowed for clearer sociological conceptions of issues as
varied as family decision making around fertility, changes in family
lifestyle, consumer behavior, investment in human capital, rising rates
of divorce, child abuse, domestic violence, demands for housing and
transportation, and the psychological and social impact of increasing
paid employment for women. 60 Legal scholarship needs exactly this
insight; understanding housework as labor should expand our thinking
about a diverse set61of legal issues from which this conception is virtually absent today.
B. Economics and Housework
Housework produces wealth that is critical to a family's material
well-being. This section reports estimates by economists of the monetary value of unpaid domestic labor. After summarizing the available
economic data, this section reflects on the decision by economists to
give attention to home labor. Economics has seen a transformation in
its understanding of housework similar to that within sociology. I
again contrast that development with the legal profession's neglect of
housework as work as a serious topic for study.
1. The Value of Housework.-Economists' estimates of the
money value of housework in the United
States range from the
62
equivalent of 24% to 60% of the GDP.

While initially surprising, this figure makes sense when one considers that Americans spend 20% more time performing housework
60 E.g., Berk, supranote 55, at 17; Evelyn Lehrer & Marc Nerlove, Women's Life-Cycle Time
Allocation: An Econometric Analysis, in WOMEN AND HOUSEHOLD LABOR 149 (Sarah Fenstermaker Berk ed., 1980).
61 This is not to say that a purely economic conception of housework can replace one that
takes account of personal relationships within a family; rather, work in the family is both productive and a part of those relationships. The same can be said of wage labor, many people love
their jobs or derive some satisfaction from their work relationships. This does not detract from
the productive nature of their work.
62 See Chadeau, supra note 18, at 97 (estimates range from 32% to 60%, depending on
whether a substitution cost or an opportunity cost measure is used); see also QUAH, supra note
20, at 75-112, Table 4.1, 96-101,103 (1993). Quah collects all of the available studies on the value
of household production in the United States. He reports on nine different studies in the United
States that provide 23 possible variations on the value of home production. The final figures
range from 24.1% to 59.5% of the GDP. Two of the estimates come from data that precedes
1930; these are some of the lowest estimates. The estimates are fairly evenly distributed
throughout the 24% to 60% range that I cite here. A United Nations report, prepared for the
China conference on women's rights in September, 1995, criticizes the failure by most industrial
nations to quantify the value of home labor and add it to their GDP calculations. U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 3, at 97. The U.N. report values women's unpaid labor at $11

trillion worldwide, and all unpaid labor at $16 trillion. The U.N. values the entire worldwide
economy at $39 trillion, comprised of the $23 trillion dollar cash economy and the $16 trillion
dollar nonmonetary economy. Id.
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63
than wage labor, when men's and women's time are combined.
Thus, while affections typically do characterize home life, activities
64
within the home are economically valuable as well.

2. An Intellectual History Within Economics: The Home Is Not
Just for Consumption.The integration of production and consumption is at odds with the tendency for economists to separate them sharply, production occurring in
firms and consumption in households.
65
- Gary S. Becker

In the same way sociologists once saw the home as a place solely
for emotional exchange and expression, economists once saw the

home as the site solely of consumption. Neoclassical microeconomic
theory had, until relatively recently, divided "productive" market
workings from "consumption" by a household. The model stipulated
that households use monetary income from the market to purchase
goods from the market that are consumed as is and from which the
household's satisfaction is derived. 66 Like the assumption in sociology
that labor occurred outside the home and emotional relationships
within, the assumption in the old economic model did not include an
account of the home as a site of productive activity.
Over the past thirty years with the rise of the New Home Economics, the old model has been discarded entirely within neoclassical
economics. 67 The New Home Economics replaced the notion of the
household as strictly the site of consumption with the concept of the
63 Chadeau, supra note 18, at 94. If over half of the labor hours in America were producing
less than a quarter of the wealth, an economist would predict that individuals would trade off
their less productive labor hours for more productive ones. Thus the status quo allocation of
labor hours should provide an economist with substantial evidence that unpaid labor is extremely valuable. Home production engages capital as well as labor, ranging from the home
itself to technologies like the washer, dryer, dishwasher, and sewing machine.
64 As an example of a different format for estimating the value of housework, Lawrence
Zelenak adjusts figures calculated in 1976 by Martin Murphy and Janice Peskin to 1992 dollars
and concludes that in 1992, a household in which one spouse performs no paid labor in the
market receives $10,450 more in imputed income from housework than a household in which
both adults work in the paid labor market. See Lawrence Zelenak, Marriageand the Income
Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339, 377 (1994). As discussed above, families in which both adults work
in the wage labor market still receive substantial imputed income from housework, so Zelenak's
figure greatly underestimates the market value of the housework currently performed in U.S.
households.
65 BECKER, ECONOMIC APPROACH, supra note 33, at 92.
66 See BECKER, TREATISE ON THE FAMILY, supra note 47, at 7-9; BERK, THE GENDER FACTORY, supra note 28, at 21.
67 BECKER, ECONOMIC APPROACH, supra note 33, at 89-114 (setting out the idea of the
household production function) is cited as the beginning of the New Home Economics literature.
See, e.g., Robert A. Pollak, A Transaction Cost Approach to Families and Households, 23 J.
ECON. Lrr. 581, 581-608 (1985).

91:1 (1996)

Legal Response to Home Labor

Household Production Function, a name given to the process by
which "[h]ouseholds are assumed to use nonmarket time and market
goods to produce nonmarketable comnodities. '68 In stark contrast to
the image of the household as unproductive in the economic sense,
the Household Production Function depends on the premise that
households are not simply consumers, but producers of commodities
for consumption. According to this account, "goods" are purchased in
the market, but are not of value to members of a household until they
are combined with time in the household to produce "commodities"
for consumption. 69 Households are seen as mini-firms,70 making decisions aimed at maximizing utility just as a firm would.
This simple insight has generated scholarship on a range of issues.
Through the lens of the Household Production Function, New Home
Economists have evaluated investment decisions in human capital, decisions as to bearing and rearing children, and time allocation decisions between work in the home and work in the market. The "makeor-buy" decision or the decision of the secondary earner 7 ' to enter the
wage labor market has been analyzed in light of an assortment of variables ranging from human capital investment to availability of substitute goods or services in the market. 72
68 Gary S. Becker et al., An EconomicAnalysis of MaritalInstability, 85 J. PoL ECON. 1141,
1143 (1977). Of course, many of the goods produced in a home are in fact marketable as well.
In addition, one increasingly sees reported a phenomenon of bringing market businesses back
into the home as a physical site. It is plausible to speculate that this phenomenon is related to
the demands of domestic labor, particularly childcare, in that it permits better integration of paid
and unpaid labor.
Marxist economics went through an analogous debate in the 1970s, with extensive discussion of the need for a new account of unpaid labor. Jane L. Collins, Unwaged Labor in Comparative Perspective: Recent Theories and Unanswered Questions, in WORK WrrroTr WAGEs:
DOMESc LABOR AND SELF-EMPLOYMENT wrrmN CAPrrAtiSM 3,10-12, 18-24 (Jane L. Collins
& Martha Gimenez eds., 1990).
69 Robert A. Pollak & Michael L. Wachter, The Relevance of the Household Production
Function and Its Implications for the Allocation of 7ine, 83 J. POL ECON. 255, 255-77 (1975).
70 Much criticism has also been generated by this comparison, both from within economics
and from without. Many of the premises of the New Home Economics have been taken up as
descriptively problematic. Much of the criticism is better viewed as improving upon the idea of a
household production function from its earliest articulations than rejecting the idea altogether.
See, e.g., MARTIn HoLwis & EDWARD J. NELL, RATIONAL ECONOMIC MAN: A PHILOSOPHICAL
CRMQUE OF No-CLASSICAL ECONOMICS 14-20 (1975) (questioning behavioral assumptions
that lie beneath this kind of neoclassical microeconomics); Berk & Berk, Supply-Side Sociology
of the Family, supra note 54, at 375-95; Theodore W. Schultz, Fertility and Economic Values, in
ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY: MARRIAGE, C-nDREN AND HUMAN CAPITAL 3 (Theodore W.
Schultz ed., 1974) (households cannot maximize utility because as institutions they cannot adjust
quickly to changing circumstances); Pollak & Wachter, supra note 69, at 255-77.
71 The idea of a "secondary earner" applies to middle class families in which wage labor
force participation for women is not an absolute financial necessity. In low-income marriages,
there is nothing "secondary" about the wages of either spouse.
72 New Home Economics has also had an influence in legal academic debates among lawyereconomists. E.g., Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi-Rents;or "I Gave Him the Best
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That these have been useful questions for economists to explore
does not mean that the assumptions underlying the New Home Economics are immune from criticism. Much scholarship has questioned
some of the key assumptions in the theory of a Household Production
Function-for example, the assumption that the household has a single utility function that the household and not the individuals within it
maximize, 73 or the assumption that preferences are relatively stable.

Similar questions have been raised as to the ability to apply Becker's
Model given problems, such as estimating "shadow" prices for family
members' time 74 and accounting for institutional constraints on
choice, including tradition.75 Nonetheless, the New Home Economics
has allowed for an interpretation of household activities that both focuses on the productive nature of housework and institutionalizes the
idea that housework must be analyzed if the market economy outside
the house is to be understood. Even if New Home Economists overestimate the capacity of their models to explain all familial behavior
without resort to the language and framework of affections, their conception of housework
advances our understanding of the productive
76
nature of that work.
The insights of the New Home Economics literature belie the notion that the family sphere and the market sphere are separate, autonomous areas. Earlier economic literature obscured the productive
nature of housework by considering the home to be the site only of
Years of My Life," 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267 (1987); Richard A. Posner, Conservative Feminism,
1989 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 191.
73

Critics include:

PAULA ENGLAND & GEORGE FARKAS, HOUSEHOLDS, EMPLOYMENT AND

GENDER 88-89 (1986); Yoram Ben-Porath, Economics and the Family-Match or Mismatch? A
Review of Becker's Treatise on the Family, 20 J. ECON. LIT. 52,52-63 (1982); Marianne A. Ferber
& Bonnie G. Bimbaum, The "New Home" Economics: Retrospects and Prospects, 4 J. CONSUMER RES. 19, 20-21 (1977); Marilyn Manser & Murray Brown, Marriageand Household Decision-Making: A BargainingAnalysis, 21 INT'L ECON. REV. 31, 31-44 (1980); Isabel V. Sawhill,
Economic Perspectiveson the Family, 106 DAEDALUS 115, 120-24 (1977); Schultz, supra note 70,
at 3-22. Becker responds with a theory that one member of a household is altruistic and takes
everyone else's utility functions into his or her own. See BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY,
supra note 47, at 172-201.
74 BERK, THE GENDER FACTORY, supra note 28, at 30; Carmel U. Chiswick, The Value of a
Housewife's Time, 17 J. HUM. RESOURCES 413-25 (1982).
75 BERK, TmE GENDER FACTORY, supra note 28, at 31; Michael T. Hannan, Families, Markets and Social Structures:An Essay on Becker's 'A Treatise on the Family,' 20 J. ECON. LIT.65,

65-72 (1982).
76 Not all economists sympathetic to the New Home Economists take the view that the language of economics is adequate to capture the activities of a family. Sawhill, supra note 73, at
120. 1 draw on the New Home Economics to illustrate how our legal conception of housework

needs to be expanded to take account of its productiveness, not to argue that it should be replaced with a strictly economic one. See generally THE CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC RHETORic (Ajo Klamer et al. eds., 1988) (collection of essays addressing the discursive aspects of

economics and its rhetorical forms and rejecting logic and facts as the sole standard for appraising economic theory).
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consumption. This insight-that production does not stop at the
household door-has demanded extensive study of a number of issues
that were not visible before the Household Production Function was
described. Since law has not yet developed an understanding of the
productive nature of unpaid labor in the home, it is missing a similar
opportunity for a better understanding of its own operation. Identification of the operative mode of analysis within the law should provide
legal actors with a similar window onto new research questions.
C. Transformed Conceptions of Housework in Sociology and
Economics and a Static Conception of Housework in Law
The foregoing discussion situates housework as a critical part of a
family's work life and material well-being and as an area of particular
interest to women. It sets the stage for an examination of the legal
treatment of housework by underscoring its significance in our lives in
time and money. It also illustrates that these findings are themselves a
product of advances in the conception of housework within the fields
of sociology and economics. This conception in sociology and economics adds to, rather than replaces, an understanding of housework's
role in intimate family relations. It broadens the conception of family
life so that it encompasses both emotional ties and material welfare.
This Part has looked at sociology and economics because they
provide data useful to the analysis of law and housework. But it also
looked at these fields for comparative purposes: advances in sociology and economics suggest a need for legal actors-in particular,
judges, legislators, and lawyers-to engage in a similar examination of
housework as work and to consider the doctrinal implications of such
an examination. 77 The understanding of housework as work ought to
inform debate about various disciplines within the law on an ongoing
basis. I argue in Part IV that legal conceptions of housework do not
capture its productive nature as conceived by sociologists and
economists.
AccouNrs OF HOUSEWORK
So far, we have looked at housework as seen by sociologists and
economists. We have seen that unpaid work is now viewed as productive, and we have seen an analytic separation of paid from unpaid
work. Neither sociology nor economics provides an account of the
process by which paid work and unpaid work became separated.
Here, history is helpful. Historical accounts show that the separate
spheres of labor are not only distinct, but stratified. These accounts
illuminate the role of law in the process of stratifying the separate
III.

HISTORICAL

77 In the legal academic literature, there has already been some consideration of this topic.
See supra note 13.
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spheres of labor. This Part traces recent historical works that recover
nineteenth century debates over the productive nature of housework.
It illustrates the importance of law in establishing and maintaining our
conception of home labor.
A.

The Origins of the Paid-UnpaidLabor Divide

The naturalization of our conception of housework as it is situated in the marriage relationship is recent. It was not always the case
that the contribution of housework to a family's material wealth was
as obscured as it is now; nor was the preference for so much homebased production always as unquestioned. A brief survey of recent
writings on the history of housework helps to show that housework as
a separate sphere involving labor of a different quality than wage labor is a modem development. This recent work has supplemented
accounts of the Industrial Revolution with a recognition of the significance of women's unpaid labor.
1. The IndustrialRevolution Created the Paid-UnpaidLabor Divide.-The separation of housework from wage labor in our culture is
a relatively recent phenomenon. Before the Industrial Revolution,
most production was home-based; small farming existence and cottage
industry fueled by both men's and women's labor sustained most
American families. Though sex-segregation was not unusual in household productive tasks, both men and women met the material needs of
the family in the same way: through production for private consumption without exchanging labor for wages. In this sense, their contributions were "equal," both grounded in a primarily noncash economy. 78
As the nineteenth century progressed, wage labor was performed primarily by men,79 although poorer women were more likely to be engaged in the cash economy. A relatively rapid shift occurred within
most American families toward dependence on nonhome-based wage
labor. With the transformation to wage dependency produced by the
Industrial Revolution came the notion of a distinct women's sphere of
home labor. As wage dependency became increasingly important, so
began the process of devaluing and obscuring the unwaged labor performed in the home: "industriousness was increasingly associated
78 JEANNE BOYDSTON, HOME AND WORK: HOUSEvORK, WAGES, AND THE IDEOLOGY OF
LABOR IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 5-8 (1990); NANCY F. Co'-r, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD:

"WOMAN'S SPHERE" IN NEW ENGLAND, 1780-1835, at 24 (1977); Jeanne Boydston, To Earn Her
Daily Bread: Housework and Antebellum Working-Class Subsistence, 35 RADICAL HIST. REV. 7,
10-11 (1986) [hereinafter Boydston, To Earn Her Daily Bread].

79 Early wage labor in factories was performed by both men and women. WILLIAM LEACH,
TRUE LovE AND PaRFEcr UNION: THE FEMINIST REFORM OF SEX AND SOCIETY 163-64 (1980).
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with money making, but work that did not bring cash payment came
80
scarcely to be recognized as work at all."
In fact, women of the Industrial Revolution, like the women
before them, performed a large quantity of productive labor within
the home. A woman's labor contributed to her family's material
wealth by reducing the amount that needed to be purchased in the
market. Since family wages then (as is still generally true today) could
not come close to paying for all the finished goods required for a family's sustenance, women's labor was not a supplement to, but an essential source of, a household's family wealth. Women prepared food,
made and cleaned clothes, raised children, made goods such as soap
and candles, took in boarders, and raised chickens for market.81 Men
were drawn into factories during the Industrial Revolution, and their
contribution to family wealth took the form of cash, while the contribution of women's labor to family wealth continued to be unwaged.
To the extent that more women performed some wage work, particularly poor women and women of color, they were not thereby relieved
of essential home production functions.
What has come to be called the "cult of domesticity" 82 arose during the first half of the nineteenth century, with increasingly well-defined and separate family and market spheres. The market was
understood as cold, competitive, male, and aggressively self-interested, while the family was understood as a haven for altruism, affection, higher moral calling, and refuge from the market world.8 3 The
idea that women serve an essential moral and spiritual role developed,
but it accompanied the idea that women were economic dependents

80 Boydston, To Earn Her Daily Bread, supra note 78, at 7, 11; Reva B. Siegel, Home as
Work- The First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103
YALE LJ. 1073, 1092-93 (1994) [hereinafter Siegel, Home as Work]; BOYDSTON, supra note 78,
at 142-163 (detailing changed views through diaries, magazines, newspapers, novels, sermons,
lectures, letters, and treatises of the era). This is not to say women did not contribute to the cash
market; women sold clothing and other household goods and kept boarders in the home, as well
as working as servants and in factories. Nonetheless, women's participation in the cash market
was not as pervasive and consistent as was men's. Joan M. Jensen, Cloth, Butter and Boarders:
Women's Household Productionfor the Market, 12 REv. RADICAL POL ECON. 14 (1980); Siegel,
Home as Work, supra note 80, at 1086-91.
81 Boydston, To Earn Her Daily Bread, supra note 78, at 9, 11-12.
82 See Corr,supra note 78, at 1; GLENNA MATriHEws, Jus-r A HOUSEWIFE: Tim RisE AND
FALL OF Dormsa-TrcrrY IN AMERICA 6 (1987); Linda K. Kerber, SeparateSpheres, Female Worlds,
Woman's Place: The Rhetoric of Women's History, 75 J. AM. HasT. 9 (1988); Frances E. Olsen,
The Family and the Market:A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1497,1497

(1983).
83 See Corr,supranote 78, at 1; MArrinWs, supranote 82, at 6; Kerber, supra note 82, at 9;
Olsen, supra note 82, at 1497.
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without cash. Their emotional role was praised, but their material labor was obscured.84
2. The Early Women's Movement: Efforts at Valuing UnpaidLabor.-Women did not bear the new hierarchy between waged and unwaged labor quietly. In recent years, historians have added to the
record of the Industrial Revolution an account of women's attempts
to gain recognition of and legal rights to their productive labor.85 The
efforts of these early feminists pulled in two directions embodying a
conflict still visible in today's feminist reform proposals.
In one direction, "material feminists" sought wages for housework as well as economies of scale that would move housework out of
the home and into a mass production context in which it would be
managed by women. This Cooperative Housekeeping movement,
which garnered substantial support around the turn of the century,
envisioned community kitchens and laundries that would allow women's work to be subjected to the same modernization and efficiencies that had come to men's work in a capitalist economy. 86 Reva
Siegel has chronicled earlier feminist reform efforts of a different
sort.87 Joint Property advocates in the years immediately following

the Civil War sought to reform marital property laws to resemble today's community property laws, with wives sharing in ownership of
their husbands' property by virtue of their marital status. Their claims
were based on the material contributions of women's housework to
household wealth. These feminists sought to supplement efforts to
emancipate women's market wage labor through earnings statutes.
Their focus was on emancipating household labor by giving it monetary value through marriage. While Cooperative Housekeeping advocates sought to abolish women's work as it existed and replace it with
a factory production model, the earlier Joint Property reform efforts
sought to reform marriage laws to credit women with the contribution
that their labor as it then existed made to a family. They sought to
have marriage laws reformed so that performing work at home would
lead to an equal economic stake in the fruits of the marriage. 8s Their
84 ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, WOMEN HAVE ALWAYS WORKED: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

14-17,38-39,63 (1981); Nancy Folbre, The UnproductiveHousewife: Her Evolution in Nineteenth
Century Economic Thought, 16 SIGNS 463, 465 (1991).
85 E.g., DOLORES HAYDEN, THE GRAND DOMESTIC REVOLUTION: A HISTORY OF FEMINIST
DESIGNS FOR AMERICAN HOMES, NEIGHBORHOODS, AND CTEs 1-29 (1981); LEACH, supranote
79, at 174-79; Siegel, Home as Work, supra note 80, at 1091-94.
86 See GILMAN, supra note 1; CHARLOTrE PERKINS GILMAN, WOMEN AND ECONOMICS (Carl
N. Degler ed., 1966) (1899); MELUSINA FAY PEIRCE, COOPERATIVE HOUSEKEEPING: HOW NOT
To Do IT AND HOW TO Do IT (1884); HAYDEN, supra note 85, at 1-22; Siegel, Home as Work,
supra note 80, at 1198-1211.
87 Siegel, Home as Work, supra note 80, at 1146-89.
88 Id.
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reform efforts8 took
women's experience of labor and tried to alter its
9
consequences.
Neither the Cooperative Housekeeping nor the Joint Property reform efforts were successful in any far reaching sense. But both are
evidence that the current legal status of housework as an essentially
noneconomic function did not develop seamlessly and naturally following the creation of separate working spheres for men and women
during the Industrial Revolution. Women fought against the image of
housework as a private, 90 noneconomic family event.
Awareness of the historically contingent conception of housework as qualitatively different from other value-producing labor lays a
groundwork for the examination of specific current legal doctrines.
Recent developments in history, economics, and sociology all suggest
a needed focus for legal scholarship.
B. Labor as Love: Legal Conceptions of Housework Compared to
Historical,Economic, and Sociological Conceptions

of Housework
Legal doctrine has not caught up to economics, sociology, or history. It has been the hallmark of the legal treatment of the family that
family life is a black box, with decisions about allocations of resources,
including time, being viewed as an entirely private matter, just as the
distribution of assets and decision-making power have been.91 An extensive legal literature now criticizes this privacy ideology of family
life. 92 Much of the focus of this literature has been on property rights,
violence, and sexuality. One lesson of this literature is that the creation of a family sphere is in part a product of law, including the deci93
sion to exempt family life from many laws of general applicability.

89 Their claim resonates in today's women's movement with efforts, like comparable worth
claims, to value women's work rather than to push women into male roles. This Article argues
for a similar improvement to the status of what women already do.
90 By "private" here I mean one that is not regulated the way a market is regulated-an
event that does not receive legal protection or recognition. The only legal aspect of the housework event was the marital status law that officially prevented a wife from monetizing her labor.
91 See, eg., Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 107 So. 2d 885 (Ala. 1958), McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d
336 (Neb. 1953). See also Olsen, supra note 82, at 1497; Jana B. Singer, The Privatizationof
Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1443 (tracing shifts in states' attitude toward marital privacy).
92 E.g., JEAN B. ErtSI-AIN, PuBuc MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN: WOMEN IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGrr (1981); FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 12, at 177; CATHARINE
A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DiscouPsns ON LIF AND LAW (1987); Olsen, supra

note 82, at 1497; Singer, supra note 91, at 1443. Lawyer-economists have also advanced beyond
treating the family as a black box. See, eg., Cohen, supra note 72; Posner, supra note 72.
93 See, eg., MARTHA A. FINEmAN & RoXANNE MYrTIUK, TmE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRI-

VATE VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF DoMEsTIC ABUSE (1994). As an example of the laws
made controversial by this critique, the Model Penal Code § 213.1 and many states exempt
spouses from the law of rape. RIcHARD A. POSNER & KATHARnrE B. SILBAUGH, A GUIDE TO

AMERICA'S SEX LAWs 35-43 (1996).
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The legal treatment of housework opens law to a similar criticism: by
treating housework as indistinguishable from other private family
matters while treating paid labor as relevant to legal doctrine, law participates in the process of devaluing housework as work.
I describe the legal treatment of housework as turning labor into
love. In some areas of the law, this process is direct, as when a court
refuses to enforce a housework contract between spouses on the theory that housework should be done in "loving and devoted ministrations. '94 In others, the labor is not ignored but subordinated to and
dependent upon familial affections, as in the case of social security,
which rewards home labor if and only if the marital relationship is
successful, while rewarding wage labor without regard to family
relationships. 95
A better conception of housework would permit it both to be intimately tied to familial relationships and also to constitute a productive
contribution to material welfare. The drive for privacy in familial relations undoubtedly reflects something important about family life; we
do not conceive of our intimate relationships in the same way that we
do an arms-length bargain with a stranger. Those who work in the
home can experience satisfaction from providing care to loved ones
and might reject an economic analysis of home labor as an impoverished or inadequate description of family life.9 6 But in the realm of
wage labor, it is acceptable both to love your work and to believe that
it is productive. A person might both love her wage labor and still
defend it as belonging to the world of economic productivity. 97 We do
not expect the back-country forest ranger to forego a wage, social security, or access to contract law simply because she loves the backcountry where she spends her work days. We do not expect that
trade-off because we view her work as work. The understanding that
her work is productive allows her to obtain material benefits from that
work despite the pleasure her work may give her.
The view that housework has a significant relational component
need not conflict with the idea that housework is productive and contributes to family wealth. The practice of labeling housework as one
or the other-affectionate or productive-yields a legal doctrine that
does not reflect the realities of this kind of work. It is the tendency of
94 Brooks v. Brooks, 119 P.2d 970, 972 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941).
95 See infra subpart IV.B (discussing Social Security).
96 Nancy Folbre & Heidi Hartmann, The Rhetoric of Self-Interest and the Ideology of Gender,
in THE CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC RHETORIC 184 (Arjo Klamer et al. eds., 1988).
97 Whether or not it is common, it might be a normatively desirable vision for wage labor.
There is an economic literature on the nonpecuniary gains from market work. See, eg., B. K.
Atrostic, The Demandfor Leisure andNonpecuniaryJob Characteristics,72 AM. ECON. REV. 428

(1982).
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legal doctrine to separate the realms of affection and productivity that
harms the houseworker.
Whether or not we have, as a culture, drawn too sharp a line between productive and unproductive activities, we cannot ignore the
consequences that flow from that line. Understanding wage labor as a
significant part of the economy has consequences in the law. It is because we attach significance to productive labor that we must recognize it wherever it exists. We could have a social security system, for
example, that took no account of the back-country ranger's work
either in collecting contributions or in distributing benefits. Under
such a system, it would be unnecessary to consider what constitutes
work, since work would have no consequences for the system. But
our social security system, as with so many of our institutions, is premised on work. If houseworkers are to receive the benefits of participation in the social security system, we must recognize the similarities
between the houseworker and the wage-worker.
The next Part illustrates the tendency within law to privilege a
conception of housework as akin to love over a conception of housework as value-producing labor. This singularity of view, I will argue,
is detrimental to the material well-being of those who perform
housework.
IV.

THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF HOUSEWORK

In this Part, I analyze a number of areas of law in which unpaid
housework is treated differently from paid work despite relevant similarities between the two. Feminist legal scholars and law and economics scholars have considered the problem of housework in a number of
discrete legal fields in recent years. Thus the treatment of housework
in a few of the areas I explore has been discussed by other people.
For example, for at least the past twenty years, academics, practitioners, and judges have debated the problems of housework in the area
of divorce law. Similarly, very recent years have seen a debate among
tax scholars over the proper treatment of housework. Where others
have examined an issue in great detail, I summarize the points that
have been made and connect critiques to my assertion that the operative conception of housework equates housework with emotional expression rather than wealth-production. In these previously-explored
areas-particularly calls for reform by other scholars-should be
strengthened by the understanding that the devaluation of housework
pervades many other areas of the law. Moreover, several of the areas
of law discussed below have not received much attention by other
people. I provide an introduction to the doctrinal issues in those
fields.
I next take up the related issue of the legal treatment of paid
domestic labor. Market, wage-based domestic labor is treated much
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more like unpaid housework than like other paid labor. The treatment of paid domestic work reinforces my argument that the influence of each discrete legal doctrine that undervalues housework is
magnified by repetition throughout the legal system.
Much of the legal analysis in this article assumes a community of
interests among women that oversimplifies reality. In some places,
the analysis is more relevant to married and higher income women
than to single and lower income women, as with discussion of marital
contracting and property distribution at divorce. Some topics are relevant to a larger pool of women, such as tax, torts, and social security.
Some are particularly relevant to lower income women, such as welfare reform and the treatment of domestic workers under labor law.
But there are very few women for whom domestic labor is never a
relevant topic.
My goal is to illustrate a pervasive mode of analysis within the
law. While programmatic reforms are discussed in places, expounding
bottom line reform proposals requires a level of engagement that is
not prudent for a project of this scope. The descriptive task here is
intended to inform ongoing legal debate on the entire range of topics
discussed in this Part.
A.

Marital Contracts: Housework Cannot Command a Price

[C]ontracts whereby the wife is to receive compensation for providing
[nursing-type] services are void as against public policy and there is no
consideration for the husband's promise.... Whether or not the modem
marriage has become like a business, and regardless of whatever else it
may have become, it continues to be defined by statute as a personal
relationship of mutual support. Thus, even if few things are left that
cannot command a price, marital support remains one of them.
-

California Court of Appeal, 199398

The law governing the enforceability of premarital agreements is
unfavorable to individuals who perform unpaid housework. 99 If
houseworkers arrange by contract to receive compensation for that
work from a spouse, the contract will not be enforced. Yet a contract
in which one spouse agrees to forego any interest in the other's paid
wages is increasingly likely to meet a court's approval. The premarital
agreement cases, through their reasoning and conclusions, contribute
to the notion that housework is more equivalent to the love that is
exchanged in a marriage than to the paid work that is performed by
one or both parties to a marriage. Through selective enforcement of
98 Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 19-20 (Cal. CL App. 1993).

99 The current literature has not explored the imbalances created by selective enforcement of
premarital agreements.
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terms, the law of premarital agreements recognizes the economic
value of wage labor while ignoring the same qualities in unpaid labor.
1. The TraditionalArgument that MaritalObligations CannotBe
Considerationfor a Contract.-Before 1970, courts took the position
that a couple could not enter into an enforceable agreement that altered the essential legal incidents of marriage. 0 0 Those "incidents"
were not exhaustively defined, but included financial obligations and
service to a family and sometimes included service in a family business. A number of reasons have been given for not enforcing agreements between spouses. Many courts and commentators have
thought that agreements are unseemly (marriage should not have
business overtones), violate public policy, promote divorce, and lack
consideration.' 0
Marital agreements were thought to lack consideration because one
could not offer as consideration something that one was already obligated to do by law. Men have been obligated to support women in
marriage, thus an agreement to support one's wife lacked consideration. 0 2 Similarly, women have been obligated by virtue of marriage
to provide services to their husbands. 0 3 These services had at one
time encompassed any labor a woman performed, whether in the
home or in the wage labor market. The Earnings Statutes of the nineteenth century ultimately gave women the right to their wage labor,
leaving husbands with a legal right to their wives' domestic labor
only. 104 Consequently, a woman's written promise to provide house100 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRACTS § 190 (1981); 6A ARTHUR L. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRAMCS § 1474 (1962); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRAcrs § 5.4 (2d ed. 1990).
The law of premarital agreements has been in flux for the past twenty-five years. This makes
definitive declarations about the state of the law difficult. This account of current doctrine is
accurate but provisional.
101 E.g., In re Marriage of Dajani, 251 Cal. Rptr. 871 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Bohanan v. Maxwell, 181 N.W. 683 (Iowa 1921); Motley v. Motley, 120 S.E.2d 422 (N.C. 1961) (voiding an antenuptial agreement as against public policy in so far as it undertook to relieve the husband from
the duty of supporting his wife); Hurley v. Hurley, 615 P.2d 256 (N.M. 1980); Hughes v. Lord,
602 P.2d 1030 (N.M. 1979); Tellez v. Tellez, 186 P.2d 390 (N.M. 1947); Frame v. Frame, 36 S.W.2d
152 (Tex. 1931).

102 Because this support obligation survives today, but has been made mutual over the past 30
years, women also owe a duty of support to men. 1 HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 6.1, at 251-52 (2d ed. 1988).

103 This obligation survives in part today, but its only relevance is to the loss of consortium
action in which damages are paid to one spouse based in part on the loss of services owed within
a marriage. It is not clear that a husband ever had the power to enforce the service obligation if
his wife did not work other than through the powerful remedy of divorce, but he was entitled to
the benefit of any labor she did perform. See infra subpart IV.C.
104 Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of MaritalStatus Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to
Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2181-96 (1994) [hereinafter Siegel, Earnings];Amy D.
Stanley, Conjugal Bonds and Wage Labor: Rights of Contractin the Age of Emancipation,75 J.
AM. His-r. 471, 495-97 (1988). Women can contract with their husbands for services performed
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cleaning or a range of domestic services to her husband in exchange
for anything was not supported by consideration because one cannot
offer as consideration something one is already under a legal obligation to perform. At least the support obligation has been made mutual in recent years so that spouses owe support to each other (in
some states both caregiving and financial support are now called "support"). 105 However, in some cases, the consideration argument is still
successful in avoiding premarital agreements, particularly when nonmonetary terms such as housework are at issue. 106
The idea that a lack of consideration could be based on a pre-existing legal duty of such breadth reflects a formalism that was consistent with contract law in the early twentieth century, at the time that
this doctrine developed. What is extraordinary about the consideration argument within marriage today is that it has survived transformations in the rest of contract law in which this kind of formalism has
been abandoned. 107 We are thus left with an exception to today's con08
tract law-a special consideration doctrine for the marital context.

in a family business, but even that is presumed to be done gratuitously in some states. See, e.g.,
Leatherman v. Leatherman, 248 S.E.2d 764 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978).
105 The number of places where these legal obligations matter in marriage, in the sense that
they are relevant in court, is small. One is in the area of premarital agreements. Another is in
tort. The service obligation formed the basis for the loss of consortium action. It is because the
action is now available to both sexes that it makes sense to say that the services obligation is
mutual; however, the action has been substantially transformed, and the relevance of the legal
obligation has been reduced in many states. See infra subpart IV.C.
106 For other cases of bargaining over nonmonetary issues, see McLaughlin v. McLaughlin,
132 A.2d 420 (Conn. Super. Ct 1957) (finding an agreement to raise child in Catholic faith unenforceable); Wood v. Wood, 168 A.2d 102 (Del. Ch. 1961) (finding an agreement that children be
brought up in the Catholic faith unenforceable); In re Marriage of Bennett, 587 N.E.2d 577 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1992) (finding an agreement to raise children in Jewish faith unenforceable); Favrot v.
Barnes, 332 So. 2d 873 (La. Ct. App. 1976) (finding an agreement to have sex no more than once
a week unenforceable); Dumais v. Dumais, 122 A.2d 322 (Me. 1956) (finding an agreement
never to divorce and to raise children in Catholic faith unenforceable); Mengal v. Mengal, 103
N.Y.S.2d 992 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1951) (finding an agreement not to allow children to live with
mother against public policy); Matthews v. Matthews, 162 S.E.2d 697 (N.C. Ct. App. 1968);
Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (finding an agreement to raise children
in the Jewish faith unenforceable).
107 "Courts have become increasingly hostile to the pre-existing duty rule." FARNSWORTH,
supra note 100, at 274 (1982). Courts labor to bring cases within exceptions to the rule. Some
courts have abandoned the rule altogether, and the rule has been the subject of legislative reforms narrowing or abandoning it. Id. at 274-78.
108 In the alternative, one could argue that this is the proper use of the consideration doctrine,
if consideration is a proxy for intent to be legally bound. See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent
Theory of Contract,86 COLuM. L. REV. 269, 299 (1986). This argument would allow married
people to bargain and give what looks like good late twentieth century consideration, but not
intend to be legally bound. But the observation that many couples bargain without the intent to
be legally bound does not provide a justification for preventing couples who do wish to be legally
bound from executing enforceable contracts.
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This consideration argument no longer extends to financial support in many states, though it survives in some. Almost all states will
enforce premarital agreements that deal exclusively with the division
of private property. In addition, the strong trend has been toward
enforcing agreements that change the financial support obligation by
precluding or limiting alimony. 09 Even though there is still a legal
obligation to provide support, in many states a couple can execute an
enforceable agreement that abrogates the support obligation or provides that in exchange for a defined level of support after marriage,
the recipient will not pursue the donor's property. The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA)," 0 adopted by at least nineteen
states in some form, provides that couples may contract over all financial incidents of marriage, including support."' Courts increasingly
take the view that it is intelligent for couples to foresee and plan for
financial issues, and that the modem era of financially independent,
wage-employed women demands the enforcement of freely negotiated
financial contracts between spouses."12 "[A] contract which defines
the expectations and responsibilities of the parties promotes rather
than reduces marital stability.""13 Some courts explicitly rest the decision to enforce an agreement governing support on the formal legal

109 The support obligation is distinct from issues of private property. Support is financial
assistance provided during an ongoing marriage to meet basic needs. After divorce, if it exists at
all it becomes a support order, also known as maintenance or alimony. Private property accumulated during marriage or brought into marriage is not vulnerable to the support obligation at
divorce.
110 UNIF. PREMARrrAL AGREEmENT Acr, 9B U.L.A. 369 (1987).
1I The UPAA also provides that couples may contract about anything else that does not

offend public policy; this phrase has not been put to the judicial test in any state that I am aware
of, and the academic literature on its meaning suggests that it is not as broad as it seems. The
Uniform Law drafters insisted that they were not changing current law; thus most people suspect
that "not against public policy" will mean whatever it meant under state law before adoption.
Housework agreements have been determined to be against public policy. See Barbara A.
Atwood, Ten Years Later: LingeringConcerns About the Uniform PremaritalAgreement Act, 19
J. LE~is. 127 (1993); Homer H. Clark, Jr., Antenuptial Contracts, 50 U. CoLo. L. REv. 141
(1979); Lenore J.Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CAL. L.
REV. 1169 (1974); Judith T. Younger, Perspectives on Antenuptial Agreements, 40 RurGERs L.
REv.1059 (1988); Laura P. Graham, Comment, The Uniform PremaritalAgreement Act and
Modern Social Policy: The Enforceabilityof PremaritalAgreements Regulating the Ongoing Marriage,28 WAKnE FoREsT L. REv. 1037 (1993).
112 See, eg., Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (Poch6, J., dissenting); Volid v. Volid, 286 N.E.2d 42, 46 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972); Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d
162 (Pa. 1990); see also LENORE J.WErrZMAN,THm MARRIAGE CoNTRAcr SpousEs, LovERs
AND THE LAW (1981); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, ContractualOrderingof Marriage:A New Model
for State Policy, 70 CAL L. REv. 204 (1982).

113 Volid v. Volid, 286 N.E.2d at 46 (declining to follow the traditional rule that agreements in
contemplation of divorce should not be enforced); see also Scherer v. Scherer, 292 S.E.2d 662
(Ga. 1982).
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equality achieved between
men and women in the second half of the
114
twentieth century.
2. Housework Remains a Marital Obligation that Cannot Be
Considerationfor a Contract,While the Rest of PremaritalAgreement
Law Modernizes.-The fact that states have become accommodating
of agreements governing financial support makes the decisions avoiding contracts for housework particularly striking. The old rule that
housework does not constitute consideration has survived without exception in those recent cases in which it has been tested. In other
words, when a couple decides that the woman will assume most of the
housework responsibilities either as her sole occupation or in addition
to her wage labor, that couple cannot provide in an enforceable agreement that her husband will pay her for that work. 115 Courts often
combine the formalist notion of a failure of consideration with
moral
disapproval of commodifying intimate aspects of marriage. 116
For example, Borelli v. Brusseau,117 a 1993 California case, was
brought by a wife who had promised to nurse her ill husband full-time
at home in exchange for consideration in his will. She performed, he
did not, and she sued his estate. The court said the agreement was
unenforceable, based on California precedent that the court refused
to modify. That precedent denied to spouses the ability to receive pay
for domestic work because "[t]o allow such contracts would degrade
the wife by making her a menial and a servant in the home where she
should discharge marital duties in loving and devoted ministrations." 118 The court is offended at the suggestion that the labor has
economic value because this suggestion degrades the affectionate motivation for its performance. Thus, the court as a matter of law turns
114 E.g., Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990).
115 Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Youngberg v. Holstrom,
108 N.W.2d 498, 502 (Iowa 1961); In re Wood, No. 63,584, 1989 Kan. App. LEXIS 875 at *5-6

(Kan. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 1989) (caring for ill spouse is not consideration for a promise to execute
favorable will because it is already owed, however, resumption of marital relations after separa-

tion is sufficient consideration); State v. Bachmann, 521 N.W.2d 886, 888 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994);
Hughes v. Lord, 602 P.2d 1030, 1031 (N.M. 1979) (agreement to exchange care for consideration
in will invalid for lack of consideration and because it is against public policy); Martinez v.
Martinez, 307 P.2d 1117, 1119 (N.M. 1957); Ritchie v. White, 35 S.E.2d 414, 415 (N.C. 1945);
Kuder v. Schroeder, 430 S.E.2d 271, 272-73 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993); Frame v. Frame, 36 S.W.2d

152, 154 (Tex. 1931). These cases arise much less frequently than financial support cases. As
discussed infra note 138 and accompanying text, this may be a result of the legal conception of
housework as unrelated to the economic well-being of a family.
116 See, e.g., Hughes, 602 P.2d at 1031 (finding a husband's agreement to take care of dying
spouse in exchange for consideration in her will unenforceable: "It is the policy of this state to
foster and protect the marriage institution. It is not the policy of the state to encourage spouses
to marry for money.").
117 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (Cal. Ct.App. 1993).
118 Brooks v. Brooks, 119 P.2d 970, 972 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941).
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labor into love, saying, "even if few things are left that cannot command a price, marital [service] remains one of them.""19
This kind of reasoning is routine in marital agreement cases addressing attempts to provide wages for housework. 120 In a recent New
Mexico case, a court refused to enforce an agreement exchanging care
of an ill spouse for generous terms in a will, saying, "It is the policy of
this state to foster and protect the marriage institution. It is not the
policy of the state to encourage spouses to marry for money.' 21 The
conflation of work and love was central to the development of concerns about marital contracts over domestic labor:
It would be contrary to public policy to permit either [spouse] to make
an enforceable contract with the other to perform such services as are
ordinarily imposed upon them by the marital relations, and which should
be the natural prompting of that 122
love and affection which should always
exist between husband and wife.
Though agreements modifying the incidents of marriage as to
property are increasingly enforceable, the law is less uniform as to
agreements to modify the financial support obligation, which is distinct from marital property distribution.'2 Arguably, the treatment of
housework is less remarkable when the financial support obligations,
as distinct from property rules, are not modifiable either. They arise,
after all, out of what were once reciprocal obligations: support and
service. Property was never a part of those legal incidents of marriage, at least before death, so those agreements are separate from the
consideration concerns. But there are distinctions between the failure
to enforce support agreements and the failure to enforce service
agreements. The first is that the strong trend is toward enforcement
of agreements modifying the support obligation; the UPAA takes the
position that they should be enforceable, as do most commentators.
There is no trend toward enforcing housework agreements, and the
old cases are still valid when tested today.124 The second difference is
discussed below.
119 Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20. In California, "support" includes service. Id.
120 See Hughes, 602 P.2d at 1030; Siegel, Earnings,supra note 104, at 2131, 2189-96.

121 Hughes, 602 P.2d at 1031.
122 Foxworthy v. Adams, 124 S.W. 381, 383 (Ky. 1910).
123 For example, in California, neither a housework agreement nor a support agreement are
enforceable because they are both marital obligations. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1620 (West 1996).
124 Vhile it may be argued that the stakes in a housework agreement are relatively small
compared to the costs of enforcement, the argument proves too much. Federal courts limit jurisdiction for some cases based on a dollar amount in controversy, arguably to make sure that the
institutional costs of bringing suit in a federal court are justified by the amount at stake. But
using a substantive field of law as a proxy for cost is not the most sensible way to effect that kind
of cost-benefit balancing, as some controversies will be large and some small in many areas of
the law, including contracts for wages in family law cases or in individual employment cases. The
vast majority of family law cases involve small stakes compared to commercial cases, but we
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3. The Asymmetry Between the Practicality of Withholding
Wages Versus Housework from a Spouse.-The second difference' 25
between housework and financial support is that in practice, housework is not amenable to a spouse's decision to keep it separate and to
herself if she wishes-it is easier to keep money away from a spouse
than housework.
Some background on the marital obligations is in order here. The
support and service obligations are not directly enforceable between
the parties when married. The support obligation may be enforceable
during a marriage only by third party creditors who may sue one
spouse for certain very narrow categories of debts undertaken by the
other. 126 The support obligation may be enforceable at divorce in the
form of maintenance (alimony) awards, but maintenance awards are
disfavored and increasingly rare or short-lived. 127 For the service obligation, the only opportunity for legal enforcement is against a third
party: loss of consortium damages may be owed to one spouse when
the other is injured on the theory that the first spouse had a legal right
to services that the injurer has taken away.
Since service and support are not directly enforceable between
spouses, one might think that a spouse has as much power to withhold
service as to withhold support. But, judicial refusal to recognize a
marital agreement because a pre-existing legal duty of service or support deprives the agreement of consideration can be seen as a mechanism for enforcing these pre-existing marital duties. This is because
nonrecognition of agreements determines the conditions under which
support and service will be given-gratuitously, if at all. This enforcement of marital duties through the rejection of contract is far more
significant for service than for support.
To say that neither the support nor the service obligation is subject to contract is not to say parallel things. Whether or not there is an
agreement as to service, the benefits of whatever housework is performed will, as a practical matter, be shared-it is not feasible to perform housework for oneself without providing a benefit to all
members of a household. The same is not true for support; as long as
there are sufficient funds available to provide necessaries-food and
shelter-no support needs to be given from a spouse with cash to the
other spouse. If the spouse with cash attempts to contract to keep his
would seriously readjust individual expectations if courts refused jurisdiction over family law
cases.

125 See infra section IV.D.3 (discussing taxation of gifts between spouses).
126 In many states, the support obligation can be enforced by a third party creditor for debts
that were undertaken to buy necessities, such as food or shelter. CLARK, JR., supra note 102,

§ 6.3, at 265-66.
127 See infra section IV.E.5; see also In re Marriage of Bevers, 326 N.W.2d 896, 900 (Iowa

1982).
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cash separate unless his spouse performs housework, he will find that
courts will not enforce this contract; nonetheless, he may keep his cash
separate and enjoy the benefits of his cash. The spouse who wishes to
contract to keep her housework separate unless she can receive cash
in return will find her agreement unenforceable, but if she tries nonetheless to keep her housework separate, she must also deprive herself
of the benefits of her labor.
The difference between the two is one of degree. One can imagine housework being performed on one spouse's behalf and not the
other-separating laundry, for example. Moreover, in a single earner
family, some monetary wealth must be shared in the form of housing.'28 But surplus wages, beyond necessity, can be kept out of a marriage invisibly and without confrontation. Savings can build for the
wage earner without the houseworker spouse knowing it. For a
houseworker, there is the possibility of withholding labor from discrete tasks, but no liquidity or savings will result. Thus there is no way
to keep a surplus from housework. Moreover, withholding labor by a
full-time houseworker invites an immediate confrontation in practice;
it cannot be done invisibly. 129 As long as a family lives under one
roof, a spouse cannot enjoy the value of her own housework without
sharing more of it than a spouse with a cash income must share cash to
enjoy the value of that cash. Thus, even if courts were as reluctant to
enforce agreements as to support as they are to enforce agreements as
to housework, the implications would be worse for the houseworker.
But courts are, in fact, more willing to enforce agreements addressing
financial support than agreements addressing housework.
The law of marital agreements is a very clear illustration of the
proposition argued throughout this Article: that housework is treated
more like the love that is exchanged in a marriage than like the wage
labor performed by spouses aimed at meeting the family's material
needs. In the eyes of the law, the fruit of that wage labor can be
owned by one of the individuals; using a premarital agreement, in
many jurisdictions that individual can alter the obligation to share the
paycheck. That is a product of the modern view that both parties are
capable of economic independence and bargaining. But housework,
recognized in the economic literature as value-producing labor, is not
given the same material recognition at law. Instead, it is part of the
128 If the housing is owned by the wage-earner, the sharing is still only partial, as the wageearner is storing capital that will be available for future exclusive use. Note that as property, that
house can most clearly be the subject of an enforceable premarital or marital agreement, so
there is potential for security for the wage-earner in the separate ownership of the house. However, signing a marital agreement as to separate ownership of property at divorce may force the
kind of confrontation that withholding housework forces.
129 Consider the occasional news accounts about housewives who go on strike. The act is
extremely overt and draws attention as a freakish event. Striking Mom Still Celebrity, SACRAMENTo BEE, July 22, 1995, at B1 (Metro).
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gift of marriage, akin to affection, and not an object to be negotiated.
The inequitable result is that wage earners can protect and preserve
their labor as their own using a contract, whereas houseworkers cannot. Given the literature on who performs these tasks, 130 this practice
perpetuates financial inequality between the sexes.
4. Practical Significance: Estates and Bankruptcy.-There has
been significant academic interest in the subject of marital contracting
and the premarital agreement in general, addressing issues other than
contracts regarding housework. 13 1 While a consistent trickle of
couples execute premarital agreements (there is no good data on how
many), it still appears to be a fringe practice and not one that is central to the legal consequences of marriage. 13 2 The scholarly attraction
of the topic stems from its theoretical promise of explaining or providing a more rational marriage law. 133 As discussed above, the prohibition on contracting over pay for housework yields an important
abstract observation about the image of housework as the currency of
emotion rather than material well-being. But there are two subjects
of practical significance in which the contract prohibition can be detrimental to the individual who performs housework. One is in the
event of a spouse's bankruptcy, and the other is at the death of a
34
spouse.
In a few recent cases and more older cases a spouse has sought
enforcement of an agreement providing that she would perform domestic labor or care of her spouse and in exchange he would provide
for her in his will. The houseworker has not prevailed in any of these
cases.135
130 See supra section II.A.1.
131 For the premarital agreement literature, see supra note 111.

132 The extensive recent literature on premarital agreements tends to argue that they are
increasingly common. See, e.g., Graham, supranote 111, at 1037; Gail Frommer Brod, Premarital Agreements and GenderJustice, 6 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 229, 231 (1994). This argument is
supported with citations to newspaper articles quoting lawyers who practice family law and say

that they have executed more of them in recent years. Other support is gleaned from the rising
divorce rate that might give rise logically to more premarital agreements. While these citations
are interesting, they provide insufficient evidence on which to base a claim that the incidence of
premarital agreements has risen enough to make them core to family law.
133 1 question the ability of a good theory of premarital contracting to provide a more rational
marriage law, but reserve the argument for a future article.
134 The prohibition was also relevant in State v. Bachmann, 521 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. CL App.

1994), in which a housework for wages contract was said to be illusory for work-release
purposes.
135 E.g., Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Bohanan v. Max-

well, 181 N.W. 683 (Iowa 1921); In re Wood, No. 63,584, 1989 Kan. App. LEXIS 875, at *5-6
(Kan. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 1989) (caring for ill spouse is not consideration for a promise to execute
favorable will because it is already owed, but presumption of marital relations after separation is
sufficient consideration); Hughes v. Lord, 602 P.2d 1030, 1031 (N.M. 1979) (agreement to care
for dying spouse is not consideration for a promise to provide for a spouse in a will; agreement
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Similarly, if a houseworker had executed a contract for payment
for her services with her spouse, she could line up with his creditors
both in the event of his bankruptcy or his death for any arrearages in
payments on the agreement if that contract were enforceable. 136 This
is a remedy that is available to a wage employee in the market to
protect her interest in labor already performed that has yielded material benefits. While some may object that permitting spouses to act as
creditors to one another would invite fraud, there is no reason to think
that the market could not respond to this problem through contract
rather than through prohibition on contract. The market today has
already adjusted to changes in family law by treating spouses as potentially separate economic units for lending purposes. For example,
creditors routinely require the signature and credit history of both
spouses on credit card accounts or home mortgages today if they wish
one spouse to bear responsibility for the other's debts, knowing that
they can no longer rely on family law to provide that guarantee. 137
Any form contract could be adjusted to give priority to a third-party
creditor over a spouse-creditor who agrees to that arrangement, and
there is no reason to think that this practice would not be adopted to
address concerns over fraud. When spouses do wish their employment contracts to carry equal force with those of other creditors, they
ought to be free to make that arrangement. To do otherwise is to
sanction creditors for continuing to rely on a traditional failure to
value domestic labor.
What can we make of the limited number of housework cases
litigated? No doubt it can be argued that trust between spouses or
lack of foresight are adequate explanations for the absence of a practice of executing agreements providing wages for housework. It may
be a product of a cultural family ideology that is consistent with the
view that housework is the currency of emotion. But it may also be a
product of the degree to which the unenforceability of such agreements is well-settled. Either possibility is supported by an apparently
greater rate of litigation on this subject at the turn of the century when
neither the law nor the cultural understanding of home labor were yet
settled.138
violates public policy); Tellez v. Tellez, 186 P.2d 390, 392-93 (N.M. 1947); Ritchie v. White, 35
S.E.2d 414, 415 (N.C. 1945); Dade v. Anderson, 439 S.E.2d 353, 354 (Va. 1994); see also Siegel,
Earnings, supra note 104, at 2181-96.
136 Lee v. Savannah Guano Co., 27 S.E. 159 (Ga. 1896); Dempster Mill Mfg. Co. v. Bundy, 67
P. 816 (Kan. 1902); Coleman v. Burr, 93 N.Y. 17 (1883); Siegel, Earnings, supra note 104, at
2181-96.
137 In the past, courts held husbands responsible for their wives' debts for necessaries, often
broadly construed. This guarantee is much weaker today. IRA M. ELutAN Er AL., FAMmY LA.W:
CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 92-94 (2d ed. 1991).
138 See Siegel, Earnings,supra note 104, at 2181-2210.
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Courts would show a better understanding of housework if they
saw that an agreement over housework is an agreement over the economic incidents of marriage. As such, the housework agreement does
no more damage to the valued emotional aspects of marriage than
does an agreement altering the support obligation or expected property distribution. In the absence of a reversal of the trend toward enforcing agreements governing property and support obligations,
courts should give equal recognition to agreements providing wages
for housework. 139
B. Social Security: Housework Is Out of the Safety Net
The social security system does provide some payment to
houseworkers under very particular circumstances. This might be
cause for celebrating progress in valuing housework. However, the
limited nature of those payments, as well as the eligibility criteria for
them, indicate an understanding of housework as primarily an aspect
of familial relationships and not as producing independent economic
value. The social security system's spousal benefit for homemakers
repeats the error seen throughout the law of treating housework as an
aspect of marital relations and failing to recognize in any concrete
sense an independent economic value to the labor.
The social security system ties old age financial security to wage
labor. A person's expected payment, billed as an insurance system, is
a function of her years in the labor force and her average earnings.
While we tie a range of taxes to monetary income, as do many other
countries, the decision to tie benefits to wages earned makes our system uniquely unsuited to handle the old age concerns of those who
devote a substantial amount of time to housework. 140 Leaving aside
the important question of whether it makes sense in the first place to
tie old age security to labor performed over the course of a lifetime,
singling out wage labor for benefits misunderstands the scope of productive work. 141
139 Enforcing these agreements will probably not lead to a major revolution in married people's experience of housework because the practice of executing marital agreements is so uncommon (although families with financial advisors may be made aware of bankruptcy advantages to
having such a contract were it enforceable). If we wanted to promote this kind of contract, we
could have several forms of marriage licenses that amount to preform contracts for wages for

housework or other contractual arrangements. Justifying the desirability of such a system would
require a different argument than simply enforcing housework contracts equally with other kinds
of marital agreements.
140 For an extensive discussion of the problems presented by the social security system for
women, see Becker, Obscuring the Struggle, supra note 13, at 264. I raise these arguments in
brief here in order to connect them to the broader theme in this Article with regard to our legal

understanding of unpaid labor and critique them from that perspective.
141 Social security clearly illustrates the consequences we attach to economic productivity.
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A wage worker accrues credits over the course of a career for
wage labor performed. She also has FICA payments deducted from
her pay to support the social security system. 142 But one cannot accrue these credits or make these payments while working in the home.
If the greater number of hours spent in unpaid labor in any sense accounts for the continuation of a wage gap between men and women,
the social security system perpetuates that economic inequality into
retirement. Since the typical work pattern for women includes time
both in the paid labor force and as full-time houseworkers over the
course of a lifetime, accommodation for time spent as a houseworker
is critical to old age security for women, who are significantly more
likely to live in poverty in their old age than are their male counterparts. To compensate for some of the difficulties faced by full- or almost full-time homemakers, the social security system does provide a
spousal benefit. 143 The system's treatment of housework can be
judged by the eligibility requirements and level of awards provided
under that benefit.
The spousal benefit is paid to the spouse of a person who has
accrued credits in the wage labor market when that wage worker (the
primary beneficiary) retires. The benefit is paid at one half the rate of
the benefit paid to the "primary" spouse, and it does not impair the
amount received by the primary spouse. It is paid without regard to
the length of a marriage that is still intact, making it clear that it does
not directly function as payment for housework performed. However,
a divorced homemaker spouse does not receive the benefit unless the
marriage giving rise to the benefit lasted for at least ten years. The
benefit also terminates under most circumstances if the divorced party
receiving the spousal benefit remarries. Most critically, a person who
has spent some time in the wage labor market and some time at fulltime housework cannot combine the spousal benefit with credits accrued on her own behalf as a result of her wage labor; she will receive
either her own benefits or one-half the amount of her spouse's, whichever is greater. 144
The spousal benefit, if it can be understood as including consideration of housework, does so very poorly. The amount of the benefit is
tied to factors other than the amount of the labor itself. These factors,
the primary spouse's salary and the continuation of the relationship
142 I.R.C. §§ 3101, 3201, 3221.

143 42 U.S.C. § 402 (Supp. 1995).
144 Id.; Becker, Obscuring the Struggle, supranote 13, at 279-82. Assuming that the beneficiary of a spousal benefit is a woman, based on actuarial predictions, she is likely to live longer
than her wage-earning spouse and thus draw from social security for a longer period of time.
Because the spousal benefit amounts to one half the wage-earner draw, a woman would have to
live substantially longer than her wage-earning spouse before the amount that the two draw
from social security is equal.

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

with the primary spouse, reflect instead the equation of housework
with the relationship. Financial security for work performed becomes
contingent on the success of the marital relationship for the
houseworker. For the paid laborer, relationships are irrelevant to old
age benefits, with the payment or nonpayment of spousal benefits
having no effect on the payment of the primary benefit or on the
amount of the contribution to the system the primary beneficiary is
required to make. There is no provision whatsoever for never-married people who perform a substantial amount of housework. Those
individuals must rely entirely on the credits accrued as a result of their
own wage-based labor, even when caretaking or other unpaid responsibilities make their work profile the same mix of paid and unpaid
work as that of many married homemakers.
The system functions poorly for those with mixed paid and unpaid labor histories. Even before taking social security into account,
those who perform housework for a substantial part of their lives
enter retirement in a more financially vulnerable position than those
who perform wage-based labor exclusively.' 45 The structure of the social security system perpetuates rather than ameliorates this problem
by rewarding least those who are neediest at retirement.
While paid labor is rewarded by the social security system in relation to its quantity and economic value, housework is rewarded contingent on an eventuality entirely unrelated to the labor performedthat is the success of a marital relationship. Not only is the system
unresponsive to the extremely common work history of combined
paid labor and housework, but it perpetuates a higher economic status
for paid labor than housework. The system allows paid labor to develop entitlements while neither taxing housework nor allowing it to
develop entitlements for its own sake. Reform proposals for homemaker credits, which would explicitly allow credits to accrue in a person's own account based on housework performed, have been
repeatedly rejected. 146 Social security is not a needs-based system

(although such a system would be more responsive to women who are
poorer in retirement than men), but neither is it a labor-based system.
Instead, it distinguishes between paid and unpaid labor, with the former leading to some level of financial security and the latter being
recognized only insofar as it is attached to a marriage relationship.
The case of social security strongly illustrates the notion that in the
law, housework is the currency of emotion rather than value-producing labor.
145 The illustrations throughout this article are intended to show that this result is in part a
product of law.
146

W. ANDREw

ACHENBAUM,

SOCIAL SECURITY: VISIONS AND REVIsIONS

Becker, Obscuring the Struggle, supra note 13, at 284-88.

133-41 (1986);
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A complete reform of the social security system could release
old-age payments from cash contributions. But more modest proposals are available to recognize the houseworker's labor without dezstroying the system as we currently know it. One would be, as
t suggested by Professor Staudt, to tax the imputed income from housework and open a social security account for all those who perform
it.147 But more modest proposals are possible. Even without a full
income tax on housework, houseworkers could be either permitted or
required to contribute to a social security account on their own behalf,
in which paid and unpaid labor credits could be combined. The
spousal benefit could be transformed such that married people divide
their contributions evenly between one spouse's account and the other
spouse's account, forcing marital sharing of social security credits. Alternatively, the spousal benefit could be made less vulnerable to the
whims of the marital relationship, as by removing the ten year time
limit and prorating the years of marriage instead. Reform of the
spousal benefit should be combined with an option to combine credits
earned from wage labor with those earned through housework, so that
the typical work history of most women would not leave them
uniquely vulnerable at the time of retirement.
C. Torts: Consortium Transforms Housework into Love
Tort law provides a person with a cause of action when his or her
spouse has been injured. This loss of consortium action proceeds today on the theory that physical injury to one spouse harms the marital
relationship, thus causing compensable suffering to the other spouse.
This consortium harm is distinct from the harm to the physically injured spouse, who may recover damages for her own injury as well.
The substance of the consortium harm felt by the spouse of a physically injured person implicates housework.
The loss of consortium action originates from the service obligation in place under coverture. Husbands owned their wives' labor,
thus a third-party injury to a wife impaired a husband's interest in that
labor. The action was based on economic damages suffered when a
husband lost the productivity of his wife, whether at home, in the
fields, or in the wage labor market. Consortium also encompassed her
sexual services, and could thus be recovered as damages in an action
for alienation of affection or criminal conversation.
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Earnings Statutes
gave women rights in their own labor that had previously been the
legal entitlement of their husbands. The Earnings Statutes permitted
wives to form contracts on their own behalf with third parties for
wages. As such, these statutes posed a possible threat to the loss of
147 Staudt, supra note 13, at 1596-99; infra subpart IV.D.
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consortium action. If husbands no longer owned their wives' labor,
why would husbands be entitled to a cause of action for interference
with that labor? It would be logical to expect that wives would now
bring suit on their own behalf for impairment of their labor, in which
husbands had no stake. 148 Indeed, a few courts decided that in light of
the loss of consortium action must be abanthe Earnings Statutes,
149
doned altogether.
Most courts chose a different route after the enactment of the
Earnings Statutes. Rather than eliminating a husband's action because it had been based on his now limited right to his wife's services,
these courts shifted the focus of the consortium action to
noneconomic aspects. 150 When the damages had been for lost economic value from a wife's labor, 151 courts transformed that understanding of consortium damages by focusing on the intangible
companionshiprelations between spouses-affections, society, and
152
that are harmed by physical injury to a spouse.

Emphasizing affection did not remove services from the picture
entirely. The service obligation was invoked through the first half of
the twentieth century to justify denying consortium actions to wives
whose husbands had been negligently injured. 153 The theory went
that a wife had no interest in her husband's services, thus she was not
entitled to recover for loss of consortium, while a husband retained an
interest in his wife's domestic services, regardless of the effects of
Earnings Statutes on wage labor. 154 He thus retained the ability to
bring a loss of consortium action for both society and services, with
society being derivative of his right to domestic services. While it was
acknowledged in the case of alienation of affection or criminal conversation that a wife has an interest in her husband's affections that is
148 Evans Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, 22 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1923).
149 Id. at 7.
150 2 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL, THE LAW OF TORTS § 8.9 (2d ed. 1986); Kevin Lindsey, A

More Equitable Approach to Loss of Spousal Consortium,75 IowA L. REV. 713, 713 (1990).
151 2 HARPER ET AL, supra note 150, § 8.9.
152 E.g., Guevin v. Manchester St. Ry., 99 A. 298, 301 (1916) (earnings statutes do not eliminate consortium action, which is based on husband's interest in his wife's society rather than her
labor); Jacob Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 651, 662 (1930)
("Consortium... has taken on a new meaning. It is a term that embraces love, affection, and
company, and seems to exclude the material services of the wife which had originally been its
basis.").
153 2 HARPER ET AL, supra note 150, § 8.9.
154 The Earnings Statutes left courts to decide whether a wife's ownership of her labor extended to unpaid domestic labor or only to wage labor. Reva Siegel and Amy Stanley have each
carefully traced the judicial struggle with interpretation of the Earnings Statutes in the context of
contract law. They each conclude that the judiciary interpreted the Earnings Statutes so as to
give women ownership of their wage labor, while leaving husbands with the rights to wives'
unpaid domestic service. Siegel, Earnings,supra note 104, at 2127; Stanley, supra note 104, at
471; see also supra subpart IV.A (discussing marital contracts).
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equal to his interest in hers, this was not enough to turn the servicebased consortium action into a gender-neutral entity.155
Eventually, the ability to bring a loss of consortium action was
extended to women, by a transformation of our concept of consortium. This transformation illustrates the ability of the legal system to
replace the idea of home labor with home affections, recasting the
activities and interests of the home into noneconomic rhetoric. The
case of Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., Inc.,' 56 in which the D.C. Circuit re-

jected the prior understanding of consortium and led the way to allowing wives to bring consortium actions on an equal footing with
husbands, bears quotation at length:
One group of cases base their results on the theory that although in the
abstract the term consortium contains, in addition to material services,
elements of companionship, society, love, felicity and sexual relations, in
cases of injury to the consortium resulting from negligence the material
services are the predominant factor for which compensation is given.
From this point they variously argue: (1) That since the wife has no right
as such to her husband's services, she has no cause of action, although, of
course, the husband, having always been entitled to his wife's services,
still has a right of action; (2) That the Emancipation Acts, having given a
wife a right to the fruits of her own services, have placed the husband in
the same position as the wife in number (1) so that neither may bring an
action, except that the husband may recover for monies actually expended. The difficulty with adhering to these authorities is that they
sound in the false premise that in these actions the loss of services is the
predominant factor. This distinction lacks precedent. It is nothing more
than the arbitrary separation of the various elements of consortium devised to circumvent the logic of allowing the wife such an action. The
development of this fiction has been attributed to the use of words....
Consortium, although it embraces within its ambit of meaning the wife's
material services, also includes love, affection, companionship, sexual relations, etc., all welded into a conceptualistic unity.
A classic torts hornbook says of Hitaffer, "[s]eldom has any single
opinion been so influential.' 5 7 The opinion, by recasting the concept
of consortium so that it formally melded services and affections, allowed courts across the country to embrace gender neutrality. But
this came with a price: courts would have to minimize the fact that
impairment of a spouse causes economic harm as well as emotional
harm.
Today, jurisdictions are split on whether they will hear any testimony as to economic damages for loss of consortium. All will hear
testimony on what are called "sentimental" damages. 158 It is an en155 2 HARPER ET AL., supra note 150, § 8.9; Lippman, supra note 152, at 662-65.
156 183 F.2d 811, 813-14 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (citations omitted).
157 2 HARPER ET Al, supra note 150, § 8.9.
158 Lindsey, supra note 150, at 713. "Sentimental damages," as their name suggests, are those
that compensate for the lost affection, not for the material services.
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tirely separate question of tort policy whether emotional harms in the
absence of physical injury should be recognized more frequently.
When a plaintiff witnesses harm to a family member, for example, the
trend is toward their inclusion. This may be good tort policy on the
ground that a physical injury to a victim causes a severe and significant emotional loss to family members that should be compensated
and for which there should be a duty of due care. But by transforming
loss of consortium from an action based on the notion that domestic
labor has economic value to one based on the notion that families
primarily provide one another love and affection, tort law participates
in the transformation of our understanding of home labor. The
changes in the loss of consortium action illustrate the analytic move
described throughout this article: turning labor into love.
D. Tax: Missing a Gain
A number of aspects of tax law fail to recognize the productive
nature of housework. Housework provides income to a family that is
not taxed. Recent tax scholarship has successfully set out some of the
problematic treatment of housework in the tax code. For example,
Edward McCaffery has described the incentives to stay out of the
wage labor market created by the failure to tax housework as imputed
income. 159 Nancy Staudt examines the failure to tax imputed income
not for its behavioral biases (because she does not assume that there is
anything wrong with performing unpaid labor per se), but because the
lack of taxation is integrally connected to the failure to provide benefits to those who perform unpaid labor. 160 Lawrence Zelenak and McCaffery have discussed the behavioral biases that the marriage
penalty-bonus creates for women to stay out of the wage-labor market. 161 I add to this -an analysis of the decision to treat all exchanges
between spouses as untaxed events that require no determination of
who benefits from unpaid home labor. 162 Combining these, we can
159 McCaffery, Taxation and the Family, supra note 13, at 1001-05.
160 Staudt, supra note 13, at 1596-99.
161 McCaffery, Taxation and the Family, supra note 13, at 1019-20; Zelenak, supra note 64, at
365-72.
162 Tax law presumes that families share all income, whether through a paycheck or imputed
through housework. There is substantial evidence that this is not true. See VIVIANA A. ZELIZER,
THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY (1994); Meredith Edwards, IndividualEquity and Social Policy, in WOMEN, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 95 (Jacqueline Goodnow & Carol
Pateman eds., 1985); Judith Siegel, Money and Marriage:A Transparency to the Struggles of
Intimacy, 4 J. INDEP. SOC. WORK 51 (1990); Diana Wong, The Limits of Using the Household as a
Unit of Analysis, in HOUSEHOLDS AND THE WoRLD-ECONOMY 56-63 (Joan Smith et al. eds.,
1984). This should be particularly relevant to the question of housework; it is difficult not to
share the income created by housework with all members of the household. It is much easier not
to share the income from a paycheck. Thus it seems plausible that people with paychecks receive more income and pay less tax on it as a result of marriage, while the same cannot be said of
people who perform housework exclusively and are married to someone with a paycheck.
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see a legal treatment of housework that, whatever its benefits, takes
all recognition of housework as a part of the economy out of the law.
Tax law reinforces the image of housework as exclusively a private act
of love, akin to the emotional bond in a marriage, not as labor, akin to
the wage labor used to meet the family's material needs.
1. Imputed Income.--Housework is imputed income. Imputed income is nonmonetary income that a person provides to herself through her labor or from her capital. While income can come
from exchanging labor in the market for wages, it can also come from
performing work for oneself that eliminates the need to procure goods
or services in the market. For example, a person who turns groceries
into meals creates "income" to herself and her family. Capital can
also yield imputed income: for example, if you own your own home
you are providing yourself with housing while others rent housing on
the market. You have imputed income in the form of the housing
itself.163 Valued as the equivalent of 24% to 60% of the GDP, housework produces a substantial income to an individual and her family.
Imputed income is not taxed. This is not simply because it is not
translated into dollars; income that is nonmonetary but is provided to
a taxpayer from another source is taxable. For example, if your employer provides you with housing, that is income to you that is usually
taxable, even though no money changes hands between you and your
employer. 164 It is basic federal policy to tax all gains, whatever the
source. 165 What makes imputed income unique is that it is both nonmonetary and the taxpayer provides it to herself-it is not a part of a
166
bargained-for exchange.
a. Past critiques of the failure to tax housework: labor market incentives.-As several scholars have pointed out, the failure to
tax imputed income gives individuals a tremendous incentive to prefer
allocating time to housework for private consumption over time to
163 The imputed income from home ownership is not taxed. Staudt, Taxing Housework, supra
note 13, at 1576 n.17; Michael J. McIntyre & Oliver M. Oldan, Taxation of the Family in a Comprehensive and Simplified Income Tax, 90 HAiv. L. REv. 1573, 1610 n.120 (1977) (criticizing the
fact that benefits from home ownership are tax free despite ease of arriving at a market value for
the property).
164 Some narrow categories of employer-provided housing are exempted from taxation. This
is where the housing looks least like a gain to the employee and most like a benefit to the
employer, as with in-hospital sleeping quarters provided to resident physicians in training. Treas.
Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(3) (1995).
165 I.R.C. § 61 (Supp. V. 1994).
166 As discussed below, in fact, the exemption does not run only to income one provides
oneself, but also to income a person provides to her spouse and children, which is untaxed either
because it is treated as a gift or because the family income is a single unit for tax purposes.
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paid labor. 167 For example, consider a woman deciding whether to reenter the paid labor force one year after the birth of a child. She will
need to purchase a number of goods and services with after-tax dollars
that she used to provide to her family through her own, untaxed
housework. Thus she will need to purchase child care services, 168 she
may decide to purchase more restaurant-prepared foods, pay someone
to clean her house, and take the family's clothing to a cleaner. All of
these purchases might be avoided if she did not enter the paid labor
force, because she could provide them through her unpaid and untaxed housework. Each bit of housework she performs on her maternity leave will be a candidate for substitution by purchases made with
after-tax dollars once she returns to the wage-labor market. The tax
on those earned dollars is a dead-weight loss to the family. For example, if it would cost her $9 an hour to hire someone to watch her children, and if she can earn $10 an hour in the wage labor market,
without any tax, it would make financial sense for her to enter the
wage labor market. But if, after taxes, she only takes home $8 an hour
from her wage labor job, it does not make sense for her to pay someone $9 an hour so that she can join the wage labor force. The $9 an
hour market value that she provides to her family by staying home
with her children is untaxed imputed income. By not taxing the imputed income, the code gives her a tax incentive to choose home labor
over market labor.
She may not be able to afford to pay for any replacement goods
or services when she re-enters the paid labor force and will instead go
without the improved standard of living that her unpaid labor had
provided to her and her family. The housework that would be performed if she stayed out of the wage labor market but is left undone
once she leaves the home represents lost imputed income to the
family.
In a gender-blind world, this might be unproblematic, as all individuals would face the same decision as to time allocation between
paid and unpaid labor. But given traditional and enduring gender
roles, it is more likely to be the woman in a middle class heterosexual
marriage who faces the decision whether to perform housework or
paid labor in the market. So long as at least one wage is needed, a
man may not experience these as genuine alternatives. 169 But if wo167 McCaffery, Taxation and the Family, supra note 13, at 1001-05; Posner, supra note 13, at
191; Zelenak, supra note 64, at 365-377.
168 There may be some tax breaks for child care payments, depending on her income level
and her employee benefit package, but none nearly large enough to compensate for the imputed
income effect. See Anne Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax
Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARv. L. REv. 533 (1995); Staudt, supra note 13, at 1603-05.
169 This is probably for cultural rather than economic reasons, although New Home Economists would say that wage discrimination against women in the market makes a family's decision
to have the man be the earner in a single-earner marriage rational.
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men do respond to the incentive to provide imputed income to a family rather than seek paid employment, the tax code encourages the
choice of housework over market work. This is a controversial incentive where so much attention has been given to the gendered division
of labor in the society and its potential detrimental effects on women. 170 Although no societal consensus exists for encouraging wage
labor over housework through the tax code, we might agree that the
171
tax code should be neutral on the issue, which it is not.
These criticisms of the tax code's incentives to work at home may
place too much importance on wage labor. Many unpaid workers derive tremendous satisfaction from their labor in the home. For these
people, the only reason to encourage wage labor would be if wage
labor were the only way to obtain financial security for one's work.
Unfortunately, that describes the current legal system. If the legal system recognized and rewarded the valuable work performed without
wages in the home, we might find less reason to provide incentives
toward wage labor.
Even if we are not concerned about disincentives to enter the
wage labor market, there are reasons, not currently prominent in the
tax literature, 172 to tax imputed income.
b. Critique of the failure to tax imputed income based on its
role in devaluing housework and denying benefits to houseworkers.Taxing income, as unpleasant as people may think it is, certainly
serves as legal recognition that the taxed item is income and thus valuable in a concrete way. Taxing housework would have the transforming effect of forcing recognition of its value. A tax could be crafted on
income from housework that would harm the houseworker, if for ex170 See, eg., KATHLEEN GERSON, HARD CHOicEs: How WOMEN DECIDE ABotrr WORK, CAREER AND MOTHERHOOD 220-27 (1985); SusAN M. OIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY

3-24 (1989); Herma H. Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its
Aftermath, 56 U. CN. L. REv. 1, 4 (1987).
171 Arguably, it is not problematic to exclude imputed income from the tax base because it is
excluded for everyone equally. This assumes, however, that all families have the same amount
of unpaid services in the home. Poor and minority women and all single people have always had
a higher rate of paid labor force participation than white middle class women. JAMES A. SWEET,
WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE 74-88 (1973); BETrE WOODY, BLACK WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE: IMPACTS OF SmucruRAL CHANGE IN THE ECONOMY 14 (1992). When fewer middle-

class women worked in the wage labor market, this assumption might have had some plausibility
for that group. With or without paid labor force participation, it is possible to imagine variations
in the amount of imputed income a family receives from housework based on numbers of children, size of home, and the number of tasks routinely replaced with market services, such as
housekeeping services, fast food, and professional cleaners. Given the variation in the amount
of unpaid labor performed in different households, it is not enough to assume equality across
individuals or families.
172 The significant exception to the trend toward encouraging market labor is Nancy Staudt.
See Staudt, supra note 13, at 1614-18.
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ample, it required cash payments of even the lowest income families,
without a compensating benefit in the form of lower taxes on wage
labor. But a tax could be crafted that would not necessarily be harmful to the houseworker. If taxes on wage labor were lowered accordingly, there would not necessarily be an effect on the overall level of
family taxation. Moreover, a well-crafted system could set up exemptions or credits for low income houseworkers, as proposed by Professor Staudt. 17 3 Administrability issues are surely presented by the
problem of taxing imputed income, and those are not dealt with
here. 174 Before considering whether administrability problems would
be worth enduring, we should consider what would be gained by undertaking them (other than the possible creation of a new tax base
amounting to 24% to 60% of the GDP). That is the question I address here.
We have seen that contract law and social security laws create
financial vulnerabilities for houseworkers, stemming from the failure
within law to grasp the connections between paid work and housework. We will see in subpart G that those vulnerabilities also weaken
financial security for the paid domestic worker. Cultural norms and
understandings are a product of many institutions and systems of
which law is only one. However, there are places where the law can
have tremendous power in shaping norms. Taxation of income is one
such area. If we instituted a federal income tax on housework tomorrow, it would not be unreasonable to predict that we would see a
rapid shift in cultural and legal understanding of the economic value
of housework. Thus, tax law currently plays a role in devaluing housework that cross-cuts different areas of law, many of which are significant to houseworkers.
Moreover, taxes are closely tied to public benefits such as unemployment compensation and social security 175 in our wage labor system, so that the failure to tax the imputed income from the
houseworker is not without consequences. 176 We could unhitch these
benefits from taxes, but that proposal is probably not so simple, given
173 See Staudt, supra note 13. This Article makes no serious attempt to propose a tax system
for houseworkers. Instead, I seek to show the benefits such a tax could generate throughout the
law.
174 See infra subpart V.A. We cannot know whether it is worth the trouble to impose a tax on
imputed income without knowing a few other things first: one, the costs of developing a workable measure, which might be lowered in a world where the value of housework were routinely
recognized; and two, the costs of not taxing housework, which have been invisible or unrecognized in the past, but which this article seeks to bring into focus. But see Staudt, supranote 13, at
1620-27 for a forthright attempt to deal with some of the administrability problems that a tax on
imputed income would present.
175 See supra subpart IV.B.
176 Other benefits that are not government mandated also flow from wage labor, for example,
pension contributions and health insurance benefits.
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the significance we attach to productivity. This article has argued that
the harm that comes from a failure to see economic value in housework is a product of the kinds of consequences we attach to the judgment that something is economically valuable. As long as we attach
so much significance to the transparently economic aspects of wage
labor, we must recognize the similarities between wage and nonwage
labor in order to do justice for the unpaid laborer.
Taxing imputed income is arguably the most radical reform discussed in this Article and perhaps the least likely to occur. But perhaps what makes the idea radical is also what makes it powerful: it
requires a fundamental reconception of the nature of home labor.
Even if this proposal fails on administrative grounds, comprehending
the problem it addresses brings us a long way toward understanding
the legally inferior status of home labor illustrated throughout this
article.
2. Marriage Penalty (or Bonus).-A substantial literature has
developed criticizing what has come to be called the marriage penalty
for married couples with two wage-earning spouses. The penalty results from the system of joint filing, which aggregates spousal tax rates
in a progressive tax system. 177 Married couples are treated as a single
economic unit for tax purposes, reporting their combined income and
calculating their taxes based on that figure. The resulting tax liability
can be higher than the spouses would have if single; this is called a
marriage penalty. Taxes for the married couple may also be lower;
this is called a marriage bonus. The income tax plan does not attempt
to make a married couple's combined income tax liability bear any
relationship to the liability they would have as single individuals. The
theory instead is that all couples should be treated the same as similarly situated couples, regardless of what income bracket the members
of the couple would be in if single in a progressive tax system. As
discussed below, an assumption of marital wealth-sharing underlies
this tax structure. This assumption may be unwarranted, and in particular, a full-time houseworker spouse may have the burdens of
wealth sharing without the benefits. 178
Today, a married couple filing jointly pays more than two single
people who each have half of the couple's combined income; however,
they pay less than one single person who is earning the same amount
individually as the couple earns combined. 179 Married people filing
177 Separate filing does not usually help; rates are set at half the married couple rate for
people who are single filing separately. Compare I.R.C. § 1(a) with I.R.C. § 1(d)(1988).
178 See supra subpart IV.A. (discussing the ease of keeping wages-as opposed to housework-away from a spouse).
179 The degree of the penalty or bonus that results in a system aimed at treating couples
rather than individuals alike is dependent on the amount of income splitting that the tax system
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separately do not avoid the consequences of being married: the tax
rate for an individual who is married and filing separately is simply
half that of a couple filing jointly. Whether a given couple receives a
marriage penalty or a marriage bonus depends on how evenly their
earnings are distributed: if one person in the couple earns all the income and the other earns none, the two will benefit as a unit from the
tax code; if the two earn relatively equal salaries, they will pay a marriage penalty.
a. Pastcritiques of the marriagepenalty-bonus: incentives to
marry or work for wages.-This system has been criticized for a
number of reasons. Most obviously, it pays the highest tribute to
those marriages that divide their labor in what we tend to call the
conventional arrangement: one person at home, out of the wage market, and the other at work in the wage market. The more egalitarian a
marriage is in terms of wages, the more each individual within it is
penalized by the tax code when compared to their single counterparts.
By being "couples neutral" along one axis (that couples with equal
combined incomes have the same tax liability), the Code is not
couples neutral along a different axis. The Code is not neutral in that
it prefers that a couple be married if they choose one division of labor
and single if they choose another. Stated differently, it prefers conventional marriages to egalitarian marriages, and is not "couples neutral" in that sense. 180
Some criticisms of the Code have emphasized the effects it may
have on the decision whether to marry. 181 Others have focused on the
effects it may have on the marginal earner's decision to work in the
wage labor market. 182 The latter criticism is relevant to the task of
permits. If any two single individuals were permitted to allocate their individual incomes evenly
between them, they would achieve the lowest combined liability in a progressive tax system.
McCaffery, Taxation and the Family,supra note 13, at 991. They would see the highest liability if
all their income were taxed to just one of them. This is because in a progressive tax system the
rate of taxation increases as taxable income rises. The amount of income splitting allowed has
varied since the inception of the federal income tax. For interesting accounts of this history, see
Boris I. Bittker, FederalIncome Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. Rav. 1389 (1975); Pamela
B. Gann, Abandoning MaritalStatus as a Factorin Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TExAs L.
REv. 1 (1980); Zelenak, supra note 64.
180 By conventional marriage, I mean one with strict divisions of labor, and by egalitarian
marriage, I mean one with roles that are closer to mirroring each other. Needless to say, a
mirror-imaged role is not the only thing that equality can mean. This could be very important
for this criticism, since it may be that we want to change the Code to ensure financial security to
unpaid workers without requiring that they go into the market to obtain that security. Nancy
Staudt's proposal implicitly reflects this notion of equality. See Staudt, supra note 13.
181 McCaffery, Taxation and the Family, supra note 13, at 1019-20; Zelenak, supra note 64, at
341-42 n.11, 364-65. This is now a concern of the Christian Coalition, which has made elimination
of the marriage penalty one of its ten Contract with American Families agenda items.
182 McCaffery, Taxation and the Family, supranote 13, at 1019-20; Zelenak, supra note 64, at
365-72.
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examining the law's posture toward housework, assuming that a decision not to enter the wage labor market is followed by a greater
number of hours spent on housework.18 3 When the marriage penalty
is examined in conjunction with the tax rules associated with imputed
income, i ' 4 the implications of the marriage penalty for housework become clearer. The higher tax on the marginal worker gives a disincentive for her to work at wage labor; that disincentive is aggregated by
the costs associated with the inability to continue providing as much
housework to the family unit. Given a deeply-entrenched societal division of labor both in the market and at home, the marriage penalty
may in practice be important to the quantity of housework a person
will perform. 185 The effect may not be as great as many commentators
assume; when women enter the wage labor market, they do decrease
the amount of time spent on housework, but not dramatically. Instead, much of the additional time comes out of leisure.' 8 6 In a world
in which, as we have seen, home labor does not lead to financial security, encouraging home labor is problematic.
b. A critique of the marriagepenalty-bonus directed atfaulty
assumptions of marital sharing.-A marriage bonus may benefit the
wage-earner spouse without benefiting the houseworker spouse. It
makes no difference for tax purposes who earns a given dollar within a
marriage. The joint filing requirements instead assume that all income
within a family is shared. But this assumption is not backed up by law;
in other words, nothing in family law requires couples to share their
monetary income. Indeed, there is evidence that marital sharing 187
of
income varies among couples, making generalizations difficult.
When there is a marriage bonus in a marriage in which one person
works for a paycheck and the other performs housework exclusively,
the bonus may simply provide a tax benefit to the individual with the
paycheck and provide nothing to the houseworker. This seems particularly relevant when we consider the failure to tax imputed income: it
183 BARBARA BERGMANN, THE ECONOMIc EMERGENCE OF WOMEN 261-66 (1986); SHELTON,
supra note 16, at 28-29. But consider that there is also evidence that women simply work more

hours, taking the additional work out of leisure when they move into the wage labor market
rather than transferring it from unpaid to paid hours. BERK, THE GENDER FACrORY, supra note

28, at 109, 117; GEERKEN & CovE, supra note 44, at 96-97.
184 McCaffery makes this link in Taxation and the Family, supra note 13, at 1001-05.
185 The idea that one person, the homemaker, is particularly sensitive to incentives because
her wage income is not crucial to family survival, is a part of the assumption that the marriage
penalty is bad. The degree to which women can enter and exit the wage labor market by choice
depends greatly on their class and marital status. Women of color have criticized white feminists' scholarship for excessive emphasis on the exclusive domestic role. See, e.g., Crenshaw,
supra note 13, at 152-60 (women of color have traditionally worked for wages).
186 See supra note 178.
187 ZEUZER, supranote 162, at 36-70; Edwards, supranote 162, at 95; Siegel, supra note 162,
at 51; Wong, supra note 162, at 56-63. See also Staudt, supra note 13, at 1593-96.
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is impractical not to share the benefits of imputed income from housework. Therefore the tax benefit that comes from the failure to tax it is
more likely to be shared between the adult members of the family
than the tax benefit associated with a marriage bonus as to monetary
income. 188
3. Exchanges Between Spouses.-Imputed income is provided
by an individual to herself, whether it takes the form of housing,
housework, construction, or tax preparation. She need not pay taxes
on it. However, if she provides it to someone else in an exchange for
something-shelter and food, for example-that person must pay
taxes on it.189 The exemption for imputed income only runs to the
individual who supplies it to herself; it is not an exemption from all
nonmonetary income. If I provide construction work to my brother in
exchange for room and board, he has received income from me and
must pay income taxes on it.190 In theory, people who live together
without marrying have to pay taxes on the value of their home services to each other as income based on a bargained-for exchange. 191
Housework provides a gain (income in tax terms) to more than just
the person who performs it. The benefit goes to all household members. This fact presents an interesting question: why doesn't the
spouse of a houseworker pay taxes on the income he receives from
housework?
There are two possible answers. The first is that, as discussed
above, it makes no difference for tax purposes who earns a given dollar within a marriage. Married couples are taxed as a unit. This implicitly assumes marital sharing of wealth, whether from unpaid or
wage labor. This assumption is highly aspirational. It cannot be
backed up empirically because there is tremendous variation as to
marital sharing of wealth. 192 Perhaps more important to this Article,
nothing in the law of marriage forces wealth sharing. Whatever
problems arise from the assumptions of wealth sharing for the analysis
of the marriage bonus or penalty are equally applicable here.
But we probably cannot explain the failure to tax income from
housework to the nonhouseworking spouse simply by reference to the
188 Proposals to eliminate joint filing also do not address the circumstances of unpaid workers
who are single and have no access whatsoever to the benefits that accompany taxation.
189 Bruce Wolk, Federal Tax Consequences of Wealth Transfers Between Unmarried Cohabitants, 27 UCLA L. REv. 1240, 1248-50 (1980).
190 If I do the work for free, he has received a gift from me. Gifts of service are exempt from
the gift tax. However, if he coincidentally makes a gift to me of greater than $10,000, he will
have to pay a gift tax on that amount. See Wolk, supra note 189, at 1249; I.R.C. § 2503a(6)
(1988); Treas. Reg. § 25-2503-2 (1995).
191 Wolk, supra note 189, at 1246. While the IRS has never decided the case directly, it has

suggested that this is so. See Angstadt v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (P-4) 769 (1968).
192 See sources cited supra note 182.

91:1 (1996)

Legal Response to Home Labor

joint return; after all, it is necessary on the joint return to declare all
income, even if the law gives no consequence to which spouse received the income. Thus the second reason we might not tax income
from housework, even when performed for another member of the
household, is because we think it is a gift from one spouse to the
other. Gifts of service are not taxed, but any return "gift" of monetary support or a wage for that service would be.
Normally, gifts are taxed within the Code, so that the donor
spouse would have to pay a tax on income given in the form of a wage
for housework that exceeds a statutory minimum. 193 But gifts between spouses are subject to a special tax exemption: they are an untaxed event. 194 This tax treatment is objectionable on two grounds.
First, the assumption that an exchange of housework and support is a
gift exchange, rather than a taxable bargained-for exchange, may not
be warranted by the facts in every marriage. Second, the exemption
from gift tax for spouses allows us once again to escape facing the
economic value of housework in the vast majority of cases.
a. The assumption that housework is performed gratuitously.-he law presumes that housework and the support given in
exchange for it are gifts, and it does not tax them.195 This is in keeping
with a general cultural ideal of marital sharing; it does not make sense
to think of a title transfer as a taxable gift when it may be a technical
adjustment in what was already understood to be shared between the
spouses. However, this may not be an accurate account of what all
married couples do. The difference between a gift-which is either
subject to a gift tax or is an untaxed event if the two parties are married-and income-which is presumptively taxable to the recipientis that income is received in a bargained-for exchange. 196 Taxpayers
must defend a gift as a gift rather than income in a fact-specific inquiry. If spouses bargain to exchange housework for financial support, that exchange should be understood as income, while if it is
performed without bargaining, it should be treated as a gift. It is not
hard to imagine that fact-specific inquiries would yield different results in different marriages. Nonetheless, because housework and any
support given in exchange for it will always be understood as gifts for
tax purposes, whether in fact there was a bargain or not, it is not subject to income tax. Since the financial gift is exempt from gift tax because the couple is married, there will not be a tax, and thus there will

193 Currently $10,000 annually. I.R.C. §§ 2503(b), 1020 (1988).
194 I.R.C. § 1041 (Supp. 1995).
195 I.R.C. § 1041 (Supp. 1995); Staudt, supra note f3, at 1593.
196 Wolk, supra note 189, at 1249 (cohabitants must pay tax on exchanged services).
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197
be no chance for an accounting of the value of the housework.
Thus, for tax purposes, the law turns labor into love-a gift-at times
when the labor may not have been intended to express that sentiment.

b. The failure to tax housework exchanges between spouses
and the consequences for housework.-If spousal exchanges were
taxed, we would at least have to acknowledge the nonmonetary income that flows from a houseworker to other household members. 198
Treating married couples as a unit for tax purposes-not taxing exchanges between married couples as income-contributes to obscuring the work as value-producing. By deciding as a matter of law
rather than as a question of fact that the work is performed gratuitously rather than as a result of a bargain for taxable income, the law
denies the monetary value of housework. No similar presumption applies to payment by one spouse for labor performed in a family business in which a wage may be negotiated and treated as income when it
passes from one spouse to the other.199 After presuming that the labor is a gift, the law then decides not to apply a gift tax to the supporthousework exchange. Thus again, no monetary value attaches to it.
The tax rules surrounding the flow of housework from one spouse to
another perpetuate the treatment of housework within the law as an
event without economic consequence.
4. The Image of Housework in the Tax Code.-The image of
housework under the current structure has replicated, to a certain extent, the error of treating housework as akin to the emotional aspects
of the relationship to the exclusion of a comparison to the wage labor
used to meet the family's material needs. Assumptions about marital
sharing of income as well as marital sharing of government benefits
flowing from taxation, like social security, force those who perform
unpaid labor to rely on emotional bonds for financial security, a requirement not placed on those who perform wage labor. By not taxing imputed income, it can be argued that Congress and the IRS have
implicitly taken the view that housework does not produce income to
any or all members of a family. Contrast this with the IRS requirement that individuals estimate the market value of other nonmonetary
gains for tax purposes. 200 Illumination of the IRS's misconception of
197 The housework gift would not be taxed to the donor because there is no gift tax for services, even if married people were taxed for gifts, but the support "gift" could be taxed as a gift, if
the facts make it a gift rather than a bargained-for exchange.
198 Of course, taxing gifts or bargains might discourage sharing. However, if we want to encourage sharing, we might compel sharing of cash to the same extent that sharing of nonmonetary income occurs.
199 See supra subpart V.A.

200 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1) (1995); U.S. v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 551 (1973).
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housework provides further support for the reform proposals of tax
scholars concerned about the effects of the code on housework.
5. Proposalsfor Reform.-Tax scholars offer divergent proposals for appropriate reform, depending on the commentator's assessment of the problem. For those who think that the problem is that the
tax code gives women an incentive to avoid the wage labor market,
the problem should be solved either through positive tax incentives to
enter the wage labor market 20 1 or through the elimination of joint fil202 If
ing to ensure federal "neutrality" toward employment decisions.
the problem is not the decision to perform housework but the lack of
financial security, government benefits, and recognition of the economic value that flows from housework, then the solution may be to
tax housework directly.203 Positive tax incentives and separate filing,
as conceived by Zelenak and McCaffery, will continue the tradition of
avoiding a dollar valuation of housework, thus avoiding an outright
recognition of the monetary value of unpaid work. Staudt's proposal
to tax unpaid labor in the home directly is a more forthright remedy to
the undervaluation of unpaid labor. For this reason, Staudt's proposal
would be more likely to have an impact on our conception of unpaid
labor, in and out of the tax context, than the other proposals.
The appropriate reform effort should be debated by tax scholars.20 4 It is important for tax policymakers to appreciate the compounding effect for women of the legal erasure of unpaid work.
Failure to tax the work to either spouse treats its occurrence as a private matter within the family; this same assumption prevents payment
for the work in contract law and makes the relationship itself, rather
than the housework, the important factor under social security law.
The examination of other areas of law in this article should influence
tax scholars and reformers in their understanding of the severity of
potential harms from the failure to address the tax treatment of
housework.
E.

Finances at Divorce: ContributionIs Treated as Need

The division of property upon divorce provides an interesting story
about the relationship between law and housework. Different reform
efforts have sought to achieve a greater stake in family-owned property as consideration for housework, with varying degrees of success.2 05 Though in historical perspective, the consideration for
201 McCaffery, Taxation and the Family, supra note 13, at 1046-53.

202 Zelenak, supra note 64, at 342.
203 Staudt, supra note 13, at 1618-20.
204 See especially Alstott, supra note 13.
205 See Siegel, Home as Work, supra note 80, at 1113-14 (discussing the Joint Property claims
of the woman's movement of the nineteenth century); UNn. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr
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housework at divorce is better now than it ever has been, it still falls
far short of full recognition of housework as value-producing labor.
Today's improved recognition of housework does not mean that women are better off financially at divorce than they ever have been. An
increasing recognition of housework's contribution to property accumulation has been accompanied by a decreasing interest by courts
206
in making support awards (alimony) based on need at divorce.
Since the recognition of housework's contribution to property accumulation is still weak and most couples have little property to divide
in any case, the loss of need-based awards, whether as support (alimony) or property, creates a harsh effect for any spouse at divorce
whose labor contribution to the marriage has been either entirely
within the home or perhaps worse, a compromise between wage work
and housework.

1. Discretionin Equitable DistributionStatutes.--EquitableDistribution statutes explicitly permit a court to transfer the title to property from one spouse to the other at the time of divorce.20 7 Unlike a
§ 307 ALTERNATIVE A, 93 U.L.A. 238-39 (1987) (expanding the pool of property eligible for
distribution). Both alternative versions of the UMDA allow for consideration of a homemaker's
contribution to the acquisition of marital assets.
206 In many ways houseworkers may be worse off at divorce than they were earlier this century. For example, it is more difficult today for a houseworker to obtain a long-term maintenance order or for her to receive property based on her needs. My point here is that there is a
better chance today than ever before that she will be awarded property at divorce on the theory
that she has contributed to its accumulation rather than on the theory that she needs it. Because
she will still probably not receive an amount of property that adequately reflects the value of the
housework, and because for most divorcing couples, future income, reflected in maintenance
awards, is a much more significant asset than actual property, maintenance (formerly known as
alimony) is more important than property division. Maintenance, unfortunately, is a disfavored
and dying entity. Some courts, though, will take the inability to make a property award into
account in deciding that some sort of support order is appropriate. See Lee R. Russ, Annotation, Divorce: Equitable DistributionDoctrine, 41 A.L.R. 4th § 16, at 408 (1985).
207 In forty-two states, a common law system of property preceded the current regime. These
states did not subscribe in any sense to the partnership model of marriage that has been rhetorically dominant for the past twenty years. In the remaining eight states, community property
rules, borrowed from the civil law of continental Europe, were always in place; they had always
subscribed rhetorically to the notion of a partnership marriage. In practice, the Community
Property regime was not much of a partnership, with courts "chipping away at wife's separate
estate and her partnership interest in community assets. Ultimately, husband became manager
of the former and virtual owner of the latter during marriage." Judith T. Younger, MaritalRegimes: A Story of Compromise and Demoralization, Together with Criticismand Suggestions for
Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 45, 59 (1981).
Under community property rules, all property acquired under the name of either spouse
during the course of a marriage is, both during the marriage and after, the property of both
spouses. In community property states, then, the task is to take property that is legally titled to
both spouses and sort out what the title ought to be after divorce. Those states came into the
modem era with a stronger presumption of a 50-50 division of property than did common law
states. In the remaining forty-two common law states, property is owned during a marriage by
the person to whom it is titled, and the marriage status itself does nothing to affect those prop-
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community property scenario, the marriage itself does not effectuate
joint ownership, but instead the statute simply empowers a court to
redistribute ownership based on certain equitable factors or at the
court's discretion.208 The relevant equitable factors (which vary from
picture of housework as providing
state to state) do not paint a2strong
09
concrete wealth to a family.
Wide discretion allows courts to be influenced by our general tendency, in and out of law, to undervalue housework. Some state statutes give essentially no guidance to courts, providing that property
should be divided at divorce "as may be just,"21 0 or "equitably;" 21' or
erty rights. Thus the task at divorce is a slightly different one with regard to property: should
property titled to one person be transferred to the other by the court? The answer has been yes,
when a statute authorizes a court to do so. See, e.g., Britt v. Britt, 383 A.2d 592, 594-95 (R.I.
1978) (holding that a court may not make an order dividing property other than according to
title in the absence of statutory authorization); Smith v. Smith, 216 S.E.2d 541, 545 (S.C. 1975)
(same); Guy v. Guy, 172 S.E.2d 735,738-39 (Va. 1970); cf. LaRue v. LaRue, 304 S.E.2d 312 (,V.
Va. 1983).
208 The need for a statute permitting a court to redistribute property is best understood by
looking at the common law states before what are called "equitable distribution" statutes were
passed. In the absence of statutory authority to redistribute property from the titled spouse to
the untitled spouse, courts simply allowed property to go with title upon divorce. For most
married women, this meant that they would receive little or none of the family's accumulated
wealth at divorce. As long as assets were kept in the husband's name, they belonged to him
throughout the marriage and at the time of divorce. See, eg., Saff v. Saff, 402 N.Y.S.2d 690, 69394 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978), appeal dismissed, 389 N.E.2d 142 (N.Y. 1979). The woman whose
labor had contributed to the effective income of the family did not thereby acquire a stake in the
family's assets; neither did the woman who worked for wages, so long as the property was titled
in the husband's name only. Some courts, before the introduction of equitable distribution statutes, would try to avoid the title rule in harsh cases either by creating a constructive trust for the
wife or by making substantial alimony awards, but these were uncertain and sporadic remedies.
ELLMAN Er AT-, supra note 137, at 224. During the latter half of this century, all common law
states adopted "equitable distribution" statutes that were aimed at ameliorating the harsh results
that followed from the title rule, with New York being the last to do so in 1980. Id.
209 The factors that a court should consider in dividing property is not the only important
question answered by these statutes. Equally important, in many cases, is the question, "which
property is subject to division?" These statutes ordinarily provide that either all the property of
either party is eligible for division (eg., Mass.), or that certain property is marital and subject to
division while other property, for example, inherited property or property acquired before a
marriage, is separate and not subject to equitable distribution. These differences are reflected by
the alternative versions of section 307 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, A and B.
Another important issue is what counts as property for division; an increasing scholarly emphasis
has been placed on expanding the definition of property to account for the fact that most couples
live on income rather than accumulate wealth, making earning potential itself a valuable asset.
See Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 77-78 (Colo. 1978) (holding that an educational degree is
not marital property which is subject to division by court; contribution by spouse to education of
other spouse is relevant factor to be considered if maintenance sought); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489
N.E.2d 712,715-17 (N.Y. 1985) (license to practice medicine, acquired during marriage, is marital property subject to equitable distribution); Bea A. Smith, The PartnershipTheory of Marriage:A Borrowed Solution Fails,68 TEx. L. REv. 689,706 (1990); Starnes, supranote 13, at 11315.
210 ALAsKA STAT. § 25.24.160 (1991).
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that a "just and reasonable" division 1 2 should be made, or an "equitable distribution. 2 1 3 In states with simple language of that sort, the
trial court has immense discretion to decide what is fair. There is no
statutory requirement that the court consider the contribution to asset
accumulation made by housework. For those courts that do consider
housework, no method of considering it is provided, and no weight is

prescribed. Appellate review is very difficult.2 1 4 A trial court may
take into account any factor that it thinks relevant, and may view
housework in any number of ways: as a minor contribution,215 as a
noneconomic contribution, or as a source of need unrelated to the
contribution of the houseworking spouse.2 1 6 The person who has devoted substantial time to housework that has translated into effective
income to the family is at the mercy of a judge who may not view that
contribution as economically significant. If, as I argue, there is a tendency across a number of legal doctrines to miss the insight that
housework is work and not exclusively a private aspect of family relationships, any cumulative effect that the missed insight produces can
influence a purely discretionary determination as to what is a just
property division at divorce.
Unfortunately, the states that provide specific factors to be considered in their Equitable Distribution statutes do not significantly im211 ARiz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 25-318(A) (West 1991).

212 MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.19 (West 1988); see also MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 25.99 (Law
Co-op 1993).

213 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236, Part B, 5(e) (McKinney 1986).
214 E.g., Axtell v. Axtell, 482 A.2d 1261, 1264 (Me. 1984) (finding that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in rating the financial contributions of the husband more highly than the
wife's contribution as a homemaker, in absence of evidence that the trial court did not consider
the wife's contribution at all); Semprebon v. Semprebon, 596 A.2d 361, 364 (Vt. 1991) (holding
that the "trial court has broad discretion ... and its decision will be upheld unless its discretion
was abused, withheld, or exercised on grounds clearly untenable").
215 E.g., Ealey v. Ealey, 596 A.2d 43, 47-50 (D.C. 1991) (finding that after a 23-year marriage
wife had no equitable interest in the home; her "sweat equity" contribution in the form of cleaning, cooking, daily chores, and home maintenance were only "quite modest contributions" in the
eyes of the trial judge, and the appellate court found no abuse of discretion in this conclusion).
216 See infra section IV.E.2. See, e.g., Phillips v. Phillips, 666 So. 2d 526, 530 (Ala. Cir. App.
1995) (finding wife entitled to award of marital property and home where "wife was a housewife
and her current medical condition prevented her from obtaining, much less maintaining, gainful
employment"); In re Marriage of Agazim, 530 N.E.2d 1110, 1114-15 (In. App. Ct. 1988) (finding
wife had limited earning potential and was thus entitled to 76% of the property after 11-year
marriage); McNamara v. McNamara, 443 N.W.2d 511, 516 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (finding wife
contributed significantly to husband's career by not pursuing her own career opportunities and
by providing comfort and support for husband's well-being; she had no earning capacity and
probably never would, was "nearly destitute and without a career," and thus was entitled to a
better property settlement than the trial court awarded); Goller v. Goller, 758 S.W.2d 505 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1988) (finding wife entitled to a substantial amount of marital property because she
could not support herself from earnings); Anderson v. Anderson, 390 N.W.2d 554, 555 (N.D.
1986) (finding property division leaving wife one-fourth of assets after 17 years as homemaker
was not fair particularly in light of the disparity in their earning power-a need-based factor).
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prove the situation. The original version of the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act (UMDA) 217 provides that courts should consider the
contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital property,
including his contribution as a homemaker; the value of his separate
property; the duration of the marriage; and the projected economic
circumstances of each spouse after the divorce in deciding how to divide assets in "just proportions. 2 18 This sounds very promising, in
that contributions to wealth made as a homemaker are included.
However, in the absence of a weight to give to that factor, or a requirement that it be monetized, courts have frequently treated it as a
minor contribution or as an explicitly noneconomic one.219 The later
version of the UMDA added many more factors, compounding the
discretion that comes with the failure to provide weights or presumptions to the list.22 0
Equitable Distribution statutes do not follow a single formula.
Nonetheless, generalizations can be made about them. The most significant is that when there are specific factors to be balanced, weights
for those factors, or presumptions as to distribution, are not provided.
Some states are moving toward judicially created presumptions, and
in some areas divorce lawyers negotiate as if that were the law, but the
majority of states still leave all discretion with the trial court and presume nothing about what makes a fair distribution of property. 221
2. Contribution Versus Need as Guiding Principles.-Another
source of confusion in Equitable Distribution statutes is that the factors listed for consideration suggest that both entitlement based on
contribution on the one hand and need on the other hand are significant to the property division. 2 2 So, for example, factors relating to
need in equitable distribution statutes include age, health, amount and
source of income, vocational skills, employability, liabilities, needs,
217 UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 307, 9A U.L.A. 240 (1987) (text of §307 as originally promulgated).

218 Id.;see also CALEB FOOTE ET AL, STATUTORY SUPPLEMENT TO CASES AND MATERIALS

ON FAMILY LAW 43-45 (3d ed. 1985).
219 E.g., Gooch v. Gooch, 664 S.W.2d 900, 903 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984); Rothman v. Rothman,
320 A.2d 496, 501-02 (NJ. 1974).
220 The second and final version tells courts to consider:.

the duration of the marriage, any prior marriage of either party, any antenuptial agreement
of the parties, the age, health, station, occupation, amounts and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate liabilities, and needs of each of the parties, custodial provisions, whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance, and the
opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall also
consider the contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation, or appreciation in value of the respective estates, and the contribution of a spouse as
a homemaker or to the family unit.
UNto. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 307 ALTERNATIVE A, 9A U.L.A. 238-39 (1973).
221 BRE-rr R. TURNER, EQUITABLE DIsTRmUTION OF PROPERTY § 8.02 (2d ed. 1994).
222 FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EoUALITY, supra note 13, at 46-48.
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opportunity for future acquisition of capital assets and income, economic circumstances of each party at the time the division of property
is to become effective, and length of marriage. 223 Factors that suggest
that a party has developed an entitlement or right to the property include contribution by one party to the education, training, or increased earning power of the other party, contribution or dissipation
of each party in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation, or appreciation of the marital property, including the contribution of a party as
homemaker, and perhaps the length of the marriage. 224 Although
contribution as a homemaker is listed as a factor associated with the
entitlement that comes with contribution, it is often discussed in the
cases as a factor justifying an award to the homemaker spouse because
of her resulting need based on her lower earning potential. 225 For example, an Illinois court noted that "[i]n a long-term marriage, the
source of the assets in acquiring marital property becomes less of a
factor and a spouse's role as a homemaker becomes greater. '226 This
is revealing in that the role of a homemaker is by statute supposed to
be a relevant factor precisely because of the homemaker's contribution to acquiring marital property. The Illinois court treats the two
ideas, contribution and role as a homemaker, as though they were
distinct.
No attempt is made to isolate those factors based on contribution
from those based on need, as though nothing is to be gained from
distinguishing them. But there is something to be gained from distinguishing need as a basis for distribution from contribution as a basis.
Need can be a lower threshold to satisfy. For example, when there are
assets of $400,000 to divide, what happens when the needs of either
party can be satisfied with $150,000? There is $100,000 in surplus if
need alone justifies redistribution. The surplus $100,000 may remain
with the wage-earner, who is considered the real contributor to its accumulation, if need is the justification for giving $150,000 to the
houseworker. In contrast to property division, alimony explicitly operates almost entirely on a need principle, rather than a contribution
principle, and leaves any surplus in future earnings to the wageearner, who occupies the position of the contributor. Recognition as a
contributor,then, can entitle a person in the eyes of a trial court to
more than that which the court finds her needs require.22 7
223 See, e.g., PA. CONS. STAT. ANN . DIVORCE CODE § 3502(a) (1991) (borrowing from the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 307).
224 Id.
225 See, e.g., supra note 216 (cases cited).

226 In re Marriage of Cecil, 560 N.E.2d 374, 379 (II1.App. Ct. 1990).
227 See infra section IV.E.5 (discussing alimony). One must exercise caution here, because in
some state court systems the practice of 50-50 division based on the contribution as homemaker
provision has developed in very recent years. Moreover, it is hard to know, given judicial discretion and the impoverished state of empirical research on family law outcomes, whether the dif-
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3. Resistance to Monetization.-What we see from the discretionary valuation of housework is a missed opportunity to consider
the value of housework in a concrete way. Most courts are extremely
reluctant to hear testimony at divorce of the actual economic value of
housework228 to the marital property accumulated: "[w]e do not believe that.., the legislature intended, through the 'homemaker contribution' language ... to stimulate detailed inquiry into the private
activities of the home." 2 9 Housework is again not simply undervalued, but is quite literally not valued. Justified by the understanding
that marriage cannot be reduced to a commercial event,23 0 women's
unpaid labor is again viewed as inseparable from the emotional aspects of the marital relationship-the "private activities of the home."
The justification that aspects of the marital relationship should not be
viewed in the terms of economic exchange does not discriminate between emotions and housework. 231 However, it does exclude easily
income and property accumulation produced by wage labor; tracing
assets from these sources is a common part of a court's conception of
the "contribution" to wealth accumulation.
Awards based on the "contribution as a homemaker" factor often
combine different understandings of that contribution: contribution
to the family's wealth through labor, contribution that allows the
other spouse to enhance his education or career, and contribution that
results in the loss of the homemaker's own career opportunities. 232
ference between contribution and need has the impact that I postulate here. However, in the
alimony context, need and contribution do have this effect: the recipient's needs are calculated,
but the wage-earning payor's are not. He is instead the beneficiary of all surplus beyond the
recipient's needs even if the amount vastly exceeds his own needs, because he has earned the
money, thus his entitlement is based on contribution. Thus, it seems plausible to predict that in
dividing property, a judge who believes that it is a homemaker's needs that justify a property
redistribution will limit the redistribution accordingly, while a judge who believes contribution
entitles her to an award will be more inclined to use a 50-50 presumption.
228 Russ, supra note 206, § 2(b). However, some courts are willing to hear testimony as to
economic value; these courts rely on the consortium and wrongful death cases. See Bidwell v.
Bidwell, 504 N.Y.S.2d 327,329 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (trial court properly excluded testimony of
labor expert as to value of homemaker services); Smith v. Smith, 363 S.E.2d 404, 408 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1987) (trial court not bound to accept the expert's testimony regarding the wife's contributions); TURNER, supra note 221.

229 In re Marriage of Patus, 372 N.E.2d 493, 495-96 (Ind. App. 1978).
230 See, e.g., Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 661 P.2d 196 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (finding monetization
diminishes individual personality); Russ, supra note 206, § 2(b) ("many courts remain unwilling
to accept any evidence attempting to place a dollar-per-hour or per-week figure on [homemaker's] services").
231 See, e.g., Pyeatte, 661 P.2d at 196 (refusing a wife's request for compensation for her contribution to her husband's schooling, saying that the act of translating that contribution into a
monetary award would reduce the individual personalities of the husband and wife to economic
entities).
232 1 HoWARD LIPSEY ET AL, VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY,
§ 19.07[6] (1995).
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The failure to sort the three out allows courts to avoid valuation by
leaning most heavily on the last element-opportunity costs. For example, in deciding on a homemaker's share in marital property, one
court allowed expert testimony on the kind of pension she would have
had had she worked in the wage labor market, but no testimony was
given as to the value of the services she performed instead.233 The
needs created by the separate kinds of investments in human capital
are very real, but they are a separate issue from the real wealth already consumed or reflected in the marital assets.
4. Poor Treatment of Mixed Labor Histories: Paid Work and
Housework Cannot Be Combined.-That courts ignore contribution
in favor of need is illustrated most clearly by considering the common
case of spouses who both work in the wage labor market. If the
homemaker provision were intended to capture concrete contributions, then it should apply when a homemaker also works in the wage
labor market, thus contributing to the marriage in two ways. But
courts have interpreted the homemaker provision as applying only to
spouses whose sole contribution is as a homemaker. 234 The focus of
the UMDA homemaker provision is on a homemaker spouse; it is not
obvious to courts that the homemaker provision has any application at
all when neither spouse is a full-time homemaker. 235 The notion that
the homemaker provision may not be used by a "breadwinner-homemaker-spouse" 236 is in serious tension with the notion that the homemaker provision represents the recognition of the economic value of
housework. We cannot fairly characterize recognition of the eco233 Parrot v. Parrot, 292 S.E.2d 182, 184 (S.C. 1982) (holding that homemaker was entitled to
share of property due to her lost career opportunities); see e.g., Williams v. Williams, 714 P.2d
548, 552-53 (Mont. 1986) (expert testified as to what pension homemaker would have had if

employed, not as to value of her housework services). It may be, in fact, that testimony as to
opportunity cost will be the most effective estimate of the value of household services, assuming
that the allocation of time to home labor was an efficient decision. But if so, one would want to
see the opportunity costs offered for the purpose of estimating the value of the unpaid labor

performed. More direct testimony on the value of housework services is possible even though it
is not practiced. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Francis, 442 N.W.2d 59, 65-66 (Iowa 1989).
234 In re Marriage of Patus, 372 N.E.2d 493 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978) ("The 'homemaker contribu-

tion' was isolated by the legislature to allow for the circumstances wherein (1) one spouse is not
employed outside the home, (2) that the unemployed spouse is solely a homemaker, and (3) the
unemployed, homemaking spouse is the primary homemaker.") (emphasis in the original); In re
Marriage of Stice, 779 P.2d 1020, 1027-28 (Or. 1989) (finding legislative intent that "home-

maker" provision is irrelevant to a claim that both spouses work full-time outside the home but
one works more in the home as well).
235 See, e.g., Stice, 779 P.2d at 1027-28 (finding legislative intent that "homemaker" provision

is irrelevant to a claim that both spouses work full-time outside the home but one works more in
the home as well); see also, In re Marriage of Banach, 489 N.E.2d 363, 369 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)

(holding that spouse who wants additional credit for housework must show greater
contribution).
236 Stice, 779 P.2d at 1028.
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nomic value of housework as a goal of the Equitable Distribution statutes if courts ignore the substantial contribution to family wealth
generated by the housework that many spouses perform in addition to
their paid labor. The literature on Second Shift work, discussed in
Part II, makes clear that many paid laborers are performing more
than half of the value-producing home labor as well.23 7 Breadwinnerhomemaker-spouses are, however, often more able to provide an income for themselves post-divorce than are full-time homemakers.
Limiting the homemaker provision to full-time homemakers suggests
that need rather than entitlement is the primary issue presented by the
homemaker spouse: her entitlement is compelling because of the
lower earning power that the full-time homemaker role has been left.
While need is indeed an extremely valuable consideration in both
property division and maintenance awards, 23 8 reliance on need when
contribution is clearly present does not represent progress in the recognition of the economic value of housework.
Moreover, this interpretation of the homemaker provision takes
inadequate account of women's most common labor pattern, a combination of paid and unpaid labor. As we have seen with the social security system, 23 9 a person must choose to accept the benefits
associated with either wage labor or housework, but not both, even
though a combination of the two describes the work profile of most
women. The reform of marital property and support law embodied in
the UMDA has brought some equity to the divorcing houseworker
who has been out of the wage labor market for a long period of
time-the conventional marriage of the last generation. But it does so
with a nonspecific notion of equity, one that is not articulated in a
manner that will accommodate the common labor proffle of the
houseworker of this generation, who does some paid work and some
housework. This can be particularly damaging when a houseworker is
in the wage labor market, but has compromised on wages there in
order to allocate more time to housework: she gets no credit for the
housework and is left relying on the skills associated with low-wage
market labor for her future welfare.
5. Support (Alimony): Different Human Capital Investments
and the Idea of an Equal Partnership.-Support, also called maintenance or alimony, operates on a slightly different principle than property division. Divorce law in the modern era has been extremely

237 See supra Part II.
238 Consider here Martha Fineman's argument that dependency is an inevitable aspect of
human experience. See FwNMAN, Tim NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 12, at 161-73.
239 See supra subpart IV.B.
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aspirational on the question of finality. 240 Modern maintenance and
property statutes both reflect a preference for property awards over
maintenance awards because property awards provide a clean break
between the parties at the time of divorce. 241 In addition, most courts
now limit maintenance awards to short-term transitional mechanisms
for effectuating the clean break, with the typical limitation being
about two years. 242 In contrast to property awards discussed above,
need alone, rather than need in combination with contribution, determines an alimony award. This new vision of limited financial support
after marriage has severe implications for the houseworker.
Property division is not an effective tool to reward housework
because most divorcing couples do not have significant assets subject
to a property division. Most couples support themselves primarily
from income, and financial security is provided first and foremost by
earning potential. 243 Because a homemaker spouse usually has limited wage labor training, she is left without this security at the time of
divorce. If modest assets are divided equally, the wage-earning
spouse still takes the bulk of the financial security with him in the

form of future earning capacity. 244 Courts have been reluctant to ex-

pand the pool of property to be divided at divorce to include this earning potential, whether in the form of an advanced degree or a simple
prediction of earning power.245 The lack of significant marital assets

240 E.g., Kvenild v. Kvenild, 410 N.W.2d 70, 71-72 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (trying to arrange
the property award so as to avoid a support award and thus provide finality); Russ, supra note
206, § 14 (arguing that equitable distribution is meant to preclude spousal support awards).
241 See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Act § 308 cONT., 9A U.LA. 348 (1987) ("[D]ual
intention [of §§ 307 and 308] is to encourage the court to provide. . . by property disposition
rather than maintenance"). The UMDA statement of policy states that courts should favor
property over support to promote finality. E.g., In re Marriage of Aud, 491 N.E.2d 894, 899 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1986); Keen v. Keen, 407 N.W.2d 643, 645 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
242 See, eg., Contogeorgos v. Contogeorgos, 482 So. 2d 590 (Fla. App. 1986); Griffith v. Griffith, 376 So. 2d 418, 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); In re Marriage of Reed, 427 N.E.2d 282, 284
(Ill. App. Ct. 1981); In re Marriage of Battles, 564 N.E.2d 565, 567 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); In re
Marriage of Bevers, 326 N.W.2d 896, 900 (Iowa 1982); Petschel v. Petschel, 406 N.W.2d 604, 60708 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Barrett v. Barrett, 614 A.2d 299, 302 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Hoak v.
Hoak, 370 S.E.2d 473, 475 (W. Va. 1988).
243 Paul Hemp, Boom and Doom, BosrON GLOBE MAGAZINE, Oct. 8, 1995, at 20.
244 See generally ALLEN H. PARKMAN, NO-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT WRONG? 6-7, 13037 (1992) (failure to understand human capital and treat it as divisible accounts for reduction in
women's post-divorce welfare); Deborah A. Batts, Remedy Refocus: In Search of Equity in "Enhanced Spouse/Other Spouse" Divorces, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 751, 752-53 (1988); Elizabeth M.
Landes, Economics of Alimony, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 35, 35-6 (1978); Starnes, supranote 13, at 125;
Leslie F. Bums & Gregg A. Grauer, Note, Human Capital As MaritalProperty, 19 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 499 (1990).
245 ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 137, at 327-28.
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alone makes it difficult for a homemaker
spouse to take any financial
246
security away from a divorce.
The modem tendency to disfavor maintenance further exacerbates the financial difficulties of a houseworker spouse at divorce,
with future income being the couple's main source of financial security and with no long-term income sharing after divorce to give the
houseworker access to that security. The trend away from maintenance is a part of the desire for a clean break at divorce. 47 But it also
reflects the view that women, the primary beneficiaries of maintenance awards, no longer suffer economic disabilities in the marketplace and can provide for their own financial needs after a short
period of retraining. 248 Even if this aspiration for sex equality does
not reflect reality, there is a reasonable argument that a person's former spouse is not responsible for sex inequality in general.249 But
when a houseworker's disability in the market is caused by family decisions about human capital investments, the financial disabilities of
the houseworker spouse are a product of the marriage. 250 In the case
of property division, there is some recognition of this problem, with
courts tending to consider this aspect of the houseworker spouse's situation more seriously than the notion that her contribution has been
an economic one. 251 But in the case of maintenance awards, there is
little interest in this problem for houseworker spouses and even less
for breadwinner-homemaker-spouses who may still have made substantial earning potential sacrifices in favor of housework.
Courts need to employ a much more sophisticated understanding
of human capital investment. As many commentators have pointed
246 Stames, supranote 13, at 86-87; LENORE J. WErrTZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE
UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES

FOR WOMEN AND

CHILDREN IN

AMERICA 61-69 (1985). Although Weitzman's data have been extremely controversial in their
reporting of the magnitude of this problem, the trend that she identifies has not. See, e.g., Saul
Hoffman & Greg Duncan, What Are the Economic Consequences of Divorce? 25 DEMOGRAPHY
641 (1988).
247 See supra note 240 (sources cited).
248 Kover v. Kover, 278 N.E.2d 886, 891 (N.Y. 1972); see also Ira M. Ellman, The Theory of
Alimony, 77 CAL L. REv. 1, 74-81 (1989).
249 Ellman, supranote 248, at 5. Ellman argues that some of women's post-divorce economic
disadvantage results from the persistence of discrimination against women in the wage labor
market. He argues that marriage law should not compensate for the portion of an ex-wife's
monetary disadvantage that results from market discrimination because that disadvantage is not
a product of the marriage. Id A partial response might be that while discrimination in the
market is not caused by that individual marriage, it may result in part from employer response to
marriage roles in general, in that employers may either perceive women employees as less dependent on wages because they receive support from a spouse and thus set their wages lower
than men's, or perceive women as greater employment risks because they do not frequently
receive the free labor at home needed to sustain the ideal worker.
250 Susan Westerberg Prager, Sharing Principles and the Future of MaritalProperty Law, 25
UCLA L. REv. 1, 7-11 (1977).
251 See supra section IV.E.2.
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out, the dilemma for the houseworker in alimony awards is a result
both of the failure of courts to understand the decisions that have
been made in a marriage as to investment in human capital and an
unwillingness to create an entitlement to one spouse's human capital
for the other spouse. 25 2 Those few courts that do see a human capital
investment at play, see one for the wage laborer who has had help
obtaining an advanced degree.25 3 No court has recognized a "familyspecific" human capital investment decision for the houseworker,
although some commentators have argued for it.254 Commentators
have viewed a homemaker's human capital investment as "firm-specific" or "family-specific," meaning that it involves skills and knowledge that add wealth to one unique "firm"-or here, family-but are
not transportable elsewhere in the market and do not retain their
value there. The houseworker's family-specific, nontransportable
human capital investment decision was made as a part of an understanding that included sharing the fruits of the wage laborer's market
human capital. Since this "investment" decision is made in reliance
on the continuation of the family and benefits the family, some stake
in the
wage laborer's human capital investment is not hard to justify. 255 While human capital investment has long been a part of the
understanding of marriage among economists, it is still absent from
the law, and as some have argued, displaced homemakers are the victims of the failure to understand the economics of marriage. Once
again we see the failure of the legal system to appreciate the economic
status of housework and the subsequent negative consequences for
those who perform it. Some court see the human capital decisions as
decisions about the intimate relationship that is being severed at divorce. 256 This again conflates the economic value of unpaid labor with
the emotional aspects of a marriage.
Unlike property distribution statutes, maintenance statutes do
not consider contribution, including contribution to human capital,
but only consider need. 257 Thus, maintenance statutes provide no real
252 See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Contracting for Security: Paying Married Women What
They've Earned,55 U. Cm. L. REV. 1193, 1196-97 (1988); Cohen, supra note 72, at 278; Landes,
supra note 244, at 44-49; Starnes, supra note 13, at 70-73, 86-89.
253 E.g., O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712,717 (N.Y. 1985); Michael G. Walsh, Annotation,

Spouse's ProfessionalDegree or License as MaritalPropertyfor Purpose ofAlimony, Support, or
PropertySettlement, 4 A.L.R. 4th 1294, 1295 (1981).

254 Landes, supra note 244, at 44-45.

255 See Landes, supra note 244, at 62-63; Starnes, supra note 13, at 124-27. But consider the

law and economics argument that full compensation for reliance encourages inefficient reliance.
A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 34-37 (2d ed. 1989); W.

David Slawson, The Role of Reliance in ContractDamages, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 197,227 (1990).
256 E.g., Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 661 P.2d at 196 (refusing wife's request for monetary award based
on her contribution to her husband's schooling; court says to make the award would diminish the
personal relationships by turning individuals into economic entities).
257 E.g., UNIF.MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 308; CLARK, JR., supra note 102, at 647-49.
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opportunity to appropriately consider housework and its contribution
to human capital. As a result, human capital in the form of increased
earning power for a wage-earner belongs solely to the wage-earner in
the absence of a showing of need on the part of the other spouse.
Once a homemaker spouse's needs are met out of a wage-earner
spouse's salary, the inquiry ends and the wage-earner retains the rest
of that salary. There is no analysis of the wage-earner's needs, thus
the wage-earner is not limited to need in deciding his share of the
future income. Instead, the wage-earner takes all of the surplus over
his spouse's needs, whether or not that surplus exceeds what is necessary to meet the wage-earner's needs.
In both property division and maintenance orders, the law has
advanced somewhat in its explicit conception of the economic value of
housework. But extreme limitations on this understanding remain.
By allowing for complete discretion in dividing property, family law
statutes do not force courts to engage in a concrete analysis of the
value of housework. By conflating contribution with need in deciding
on property division, courts tend to recognize the detrimental effects
on women's market potential that have resulted from housework
more than the entitlement to property that housework ought to create
because it has generated substantial wealth for a family. With regard
to maintenance orders, the trend away from permanent maintenance
reflects a view about disentanglement that assumes that marriage
work roles, especially the housework role, were a function of the emotional bond in the marriage and not of any economic motivation or
effect. A failure to understand human capital investment decisions
made in marriage has left those whose skills and training are family
specific (so as to maximize the material rewards to a particular family
unit whether or not those individuals also work in the paid labor market), without financial security. Finally, basing maintenance on need
rather than on a combination of need and contribution precludes a
serious analysis of the justification for using maintenance, not just
property, to compensate houseworkers for their contribution to the
wealth accumulation represented by their human capital decisions.
F. Welfare Reform: Caringfor Children Is Not Work
Today's welfare debate, and in many states today's welfare programs, treat a person who works in the home caring for children as
someone who does not work and who has no work ethic. Housework
here is defined as precisely the opposite of work: it is understood as
leisure and those who are doing it are condemned precisely because
they do not "work."
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The Social Security Act of 1935 contains the federal government's main social welfare programs. 25 8 Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) is the federal program providing cash
assistance for poor children and their guardians, who in most instances
are their mothers. Supplemental Security Income (SSI) provides cash
assistance to the elderly and disabled. Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI), provides cash upon retirement to wage-earners, spouses
of wage-earners who have not been in the labor market, and survivors
of wage-earners. AFDC is commonly called welfare, and OASI is
commonly called "social security."
These different programs, as many have argued, divide recipients
into the "deserving" and the "undeserving. ' 259 The deserving include
contributors to the wage economy who receive social security benefits-even though those benefits exceed actual contributions madeand in that sense have a substantial welfare component. 260 The deserving also include those who are unemployable without fault: the
disabled and widows 26 1 and children of participating wage-earners.
The undeserving include the poor who are "employable" 262 but unemployed,2 63 and single mothers who are either divorced or never married rather than widowed. 264 The former, it is thought, are needy due
258 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-306 (West 1996).
259 See JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL CoNsTrruION OF POVERTY 7 (1991); MICHAEL B. KATz, THi UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO
WAR ON WELFARE (1989).
260 Robert D. Hershey, Jr., MisunderstandingSocial Security, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1995, at
4E (average beneficiary retiring at 65 will get back all the money she put in with interest in
approximately three and one half years, leaving ten years of "undeserving" benefits, assuming a
normal life span).
261 Survivors' benefits are also available to widowers, but the notion that they are designed
for widows is deeply entrenched in the social security system. HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra
note 259, at 107.
262 Whether someone is considered "employable" is a judgment that is not limited to whether
they can obtain and keep a job without violating abuse and neglect laws. Many disabled or blind
people are capable of work with accommodations, and the status of being a widow is completely
disconnected from judgments about employment prospects. At one time, single mothers of children were in the category "unemployable" because of a narrow vision of a proper maternal role.
Law, supra note 13, at 1254-61. The "employable" designation today does not depend on a
judgment either that child care is available to cover the welfare mother's current work in the
home, or that there is any job available to her (particularly when unemployment is high), much
less a job with a wage that could support her family. JOEL F. HANDILER, THE POVERTY OF
WELFARE REFORM 56-88 (1995). Instead it is a judgment that society does not approve of her
choices as to childbearing, marriage, or divorce, and so does not wish to see her supported in her
role as a mother. Id. at 89-109.
263 Unless they have recently been employed for a period of time, in which case they may be
eligible for the more generous unemployment compensation program. Gwendolyn Mink, Welfare Reform in HistoricalPerspective, 26 CONN. L. REV. 879, 887 (1994).
264 E.g., FINEMAN, Tim NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 12, at 115-88; HANDLER &
HASENFELD, supra note 259, at 3, 7; KA-z, supra note 259, at 4-8.
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to something beyond their control; the latter are needy due to personal choices.
SSI and OASI cover the deserving. The maximum monthly payments to the aged and disabled under SSI are uniformly higher than
the awards paid to needy children and mothers under AFDC.265 The
widow of a wage-earner receives comparatively generous benefits
under social security. Her children may be eligible for very generous
survivor's benefits in circumstances in which the children of a woman,
similar in all respects but that she was never married, are not eligible
for any assistance under any of the Social Security programs
or are
266
only eligible for the far less generous AFDC benefits.
The AFDC benefits, available to the "undeserving," have always
been accompanied by behavioral requirements. In the early years,
AFDC (at one time ADC) went to white widows; African-Americans
were not enrolled, nor were never married women. Single mothers
were strictly monitored under "man-in-the-house rules" to make sure
that they had no sexual relationships with men.267 Today, emphasis
has shifted to procreative decisions as expressed in "family caps" that
do not provide aid to children born after a woman is already receiving
AFDC.268 But today's most important behavioral control for our purposes is the work requirement.
Work requirements are not new to welfare, but they have become
increasingly strict over the past six years, and the welfare reforms currently under debate are more restrictive still. At one time, women
with small children on AFDC were not eligible to participate in job
training programs, which were reserved for men or for childless women.269 Later, job training and workfare programs became available
to women with small children on a volunteer basis, but these women
had an option to care for their children in their home instead of seeking wage work. 270 Today, many states require women to participate in
workfare or job training programs when their children are preschool
265 Law, supra note 13, at 1326.
266 Fineman, supra note 13, at 282-83.
267 "Man-in-the-house" rules conditioned AFDC on never having a man in the house, even
for a single night. HANDLER, supra note 262, at 92.
268 Twenty states have taken steps to impose a family cap. Barbara Vobjeda, Most States are
Shaping Their Own Welfare Reform, WAsH. PosT, Feb. 3, 1996, at A7.
269 Law, supra note 13, at 1262-67.

270 That welfare permitted women the option of caring for their children does not mean that
there was no attempt to control the conduct of these women; racial barriers and restrictions on
sexual activity are an important part of the history of welfare enrollment in this country. Narrowing the welfare roles through eligibility restrictions has always been a part of the welfare
system, but once qualified for AFDC, the choice to care for one's young children in the home
was permitted. Joel Handler, The Transformation of Aid to Families with Dependent Children:
The Family Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 457, 460-66,
473, 519 (1987-88).
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age, often one year old, and sometimes sooner.271 Lip service is paid
to the need for child care to accompany these work requirements, but
the actual availability of child272
care and funding for it are extremely
limited for women on AFDC.
Why the drive to promote market work for mothers of infant children? The history of work requirements and their relationship to the
purposes being served by the welfare system is complicated and has
received attention from many quarters.2 73 Here, we are interested in
the relationship between the failure to perceive the AFDC mother as
working in the home and our larger understanding of housework. If,
as I have argued, housework is ennobled by familial relationships and
affections such that it is an act of love rather than labor, the disparagement of the AFDC mother takes on a new shape. As Martha
Fineman has argued, the absence of an adult male in the life of a welfare mother is what degrades the value of her work-no sanctioned
affection, no work. 274 The welfare mother is seen as a marriage failure; thus, she is thought to have a motivation problem related to
work-her work at home is invisible. Had she been married and widowed, SSI would be available to her with no work requirement. 275 As
with the spousal benefit under social security, financial rewards for
housework do not result from performing the work, but from successful maintenance of the romantic relationship between spouses or parents of a child. Love is visible; labor is not.
Compare the position in the reform debate of the housework of a
middle class married mother to that of a poor single mother. The
poor single mother is exhorted to start working, meaning to go into
the wage labor market, as if she were not working at home. At the
same time, the Christian Coalition advocates, as a part of its Contract
with American Families, that full-time homemakers be permitted to
make contributions to IRAs in the same amount as a wage-earner,
"thereby providing equitable treatment to spouses who work at
home. '2 76 This reform is called the "Mothers and Homemakers'
Rights Act," and standing on its own, it is a positive development in
271 E.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 409.029 (8)(a-b) (1993) (all welfare recipients, regardless of children,
to participate in employment plans). The welfare debate ignores the strong economic incentive
for wage work-the low level of AFDC benefits.
272 See HANDLER, supra note 262, at 111, 124-25.
273 See, e.g., HANDLER, supra note 262, at 32-88; HANDLER & HASENFELD, supranote 259, at
170-200; KATz, supra note 259, at 223-35; Martha Minow, The Welfare of Single Mothers and
Their Children, 26 CoNN. L. Rnv. 817 (1994); Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Reform Proposals,102 YALE L.J. 719 (1992).
274 FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supranote 12, at 106-25; Fineman, supra note 13, at

285-89.
275 Fineman, supra note 13, at 282-83.

276 Press release of the Christian Coalition, Christian CoalitionReleases Contractwith American Families (May 19, 1995) (on file with author).

91:1 (1996)

Legal Response to Home Labor

the recognition of home labor. But the same groups that are convinced that single mothers on AFDC who work at home lack a work
ethic are equally concerned about equitable treatment for "spouses
who work at home." There are two ways to tell who they think deserves "equitable treatment" with market workers. The first is that
they refer to "spouses;" these are the worthy houseworkers, whose
role becomes work because they are married. The second is that the
IRA is not of use to someone who is making a passingly livable wage
and cannot avail herself of long-range savings; it provides an income
tax benefit only to individuals whose income is sufficient to warrant
taxation. The funds for the IRA contribution must come from a
wage-earner, thus the "equitable treatment" is dependent again on a
marriage bond.
The work of married middle class women and single welfare
mothers bears further comparison. The available data indicates that
mothers of young children on AFDC are working the same number of
hours as mothers who are not on AFDC with the same allocation between paid and unpaid labor.277 The AFDC family allocation, which
averages $383.49 per month, 278 cannot support an individual, much
less a family. Thus the majority of mothers receiving AFDC also
work in the paid labor market in an unreported capacity, such as domestic workers, bartenders, and caterers, with a very small number
selling drugs and engaging in prostitution to bring their families up to
the poverty line.279 The average middle class mother works part-time,
allocating the rest of her time, as does the AFDC mother, to housework including the care of her children.
Thus, the perception that women on AFDC have a deficient desire to work or are currently not working in comparison to other women is not borne out by data.28 0 In fact, it seems plausible that the
Second Shift work in the home is more time-consuming for poor women than for middle class women,
as poor women can afford fewer
labor-saving devices and services. 281
277 HANDLER, supra note 262, at 51-54; Heidi Hartmann & Roberta Spalter-Roth, Reducing
Welfare's Stigma: Policies that Build upon Commonalities Among Women, 26 CONN. L. REv. 901,
908 (1994) (citing data from

ROBERTA SPALTER-ROTH ET AL, COMBINING WORK AND WEL-

FARE: ANaT-PovERTY STRATEGY (1992)).

278 Figures are for 1992. Social Security Programs in the United States, 1993, Soc. SEcUTrrY

BULL, Dec. 23, 1993, at 3. Other social programs such as subsidized housing or childcare can
raise the value of government support from these figures, but those programs tend to be subject
to availability and very vulnerable to budgetary constraints.
279 HANDLER, supra note 262, at 51-54; CISTOPHER JENCKS, Rnnuc-mrNo SOCIAL POuCY

208 (1992); Kathleen Mullan Harris, Work and Welfare Among Single Mothers in Poverty, 99 AM.
J. Soc. 317, 329 (1993).
280 The need for welfare for poor women results not from a deficient work ethic, but a deficiency of jobs paying livable wages. HANDLER, supra note 262, at 54.
281 Martha Minow makes this argument persuasively. See Minow, supra note 273, at 829-30.
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The work requirements of AFDC are built around the idea that
women staying home with preschool children are not working. Thus
in the welfare system, we again see housework treated as something
other than work. A marital relationship makes the role of caretaker
valid;28 2 the labor is not labor without the love. As with the spousal
benefit for social security, in this context the law does not deny that
housework is work because of love, but conditions its value on
whether it's accompanied by a successful adult relationship. Thus,
without love, it cannot be labor.
G. Labor Laws: A Wage for Housework Does Not Make It Work
So far, we have looked only at examples of the legal treatment of
unpaid housework. We now turn to a completely different set of laws
that shed light on the issues surrounding unpaid labor. Those are the
ordinary labor laws governing paid domestic workers. Few would argue that paid domestic workers do not fit the most basic understanding of what it means to be "employed"-working for pay outside the
home. One might expect the legal treatment of paid domestic workers to track, more or less, the legal treatment of all wage workers. But
in fact, the treatment of paid domestic workers is made up of a series
of exceptions to ordinary labor laws. Some exceptions are explicit,
such as exemption from all of the National Labor Relations Act, from
coverage under the Occupational Safety and Health Act coverage,
and from much of workers' compensation law. Others are a matter of
extreme underenforcement, such as social security coverage (which
was recently amended to cover fewer paid domestic workers) 28 3 and
unemployment taxes. While domestic workers are not exempt from
all labor laws, their significantly different treatment from other paid
laborers merits some investigation. These exemptions paint a picture
of a kind of work that does not look like work, even when it is done
for pay. The paid domestic worker, already suffering in practice the
low wage and lack of job security and benefits that keep her on the
edge of a living wage, is also formally denied the protections that ordinarily accompany paid employment. Thus, the work has both low status in practice and low status in law.
It might be difficult to demonstrate the causal relationship between the legal treatment of the paid and the unpaid domestic worker.
However, it seems plausible to suggest that we treat the paid domestic
worker as different legally from the rest of the paid working world in
part because the kind of work performed by a paid domestic worker is
2K FmEmAN, TnE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 12, passim.
283 Taxation, Budget and Accounting Text, Daily Rep. Exec. (BNA) No. DER 63 d77, sec. L

(Apr. 3, 1995); Social Security Domestic Employment Reform Act of 1994, (BNA) Pub. L. No.
103-387, 108 Stat 4071 (replacing the quarterly threshold of $50 with a yearly one of $1,000 for
paying social security tax on domestic workers).
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in most families performed by a family member without pay, and thus
subject to the legal rules of housework discussed so far.28 4 The history
of the relationship between paid and unpaid domestic workers has
been written as one of extreme racial and class tension among women,
undoubtedly with good reason.28 5 But it may be that the economic
circumstances of the paid domestic worker are tied to those of the
unpaid houseworker by similarity as well as difference between them.
The labor of paid domestic workers replaces the unpaid housework
performed in other homes by a member of the household, and the
transition to paid labor in those few homes that employ domestic
workers does not transform our understanding of the work itself. Devalued or not valued when it is performed for free, housework is not
fully dignified as labor even when it is performed for pay.
Only when domestic work is performed in a business-for example, when an apartment complex employs a staff of housekeepers or a
business contracts with households for housecleaning-does the work
achieve its status as labor warranting protection under labor laws.
There, the employment relationship is between a firm and the domestic worker, a relationship that does not resemble family relationships
as much as it resembles many paid labor relationships. Conversely,
the relationship of the individual employer to a paid domestic worker
resembles the family relationships more closely. When that resem286
blance is strongest, labor laws do not apply to the relationship.
Consider, for example, the response of a politician who failed to
check the immigration status of a childcare worker: he said that by
the time he knew the nanny was in California illegally, "it was too
late"-the family had become attached to her.2 Labor laws give way
when the employee is a "part of the family." Language from the early
labor law decisions establishing a domestic-employee exemption support the notion that labor laws do not apply to paid domestic workers
284 This is not to say that the poor treatment of paid domestic workers can be explained
entirely by reference to the unpaid domestic worker. Racism, immigration issues, and poverty
all play a role in the position of the paid domestic worker. See infra note 285 (sources cited).
285 JUDITH ROLLINS, BETWEEN WOMEN: DomsTIcs AND THEIR EMPLOYERS 155-203 (1985);
MARY ROMERO, MAID IN THE U.S.A. 97-133 (1992).

286 It may be argued that a business, because of its size, has the administrative capability to
handle labor laws in a way that an individual employer does not. This fact cannot be used to
explain these labor law exemptions. These provisions exempt domestic workers by name in
statutory language or in regulations, in provisions quite separate from those addressing administrative concerns such as the size of a business. It would be extremely odd to attempt to address
administrative concerns over the size of an enterprise by naming one kind of employment arrangement that fits that description, and only one. It makes more sense to think of the exemption as sparing the individual the role of employer within the home, a justification that feeds into
my argument that the law takes an active role in obscuring the fact that housework is in fact
work. See supra subpart III.B.
287 Dick Rogers & Lisa M. Krieger, Huffington Blames Nanny on His Wife, S.F. EXAMINER,
Oct. 28, 1994, at A-1.
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because of a conception of the worksite, a private home, as a place of
comfort and affections. 2s8
I raise three explicit examples of exemptions from coverage
under ordinary labor laws for paid domestic workers: an explicit exemption under the National Labor Relations Act, an explicit exemption from Occupational Safety and Health Act regulations, and-in
almost all states-an
exemption of some sort from workers' compen289
sation protection.
1. The NationalLabor Relations Act. -The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), along with its amendments, is the mainstay of
labor law. It sets out the basic rights and responsibilities of employers
and employees in their relations with one another. The NLRA's coverage is sweeping: it covers "any industry or activity in commerce," as
well as any employer for whom a labor dispute would "tend to burden" commerce. 290 The statute explicitly exempts a tiny class of employees, including government workers (who receive similar
protections under different statutes), 291 agricultural workers (who are
sometimes covered under state law), 292 independent contractors, and
"any individual employed... in the domestic service of any family or
person at his home. ' 293 No alternative statute covers domestic workers, who currently stand without labor law protection. 294 Thus, domestic laborers are denied all of the benefits that labor law brings to
collective bargaining. Without a chance to organize in recent years
288 State v. Cooper, 285 N.W. 903, 905 (Minn. 1939) (holding that domestic workers cannot
picket a home despite legal entitlement of other workers to picket their worksites: home is "the
abiding place of affections").
289 I do not address the significant underenforcement of labor laws that do apply to domestic
workers, such as unemployment compensation and social security, although I believe that this
underenforcement also reflects the view that domestic labor is different in kind from other labor.
290 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197, 142(1) (1994). We know from Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125
(1942), where wheat that a family grew for its own consumption affected commerce, that the
family economy affects commerce. Consider also the measures of the value of housework ranging from 24% to 60% of the Gross Domestic Product. See supra section II.B.1.
291 Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1994) (covering federal employees); ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TExT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND
COLLECrIVE BARGAINING 27 (1976) (state statutes cover state government employees).
292 See, e.g., Alatorre-Aenovich-Dunlap-Berman Agricultural Labor Relations Act, CALLAB. CODE §§ 1140-1166 (West 1989).

293 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994). The National Labor Relations Board, in its administrative jurisdiction, promulgated regulations requiring a certain dollar volume for coverage under the Act.
That volume would exclude domestic workers in practice. However, this practical exemption is

not in the statute itself. Where the NLRB regulations are aimed at administrative feasibility, the
statutory exemptions are prior to such concerns. This is apparent in the OSHA exemption for
household workers, which is justified simply on "public policy" grounds. 29 C.F.R. § 1975.6

(1995).
294 Most state statutes also exempt domestic workers. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 8-3-104

(11)(a) (1994); S.D. CODIMIED LAWS ANN. § 60-9A-1(3) (1995).
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under the protection of labor laws, it is hard to compare the low wages
of domestic laborers to those of workers for whom organization is easier, without questioning whether legal disadvantages inorganizing are
responsible in part for depressing wages. If labor law has played some
role in setting the market rates for domestic labor, this law may have
an effect on the level at which we value housework in the divorce
context as well as in social security accounts, where policymakers may
informally assess the value of unpaid labor by comparing it to its closest paid equivalents.
Before the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935, there was already
a significant history of organization by paid domestic workers. Despite varying degrees of disinterest or active rejection by mainstream
organized labor unions like the AFL, a significant number of local
unions of maids had formed using hiring halls to force local employers
to improve wages and working conditions. 295 This history of organization belies the objection that it is impractical to apply ideas of organized labor to scattered-site and multiple-employer jobs. There has
been a continued
but marginalized interest in organization among domestic workers. 296
Some courts were quite explicit in invoking the image of the
home as a site of affections to justify exempting the home from labor
confrontations. In 1939, the state of Minnesota upheld the conviction
for nuisance of a domestic worker who had picketed his employer's
home-the employee's workplace. The court said the worker was not
entitled to the protection of a Minnesota statute entitling all employees to organizing rights, because the home "is a sacred place for people to go and be quiet and at rest and not be bothered with the turmoil
of industry"; it is "[t]he abiding place of the affections, especially domestic affections. ' 297 These domestic affections were assumed to
cover the relationship between the paid domestic worker and the employee. This court transformed labor into love in a surprising configuration: paid employee and employer. This case shares rhetoric and
reasoning with contract cases that address a wife's housework and the
affections in which that work is wrapped. 298
Contemporary National Labor Relations Board interpretations
of the exemption shed ongoing light on the relationship between the
treatment of paid and unpaid domestic work. Board decisions have
295 DONNA L. VAN RAAPHORST, UNION MAIDS NOT WANTED: ORGANIZING DOMESTIC

WORKERS 1870-1940, at 155-185 (1988).
296 Thle AFL-CIO recently recommended that domestic workers be covered under the
NLRA. AFL-CIO, Employers Spar Over Reform of Labor Laws Before Dunlop Commission,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 173, at C-1 (Sept. 9, 1994).
297 State v. Cooper, 285 N.W. 903, 905 (Minn. 1939) (quoting Andersen v. Ucland, 267 N.W.
517, 518 (Minn. 1936)).
298 See supra section IV.A.2.
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distinguished between workers who perform domestic work for corporations, such as maid service agencies, condominium complexes, or
hotels, on the one hand, and workers who are "in the domestic service
of any family or person at his home," on the other.2 99 Employers who
hire a large number of domestic workers to maintain a hotel or condominium complex are not within the exemption and thus receive protection under the NLRA. The exemption, then, is not tied to the kind
of work itself, but instead to the combination of the work and the
relationship between the employer and employee. A one-on-one relationship, the one that most closely resembles a familial relationship,
falls outside the scope of labor law, while the less personal relationship falls within labor law. I argue that for the unpaid houseworker,
the relationship to her family obscures her work as work, and courts
turn to that relationship explicitly in rejecting notions of a labor exchange within the family. Again, affections and markets become mutually exclusive within the law; the home looks different than many
other job sites because of the relationships it contains. Thus it cannot
be the site of any market transactions. Notions of privacy within the
family are extended to an individual paid domestic worker when the
work she performs and her work conditions most clearly resemble
300
that of an unpaid worker.
2. OSHA.-The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)
is broadly defined and interpreted to touch all activity within the
Commerce Clause by anyone who meets the definition of
scope of the' 301
"employer."
An employer is any person engaged in a business affecting commerce who has an employee, even if the "business" is noncommercial.30 2 Unlike the NLRA, there is no regulation providing a
downward size limit below which the Act will not be enforced; even
an employer who employs one person must comply with OSHA
30 3
regulations.
The OSHA regulations explicating general coverage under the
Act have two interesting provisions touching on housework. The first
exempts farm employers from coverage when the employee is a mem299 Ankh Services, Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 478, 480 (1979).

300 Obviously, other explanations for the distinction between domestic workers in the home
and in a hotel can be proffered. But, it must be remembered that there is not a statutory exemption for any number of other kinds of employees who work alone for an employer, or work in an
individual's home. While the Board may have set out jurisdictional boundaries in administrative
regulations based on prudential concerns that would exclude both domestic workers and other

small workplaces, the grounds for exempting domestic workers, because they are statutory, are
prior to those prudential ones.
301 See supra note 290.
302 Id.

303 29 C.F.R. § 1975.4(a) (1995) (the Act covers employers with one or more employees);
Poughkeepsie Yacht Club, 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1725, 1726 (1979).
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ber of the immediate family of the employer; thus, commercial work
done by families is beyond the reach of OSHA. Here the existence of
the familial relationship leaves unprotected what is without question
30 4
labor conducted in a workplace under any other circumstances.
The second regulation exempts from the definition of employer,
"'as a matter of policy, individuals who, in their own residences, privately employ persons for the purpose of performing... what are
commonly regarded as ordinary domestic household tasks, such as
house cleaning, cooking, and caring for children. '305 Where the familial relationship prevented the existence of an employer-employee relationship in the farmwork context, the employer-employee
relationship does not exist here because of the tasks performed rather
than because of the nature of the relationship. The defining characteristic of the tasks exempted is that unpaid family members are the
usual workers in these areas and paid laborers are the exception. It is
not enough to say that the enforcement of the Act would be too difficult because of the job site; OSHA regulates the working conditions
of other people who enter private homes on a regular basis. 306 If an
individual hires another individual to paint her house or to build an
addition onto it, assuming that the employer has some control over
the job,307 she is subject to OSHA regulations even inher home.
It is hard to imagine that the average home qualifies as a safe
place to work for either the hired housekeeper or the unpaid one.
Housekeepers are exposed to cleaning chemicals, improperly ventilated work spaces, dangerous objects such as knives, appliances like
gas stoves, and other conditions that would not survive in another
workplace without prescribed precautions. 30 8 It seems plausible that
304 29 C.F.R. § 1975.4(b) (1995).
305 29 C.F.R. § 1975.6 (1995). Here is a perfect example of the family ideology that gives a
new meaning to the term "private." What is meant by "privately" employed here? The Act
applies primarily to private employers and the majority of workers covered by the Act are "privately" employed. Here, private must have a different meaning. It could mean "individually"; I
believe that it does not because the Act covers one person employing one other if the activity
affects commerce. The more plausible meaning is that the individual is performing work that
replaces the tasks of a household member.
306 See Telephone Interview with Boston OSHA Administrator (July 1994) (on file with
author).
307 This is subject to the labor law definition of employee, requiring a measure of employer
control over the work such that the employee is not an independent contractor. These OSHA
regulations are generally not enforced in the house painter context, but they do apply. See id. In
the housecleaner context, the regulations do not apply. The dividing line is whether the employee is performing "common household tasks," which are exempted from OSHA regulation
altogether.
308 The unpaid family member who performs housework may also be subject to physical violence in her work environment. I doubt that most people would see this as an occupational
hazard, but it is commonplace among battered women to be concerned that inadequate performance of housework will trigger a violent reaction. In this sense, fear of violence is a working
condition. Hadfield, supra note 13, at 98.
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the tendency in all areas of the law to view housework as something
other than work spills over to those cases in which housework is performed on a cash transaction basis.
3. Workers' Compensation.-Workers' compensation exceptions track the OSHA story. Though state statutes vary, most explicitly exempt the domestic laborer, while not exempting all laborers
who work in individual homes.
Only New Hampshire applies its workers' compensation statute
to all domestic workers. 30 9 Twenty-three other states cover domestic
workers under some circumstances, but those circumstances may be
so narrowly defined as to effectively exclude most common cases. 310
The remaining twenty-six states explicitly exempt all employers of domestic workers within private homes from mandatory participation in
workers' compensation programs. 311 Left to interpret these statutes,
courts have decided that work performed in a private household that
does not resemble traditional housework (for example, the cutting of
trees off of private property) falls outside of the statutory exemption-workers who do not do housework are covered. 312 Like the
failure to provide OSHA coverage, the failure to provide workers'
compensation coverage surely cannot be justified by the magnitude of
the risks in a private home. Nor would one expect that domestic
workers, who are typically extremely marginalized members of the
paid labor force, 313 are in a better position to carry a suit through the

ordinary tort processes than all other workers.
4. Administrative Concerns.-It may be argued that administrative concerns caution against requiring labor law protection for domestic workers. If the number of persons a given employer employs is
to be a limiting factor on labor law protection, it can be (and sometimes is) articulated directly. Numerical difficulties do not justify distinguishing the domestic worker from any other worker who is a solo
employee. Individuals might be expected to do what very small businesses often do: contract payroll concerns, including compliance with
labor laws, out to an agency. Housecleaning companies currently per309 4 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION app. A-5-1 to -2 (1995).
310 Id. For example, in Kentucky and Washington, domestic workers are covered if two or
more domestic workers are employed in the same home 40 or more hours a week, even though
those states have no numerical exemptions for general employment. Id.
311 Id. Figures are for 1994. Twenty-three states permit employers to participate in workers'
compensation on a voluntary basis. Id.
312 E.g., Brown v. Lineberger, 496 So. 2d 966 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Nelson v. Bradshaw,
791 P.2d 485 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that private nurse was not a domestic servant and
thus outside statutory exemption). See generally 1C ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORK-

MEN'S COMPENSATION § 50.30 (1995) (even employment within a private household may not be
considered domestic service by courts, depending on the specific tasks).
313 RoLLINs, supra note 285; ROMERO, supra note 285.
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form this function for those consumers who choose to use them rather
than hire domestic workers directly.
5. The Paid Domestic Worker and the Status of Housework.The paid domestic worker is the victim of association with the unpaid
domestic worker. The paid worker is denied the benefits of labor law,
in some cases explicitly because the home is the site of affections or
because housework, unlike other work in the home, raises unique but
unspecified public policy concerns. Like the unpaid worker, the paid
domestic worker's job is considered to be different from all other
work, whether performed in a house as a sole employee or part-time.
The unpaid houseworker also suffers from the low status of the
paid domestic worker. In the few areas in which courts and commentators are willing to talk about the monetary value of housework, that
value is calculated based on the market wage for a paid domestic
worker. In loss of consortium cases, wrongful death cases, 314 and
sometimes in commentary concerning divorce, the value of unpaid
housework rises and falls with the value of paid housework. If the
value of paid housework is itself deflated by labor laws or by competition with tax-subsidized unpaid houseworkers, no fair market value
for housework can be found. Thus the laws governing both paid and
unpaid domestic work are relevant to either the paid or the unpaid
houseworker.
V.

A.

CONCLUSION

Administrative Concerns

Many people may object that valuation of housework is administratively impossible or extremely invasive. This objection correctly
recognizes the cost of assigning monetary values when they are not
transparent. This Article argues that there is also a cost to not assigning monetary values to housework. The latter cost is borne by
those who perform housework, primarily women. We can make
guesses about the administrative costs of placing value on housework,
and those costs are relevant. But we cannot decide whether to value
housework without understanding the costs that this Article illustrates-the costs of declining to value housework. Increasing the frequency with which we place monetary value on housework would
force an increased appreciation of its value both by those who do it
and by other household members.
Many measures of the value of housework have in fact been proposed by family law scholars, economists, tax scholars, courts in loss of
314 It is worthwhile to note that in these two areas in which the law does place a value on
housework, it is not the houseworker who collects the damages, but her family.
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consortium cases, and others. 315 We could ask which work could have
been purchased on the market instead of being produced at home.
We could look at the prices of similar services available on the market
to estimate the value of housework.3 16 This can be done using the
price of a generalist, such as a housekeeper. This method relies on the
assumption that all housework tasks could be performed by one unskilled laborer, which is a weakness of the method. It could also be
done by adding the costs of skilled laborers-cooks, nurses, and gardeners, for example. This method assumes that productivity in the
home is the same as on the market, a point for which there is no avail317
able evidence.
Opportunity costs are another possible measure, assuming that a
person will only self-provide services as long as those services are
worth more than the amount she could be making in the paid labor
force. This method assumes that work in the paid labor market
matching a person's skills is always available. It also leads to the result of valuing labor in the home that produces one good the 318
same as
labor in the market that produces an entirely different good.
An hourly wage could be assumed for most workers in a household, or a per-child calculation made. An average estimate based on
the number of children and the size of the home could be used, in a
manner similar to the standard deductions on tax forms, with offsets
for services that are purchased on the market, such as restaurant
meals, dry cleaning, housecleaning, and paid child care services. Or,
as with the taxing of employee benefits for which there is not a ready
market, we could force individuals to estimate from the closest available comparison. Any serious effort to value housework within the
law would require further attention from economists to developing
workable valuation tools. 3 19 The United Nations, in its sixth annual
Human Development Report, advocates the development of valuation tools for unpaid labor and the inclusion of that labor in gross
320
national product calculations.
The difficulties associated with estimating the value of housework
may simply result from lack of practice; in the face of a requirement of

315 For an extensive discussion of evaluation methods, see QUAH, supra note 20, at 32-74.
316 As I have argued, these prices are themselves deflated by law. Nonetheless, they may be a
starting point for valuing housework. Undertaking to value housework could lead to an eventual
increase in wages for domestic workers. See supra section IV.G.5.
317 Chadeau, supra note 18, at 93.
318 Id.
319 See, e.g., QUAH, supra note 20, at 32-74; Landes, supra note 244, at 50.
320 U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 3, at 87-98.
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valuation, we would probably get better at it.321 Unwillingness by
courts to value housework perpetuates the difficulty of doing so.322
B.

The Law of Housework

The law uses the framework of emotions to deny financial security to houseworkers. The message is that the activities of the home
are primarily affectionate and private; recognizing the productive nature of home labor would force us to commodify emotions. Faced
with this prospect, legal actors opt instead to leave the multi-faceted
home labor role in the same legal sphere as familial affections
themselves.
By failing to enforce contracts between spouses providing wages
for housework, the law explicitly prohibits attempts to obtain security
for labor on the grounds that bargains in families are inappropriate to
the affections of family life. When love motivates work at home,
nothing but love should be its reward.32
By providing no opportunity for houseworkers to make contributions to the social security system on their own behalf and to combine
those contributions with contributions from wage labor, the law denies the houseworker the opportunity to gain a stake in the nation's
old-age financial safety net. In social security law, financial security
for houseworkers is ensured only through the maintenance of intimate
relationships, not through a history of work in the home. By tying
full-time houseworkers' social security payments to the length of a
marriage, the emotions themselves become the measure of dessert
within the system.
At the time of divorce, wages are discussed as a part of the contribution to family wealth in dollar amounts, while housework is discussed in any number of ways, but almost never in terms of concrete
dollar contributions. Housework can warrant property awards because a houseworker is financially needy, but it is less common for
courts to make financial awards because a houseworker is considered
to have contributed as much to the material wealth of a family as a
321 See In re Marriage of Francis, 442 N.W.2d 59, 65-66 (Iowa 1989) (allowing expert testimony as to value of housework services in divorce action). I do not mean to underestimate the
task of estimating values when there is no competitive market, as in the bilateral monopoly of
marriage.
322 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Patus, 372 N.E.2d 493, 496 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978) (calling earnings "reliable indices" of contribution, while refusing to hear "volumes of self-serving testimony"
regarding "who washed dishes, who took out the trash, who painted the house, who changed the
oil in the car, who changed the diapers, who paid the bills, and who mowed the lawn ... ").
323 A different standard applies to wage labor, which is often performed to bring wages to a
family and thus is motivated by love. The process of valuing the wage-earners' work through the
money paid does not obscure the spirit in which the work can be done-for the family's wellbeing.
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wage-earner. 324 If a person contributes both wages and housework,
only one of those contributions can be weighed at divorce. Because
need and not dessert sets the stage for alimony awards at divorce, any
surplus wage, beyond the needs of a houseworker spouse, is retained
by the wage-earner at the time of divorce, while the houseworker
spouse is left without skills that translate into liquidity. When the affections of a marriage have died, the houseworker's stake in the
wealth generated by her labor is also lost, including marketable
human capital.
Mothers of very young children who receive AFDC are castigated in the welfare reform debate for lacking a desire to work, as
though caring for children were not work. Disapproval of these
mothers stems from their "chosen" marital status, but is expressed as
disapproval of their "chosen" work status. Women who are married
and performing identical work receive concrete approval within the
welfare debate because the work is performed within a relationship
and thus wrapped in the appropriate emotions.
The productive nature of housework is implicitly rejected in the
failure to tax it as income. By treating the family, rather than the
individuals within it, as the taxable unit, we assume a sharing of
wealth that is not compelled by law. In tax, divorce, and contract law,
we allow one spouse to earn cash and keep it away from the other
spouse, but houseworkers have only a limited similar ability to withhold the benefits of their labor from a spouse. The sharing presumed
by tax law and upon which benefits can be delivered to a wage-earning tax-payer must result from the emotional bond within a marriage
because legal compulsion to share does not exist.
In tort law, the damage item called "loss of consortium" used to
consist of compensation for the economic value of lost services. When
a husband's ownership of his wife's services was limited by statute
during the second half of the nineteenth century, courts transformed
the meaning of "consortium" so that it now primarily encompasses
marital affections. The legal understanding of the activities of the
home changed from production to emotional exchange, without a corresponding change in the material reality of those activities.
Paid domestic workers, a field populated by immigrant women
and women of color, do not receive the protection of basic labor laws
in part because they work where expression takes the form of affec324 When a houseworker is given an equal share at divorce, it is not because of the economic
contribution she makes, but because of a recent rhetorical commitment to the notion that marriage is an equal partnership in which inputs include love and affection and housework, undiffer-

entiated and on an equal footing with money. This is not to say that equal division of property
or future income is the norm in divorce cases, but that many modem courts are more inclined in
that direction than their predecessors. The grounds for the newer vision, however, is not consistently or clearly an understanding of the unpaid labor contributions. See supra subpart IV.E.
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tions rather than of market dealings. Moreover, the wage of a paid
domestic worker is driven down by competition with a tax-subsidized
unpaid houseworker-the competition, the unpaid houseworker, can
do the work for less because there are no taxes. 325
All other attempts to monetize housework depend on the paid
domestic worker's substitution cost. For example, in loss of consortium and wrongful death cases, courts will often accept direct testimony on the costs of hiring a housekeeper, nurse, or child care
worker. If those workers' wages are already deflated by tax subsidies
to their competition, the low monetary value of housework will be
perpetuated throughout the law. At divorce, housework is often understood to have lower economic value than the wage contribution of
paid workers, particularly when the paid worker is middle class or
richer. The courts' understanding of the value of housework, however, is influenced by a market for paid domestic labor that is itself a
product of law.
In all of these ways, the affectionate characterizations of housework are used to justify treatment of the houseworker that leaves her
without financial security. Given these consequences of a conception
of housework as exclusively an expression of affection, houseworkers
would benefit from a fuller conception of housework, one that shows
its significant similarities to wage labor.
Reconsider the case discussed in the Introduction of this Article.
It should not be surprising that the Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected Suzanne Bachmann's claim that housework and child care
could be employment for work-release purposes. 32 6 There is no discussion in the opinion of a purpose of the work-release statute that
32 7
would be undermined by recognizing housework as employment.
Instead, the court referred directly to the following other areas of law
to support its contention that housework is not employment: that
homemakers are not covered under workers' compensation; that the
promise of payment from her spouse is illusory since she already had a
duty to perform the work; and that because the home is not the site of
industry, a paid domestic worker is not an employee for labor law
purposes. The work-release statute did not speak to the status of
houseworkers one way or the other, but the court found ample support in the law for its understanding that housework is so different
from paid work that it cannot be covered by the same statute. This
325 In other words, it is cheaper to marry your housekeeper than to pay her. Cf. A. C. PIGou,
THE ECONOMICS OF WEL.F
326 See supra Part I.

32-33 (4th ed. 1948).

327 See State v. Bachmann, 521 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994). These reasons may existfor example, lack of supervision. But that reason should be offered and evaluated on its own
merits. The court avoided any discussion of statutory purpose by defining housework as different than employment.
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interpretation undoubtedly flies in the face of Suzanne Bachmann's
understanding of her position: one suspects that from her first day in
jail, the family took on new expenses either from her husband's lost
wages or in the form of child care expenses. Bachmann certainly
would understand that the money lost was a result of work that she
could no longer do.
C.

The Relationship Between Image and Material Well-Being

Throughout this Article, I have illustrated a conception of housework that is held by judges and legislators. That conception is that
housework is similar to the affections of family relationships, which
removes housework from comparison to wage work. But one might
simply respond by asking, what difference does it make how we conceive of housework? The home can be the site of unique emotions.
Why does it matter that it is conceived of differently than the market?
What matters is what flows from the different conceptions. The
notion that housework is an expression of affection is used to deny the
houseworker financial security. By describing housework as a matter
of affections to the exclusion of any other characteristics of the work,
legal actors deny similarities between housework and wage work.
Wage work leads to financial rewards-this well-established concept is
supported by law. Drawing the connections between wage work and
housework is one way to try to improve the rewards that come from
housework.
Some will see a nightmare of market language and conceptions
applied to intimate relations. A larger project might undertake to examine wage work for its unappreciated similarity to family life, for the
nonmonetary rewards it offers, and for the significance of relationships in the market. This Article argues that the line between wage
work and housework is drawn too starkly, and that consequences then
flow from that distinction. By characterizing housework as entirely
different from wage work because housework occurs within families,
legal actors build a rationale for denying houseworkers legally supported material benefits.
Where the characterizations of housework as affectionate are
used to justify treatment that leaves women economically insecure, we
must challenge that result. There are a number of ways to approach
this problem. One is to say that we should detach all of the significance we give to economic value in the wage labor context from wage
labor; this is not the approach I take here. Another is to point out
that the market and the family are not as dichotomous as these conceptions would suggest. Perhaps this is because the market itself involves more emotional value than is suggested by our current
conceptions: many people love their jobs, and many people perform
their jobs because they are providing for loved ones. Regardless,
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neither of these facts undermines the value of the jobs. But just as it
may be important to see the emotional aspects of wage labor, it is
equally important to see the economic value of housework. A view of
housework as implicating familial relations should not conflict with an
understanding of the economic value of the work, but in the eyes of
the law, it does. As long as we give significant legal consequence to
work that produces economic value, we32need
to see that housework
s
fits our description of productive work.
D. Women's Work and the Feminist Agenda

In recent years, feminists have focused on women's domestic
work as a primary source of inequality in wealth, power, and satisfaction. Most of the legal reform proposals generated by this focus have
sought to decrease the impact of women's domestic role on women's
wage work, through valuable reforms such as parental leave, comparable worth, and the promotion of part-time benefits. These reform efforts implicitly assume that wage work is the road to gender equity for
women. Under current legal conditions, this is accurate: many of the
legal doctrines discussed in this Article should lead us to conclude that
housework is not the road to material benefits. This Article asks why
domestic work is the road to inequality, focusing on the legal consequences that attach to women's unpaid labor. I advocate taking the
legal treatment of what women already do-housework-as seriously
as we take legal barriers that prevent women from doing otherwise. 329
It is difficult to evaluate the desirability of performing wage work
versus housework in the context of laws that prevent housework from
yielding financial security. It is similarly difficult to evaluate in the
abstract the fact that women do more housework than men do, based
on ideas about anything inherent to the work itself. The gender disparity in hours spent on unpaid labor becomes problematic when
combined with the low legal status of the work. We can only be deliberately agnostic as to any inherent desirability of performing wage
work versus housework when forming judgments under the condition
of the extreme legal devaluation of housework. In the absence of any
reason to think that in a perfect world housework is preferable to
wage work or vice versa, reforms in both areas of the law are essential.
There is a danger here. It is possible to elevate the status of home
labor only enough to discourage some women from entering the wage
328 This Article does not address the interesting question of why legal actors view housework
as a matter of emotions. Lag theory, institutional competence at gathering information, or sexism are possible explanations, but I do not attempt to test or verify any of those ideas here.
329 This comment should not be read in any sense as disparaging advocacy of legal reforms
that focus on taking down barriers to wage work. In the absence of any reason to prefer housework to wage work, it is very important to bring down barriers to wage work at the same time
that we elevate the legal status of housework.
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labor market, without changing the supremacy of the wage labor market in terms of wealth and power. This risk causes many330feminists to
This Artibe skeptical of legislation friendly toward homemakers.
of
home
labor
of
the
treatment
cle asks for a systematic improvement
precisely to avoid this pitfall.
Legal actors should add to their conception of housework the notion that it is unpaid value-producing labor. Each time a legal actor
approaches a problem involving unpaid housework, she should not
see it in a vacuum. To view the decision that a court makes about
work-release, for example, as an individualized determination about
housework's role within work-release policy, seriously underestimates
the power of an individual legal issue to reinforce norms within the
law. When we recognize that the treatment of housework as something different than work that is pervasive in the law, rather than episodic, legal actors will have a better perspective on the consequences
of doctrinal decisions that may perpetuate the vulnerable economic
status of those who work without wages.

330 See supra subpart IV.F (discussing the Christian Coalition's advocacy of IRA accounts for
homemakers).

